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MISREPRESENTATION IN PROCUREMENT OF
INSURANCE: THE ARKANSAS LAW
D.F.Adams*

The enactment of the Arkansas Insurance Code of 1959' has
worked substantial changes in the law concerning the effect of false
representations made by an applicant for insurance in order to induce an insurer to issue a policy. Some of these changes are not
readily apparent in the wording of the statute, and the effect of the
legislation remains unsettled in a number of respects. It is the purpose of this paper to review the history of Arkansas' law governing
misrepresentation in procurement of insurance, then to attempt an
assessment of the impact of the 1959 statute.
The subject cannot be treated meaningfully without some investigation of the law relating to insurance warranties, but treatment
of warranties will be restricted to those based on representations
made to an insurer as inducements to contract.2
* Professor of Law and Acting Dean, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of
Law. B.A., Dickinson College, 1947; LL.B., 1949, J.D., 1968, Dickinson School of Law.
1. 1959 Ark. Acts 148, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-2001 to -4920 (1980) [hereafter cited as
Insurance Code].
2. Arkansas cases have recognized that warranties may be affirmative or promissory,
the difference being that an affirmative warranty relates to facts existing before or at the
inception of the insurance, while a promissory warranty relates to events which may occur
after the insurance has taken effect. Mechanics Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 57 Ark. 279, 21 S.W.
468 (1893), illustrates a promissory warranty. An applicant for fire insurance on a gin house
answered "yes" to a question in the application for insurance: "Will you warrant not to
work at night, or by artificial light, and to permit no smoking about the premises?" The
agreements in the application were incorporated into the policy subsequently issued. Referring to this agreement, and another in the application, the court said: "They thereby became
what are denominated promissory warranties, and their performance was made a condition
upon which the insurance company should become liable for losses by fire without which
the assured was not entitled to recover." 57 Ark. at 283, 21 S.W. at 469. Since promissory
warranties do not relate to misrepresentations of past or present fact (except in the sense that
the warrantor may impliedly represent that he presently intends to keep his promise, a type
of misrepresentation of present fact of which no point has been made in the Arkansas insurance warranty cases), warranties of this type are outside the scope of this paper.
An affirmative warranty is illustrated, and distinguished from a promissory warranty, in
Western Assurance Co. v. Altheimer, 58 Ark. 565, 25 S.W. 1067 (1894). Policies of fire
insurance on a merchant's stock of goods contained an "iron-safe" clause, providing in part:
"The assured, under this policy, hereby covenants to keep a set of books showing a complete
record of business transacted, . . . together with the last inventory of said business. . . and
in case of loss the assured agrees and covenants to produce such books and inventory, and,
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I. PRE-1959 LAW
Although an occasional statute affected Arkansas' law of misrepresentation in procurement of insurance in the years prior to the
adoption of the Insurance Code, the bulk of the law was decisional.
The first reported case dealing with the subject was not decided until
1889,1 but there was abundant authority to be drawn upon in the
decisions of courts elsewhere in the United States, and a body of
Arkansas law of considerable subtlety quickly developed.
In common with other American courts, 4 the Arkansas
Supreme Court, in its pronouncements of doctrine, drew a sharp
distinction between statements 5 made by an insurance applicant
which were "warranted" to be true and "representations" 6 (often
in the event of a failure to produce the same, this policy shall be deemed null and void
...
" The policies further provided: "This policy shall be void, and of no effect, if the
interest of the assured be other than the entire, unconditional and sole ownership." The
court commented: "The stipulation of the 'iron-safe' clause constituted an express promissory warranty, and of the clause as to ownership, an affirmative warranty; they were in the
nature of conditions precedent to recovery, and a strict compliance with their terms was
necessary, according to the intent and understanding of the parties." 58 Ark. at 575, 25 S.W.
at 1069. (One might quarrel with the characterization of the ownership clause as an affirmative warranty, in that it could be read as referring to ownership of merchandise not only at
the time of issuance of the policy but also during the term of the policy. To the extent that it
was prospective in operation, it would be more properly termed a promissory warranty.
However, insofar as it related to ownership of the stock of goods on hand at the inception of
the insurance, it was certainly affirmative.)
Affirmative warranties may or may not be based on representations actually made by
the applicant for insurance. The ownership clause in the Altheimer case, though it created
an affirmative warranty, does not appear from the report of the case to have been based on
any actual assertion by the insured that he was the sole and unconditional owner of the
property to be insured. The type of affirmative warranty with which this paper is concerned
is illustrated by Southern Ins. Co. v. White, 58 Ark. 277, 24 S.W. 425 (1893), where, in his
application for fire insurance on a gin, the insured answered "no" to the question: "Is any
other party interested in the property?" The application was incorporated into the policy,
and the policy provided: "This entire policy shall be void if... the interest of the insured
in the property be not truly stated herein."
3. Insurance Co. v. Brodie, 52 Ark. 11, 11 S.W. 1016 (1889).
4. See generally E. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW, chs. 7, 9 (2d ed.
1957); W. VANCE, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF INSURANCE, ch. 7, pts. 3, 4 (3d ed. 1951); R.
KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW §§ 5.6 to .7 (1971).
5. The statements and representations referred to in this paper are usually express.
Implied representations, other than those which may be implied by express statements, are a
rarity in the insurance cases. However, see Anderson v. Frank Reid Burial Ass'n, 218 Ark.
817, 239 S.W.2d 12 (1951), where an application for reinstatement as a member of an association providing burial benefits was treated as implying a representation of good health
which, if fraudulent, would avoid the policy.
6. Providence Life Assurance Soc'y v. Reutlinger, 58 Ark. 528, 25 S.W. 835 (1894), is
the leading case.
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categorized, to sharpen the distinction, as "mere representation".) 7
Misrepresentations warranted to be true were said to differ notably
in legal effect from misrepresentations not so warranted. The distinction was described in a leading case in these words:
As a general rule, a warranty is a stipulation expressly set out,
or by inference incorporated, in the policy, whereby the assured
agrees "that certain facts relating to the risk are or shall be true,
or certain acts relating to the same subject have been or shall be
done." Its purpose is to define the limits of the obligation assumed by the insurer, and it is a condition which must be strictly
complied with, or literally fulfilled, before the right to recover on
the policy can accrue. It is not necessary that the fact or act warranted should be material to the risk; for the parties by their
agreement have made it so ...
On the other hand, representations are no part of the contract of insurance, but are collateral or preliminary to it. When
made to the insurer at or before the contract is entered into, they
form a basis upon which the risks proposed to be assumed can be
estimated. They operate as the inducement to the contract. Unlike a false warranty, they will not invalidate the contract, because they are untrue, unless they are material to the risks, and
need only be substantially true. They render the policy void on
the ground offraud, "while a non-compliance with a warranty
operates as an express breach of the contract."8
If, then, an applicant for insurance 9 made representations to the
7. Eg., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Maxwell, 152 Ark. 64, 70, 237 S.W. 708,
710 (1922); Lincoln Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 134 Ark. 245, 248, 203 S.W. 698, 699
(1918); Title Guar. & Sur. Co. v. Bank of Fulton, 89 Ark. 471, 479, 117 S.W. 537, 540 (1909).
8. Providence Life Assurance Soc'y v. Reutlinger, 58 Ark. 528, 532-33, 25 S.W. 835,
836 (1894) (emphasis in the original).

9. Misrepresentation by one other than the applicant for insurance occasionally can
give the insurer a defense. For example, Wilbon v. Washington Fidelity Nat'l Ins. Co., 181
Ark. 1127, 29 S.W.2d 680 (1930), application was made for insurance on the life of a ten year
old boy. The application was signed by the boy's father on behalf of the boy as applicant;
the father also signed in his own behalf, consenting to the making of the application and
certifying the answers given in the application to be true. The father was the beneficiary of
the policy. In an action to enforce the policy, the trial court instructed the jury that if they

found that a false answer had been given in the application to the effect that the boy had
never had heart trouble, and that the falsity was known either to the assured or to the beneficiary, and that the truth was not disclosed to the insurer before the policy was issued, they
should find for the defendant. Judgment on a verdict for the defendant insurer was reversed
and the case remanded for new trial for error in instructions. The child of tender years
could not be guilty of fraud, and the instruction permitted the jury to find for the defendant
on that basis. If, however, the father was guilty of fraud, that would provide a defense for
the insurer, since the father was required to consent to the application and certify the truth
of the answers.
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insurer to induce issuance of the policy, and those representations
were, by the terms of the policy, warranted to be true, the insurer
could establish immunity from liability on the policy simply by
showing that the representations were not true. That the deviation
from the truth was slight,' ° or that the falsity of the representation
did the insurer no demonstrable harm," was of no moment. This
followed from the concept that the warranty was a term of the contract of insurance, operating as a condition precedent to the insurer's
duty of performance, and the contract would be enforced according
to its terms or not at all.' 2 A "mere representation", by contrast, if it
was false, would provide
the insurer with a defense' 3 only if it was
"substantially" untrue' 4 and "material";' 5 it was grounds for avoid10. See Capital Fire Ins. Co. v. King, 82 Ark. 400, 402, 102 S.W. 194, 195 (1907) (statements in application for fire policy warranted true; court quotes from Providence Life Assurance Soc'y v. Reutlinger, 58 Ark. 528, 25 S.W. 835 (1894), that warranty "is a condition
which must be strictly complied with, or literally fulfilled, before the right to recover on the
policy can accrue."); Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Ward, 65 Ark. 295, 298, 45 S.W.
1065, 1066 (1898) (though discussing primarily question of materiality, court indicated that
literal effect was to be given to warranty term in accident policy that policy should be void if
statements made in application were "untrue in any respect"); Western Assurance Co. v.
Altheimer, 58 Ark. 565, 575, 25 S.W. 1067, 1069 (1894) ("iron-safe" and "ownership" clauses
in fire policy; court disapproved instruction that recovery could be had on policy if insureds
had "substantially complied with the terms of the policy"; "exact or literal compliance"
required).
11. See Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Farmer, 65 Ark. 581, 47 S.W. 850 (1898)
(dictum that where answers in application for life insurance were warranted true, court cannot inquire into materiality of questions and answers); Capital Fire Ins. Co. v. King, 82 Ark.
400, 102 S.W. 194 (1907) (warranted statement in fire policy that house to be insured had
cost $2000, when actual cost was $1700; though policy limit was $1200, policy held void for
breach of warranty; dissenting opinion arguing that policy should be construed as limiting
avoidance to material misstatements); Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Ward, 65 Ark.
295, 45 S.W. 1065 (1898) (materiality not to be inquired into).
12. Capital Fire Ins. Co. v. King, 82 Ark. 400, 102 S.W. 194 (1907); Franklin Life Ins.
Co. v. American Nat'l Bank, 74 Ark. 1, 84 S.W. 789 (1905); Standard Life & Accident Ins.
Co. v. Ward, 65 Ark. 295, 45 S.W. 1065 (1898).
13. An insurer believing that it has been relieved of responsibility on a policy by reason
of misrepresentation or breach of warranty might be found asserting that contention either
as defendant in an action, usually an action to recover on the policy, e.g., American Nat'l
Ins. Co. v. Laird, 228 Ark. 812, 311 S.W.2d 313 (1958), or as plaintiff, e.g., American Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Edenfield, 228 Ark. 93, 306 S.W.2d 321 (1957) (suit in chancery for cancellation of policies); Walker v. Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n, 140 Ark. 192, 215 S.W. 598
(1919) (action to recover payments made on policy claim). The legal principles governing
the question of the insurer's liability do not differ significantly depending on whether the
insurer is plaintiff or defendant. In this paper when reference is made to an insurer having a
defense, the usage is a short-form way of saying that the insurer is not liable on the policy.
14. National Annuity Ass'n v. Carter, 96 Ark. 495, 499, 132 S.W. 633, 634-35 (1910)
(quoting from Providence Life Assurance Soc'y v. Reutlinger, 58 Ark. 528, 25 S.W. 835
(1894)).
15. Inter-Ocean Cas. Co. v. Huddleston, 184 Ark. 1129, 45 S.W.2d 24 (1932); American
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ance of the contract because of deception in the inducement16to contract, not because it entered into the terms of the contract.
A further distinction between such warranties and representations soon developed: misrepresentation would not make a policy
voidable unless the representation was made with knowledge of its
falsity (or, possibly, without belief in its truth) and with intent to
deceive the insurer,' 7 while if a represented fact was warranted true,
Life & Accident Ass'n v. Walton, 133 Ark. 348, 202 S.W. 20 (1918); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Owen, 111 Ark. 554, 164 S.W. 720 (1914).
16. Old Colony Life Ins. Co. v. Julian, 175 Ark. 359, 365, 299 S.W. 366, 368 (1927);
Southern Sur. Co. v. Barham, 133 Ark. 220, 222, 202 S.W. 231, 232 (1918); Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 105 Ark. 101, 105, 150 S.W. 393, 395 (1912); National Annuity Ass'n v.
Carter, 96 Ark. 495, 499, 132 S.W. 633, 634 (1910); Capital Fire Ins. Co. v. King, 82 Ark.
400, 402, 102 S.W. 194, 195 (1907).

While nonfraudulent misrepresentation, in the absence of breach of warranty, did not
make a contract of insurance voidable under the Arkansas law prior to the enactment of the
1959 Insurance Code, it was held in Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Wilmans, 214 F. Supp. 53
(E.D. Ark. 1963) that such misrepresentation could justify rescission of the contract in equity
on grounds of mutual mistake. No Arkansas Supreme Court decision has been found applying this theory in insurance situations involving misrepresentation.
17. Universal Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Stuart, 219 Ark. 863, 245 S.W.2d 219 (1952)
("an insurance company is liable unless there were fraudulent misrepresentations made by
the applicant to the company that induced the issuance of the policy"); National Life &
Accident Ins. Co. v. Threlkeld, 189 Ark. 165, 70 S.W.2d 851 (1934) ("a misrepresentation
will not avoid a policy unless wilfully or knowingly made with intent to deceive"); Missouri
State Life Ins. Co. v. Witt, 161 Ark. 148, 256 S.W. 46 (1923) (approving instruction that the
insurer had the burden of showing that false, material representations which induced the
issuance of the policy were made to it by the insured knowingly, willfully and with intent to
defraud the company, the reference to "intent to defraud" being treated as meaning "intent
to deceive"); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Owen, Ill Ark. 554, 164 S.W. 720 (1914) (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 105 Ark. 101, 150 S.W. 393 (1912), for the proposition that
"where answers in an application for life insurance constitute merely representations, a misrepresentation or omission to answer will not avoid the policy unless willfully or knowingly
made with intent to deceive"); German-American Ins. Co. v. Brown, 75 Ark. 251, 87 S.W.
135 (1905) (approving instruction that if the insured "knowingly made to the agents of the
insurance companies a false and fraudulent statement of the value of the property to be
insured, in order to procure the insurance, then the plaintiff cannot recover. . . but a misstatement of such value made in good faith, believing the same to be true, would not avoid
the insurance").
The references to "willful" misrepresentations in some of these opinions are not clear in
meaning. It is commonly defined as meaning deliberate, with intent to produce the result.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1435 (5th ed. 1979). So used, the term adds nothing to the
requirements that a misrepresentation be made with knowledge of its falsity and with intent
to deceive the insurer. It is to be noted, however, that some of the cases speak of misrepresentations "knowingly or willfully made with intent to deceive." Eg., Thre/keld, 189 Ark. at
168, 70 S.W.2d at 853. That usage may indicate that a misrepresentation could be grounds
for avoidance, even though the person making it did not know it to be untrue, if he did not
actually believe it to be true and made it to induce the insurer to contract.
It has been suggested that it may not be accurate to say that Arkansas cases required
that misrepresentations be made knowingly or willfully with intent to deceive, in order to
avoid the policy, because some of the Arkansas cases making such an assertion involved
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proof of its falsity would establish a defense for the insurer despite
the applicant's good faith in making it. 8
These "black-letter" rules remained in force, for the most
part,' 9 until the enactment of the Insurance Code in 1959.20 Staterepresentations of opinion or belief, not statements of fact. Whiteside & Hoggard, Recent
Developments in InsuranceLaw, 3 ARK. L. REV. 55, 57 (1948) (citing Magaw, Representations
in the Law of Life Insurance, II, 12 TEMP. L.Q. 55 (1937)). A representation of opinion or

belief would presumably not be a misrepresentation unless the person making it did not
genuinely hold the opinion or belief professed. See Magaw, Representations in the Law of
L ife Insurance,1, 11 TEMP. L.Q. 463, 486-90 (1937). It is true that many of the cases insisting that misrepresentations be fraudulent to the grounds for avoidance involved representations that could readily be treated as merely statements of opinion or belief. See, e.g.,
Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Witt, 161 Ark. 148, 256 S.W. 46 (1923) (representation by
layman applying for life insurance that he was in "good health"); German American Ins.
Co. v. Brown, 75 Ark. 251, 87 S.W. 135 (1905) (assertion by applicant for fire insurance of
the value of the property to be insured). Nevertheless, the cases did not in terms distinguish
between representations of opinion or belief and representations of fact, and it is not possible to account for all the cases requiring fraudulent intent as involving statements of opinion
or belief. This is so, for example, of the cases involving false answers to questions regarding
prior consultations with or treatment by physicians. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Owen, 111 Ark.
554, 164 S.W. 720 (1914); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 105 Ark. 101, 150 S.W. 393
(1912).
18. Progressive Life Ins. Co. v. Preston, 194 Ark. 84, 105 S.W.2d 549 (1937); Unionaid
Life Ins. Co. v. Munford, 180 Ark. 1048, 24 S.W.2d 966 (1930); Mississippi Life Ins. Co. v.
Meadows, 161 Ark. 71, 255 S.W. 293 (1923); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 105 Ark.
101, 150 S.W. 393 (1912); National Annuity Ass'n v. McCall, 103 Ark. 201, 146 S.W. 125
(1912) (dictum).
19. A statute of 1899 did modify the law of warranties in the limited field of fire insurance on personal property, by providing that "proof of a substantial compliance with the
terms, conditions and warranties of such policy . . . shall be deemed sufficient" to show
satisfaction. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3237 (1980). Applying the "substantial compliance"
rule of this statute are, inter alia, Seaboard Ins. Co. v. Caver, 207 Ark. 1038, 183 S.W.2d 922
(1944); National Liberty Ins. Co. v. Spharler, 172 Ark. 715, 290 S.W. 594 (1927); Queen of
Arkansas Ins. Co. v. Malone, 111 Ark. 229, 163 S.W. 771 (1914); People's Fire Ins. Ass'n v.
Gorham, 79 Ark. 160, 95 S.W. 152 (1906).
20. In an article published in 1949 the authors appeared to take the position that Arkansas law did not treat breach of warranty as a defense unless the warranty was "substantially
false," and they asserted without qualification that, "Whether classified as a warranty or a
representation, it has long been settled in Arkansas that an insured's false statement to defeat his recovery must relate to a matter material to the risk .... " Whiteside & Hoggard,
Recent Developments in Insurance Law, 3 ARK. L. REV. 55, 56 (1949). If these observations
are treated as stating a conclusion concerning the effect of Arkansas cases there is much
truth in them, as the following text will show, but the Arkansas cases did not repudiate the
"black-letter" rules that any breach of warranty, no matter how slight, is a bar to enforcement of the policy, and that materiality is not to be inquired into. It is conceded that cases
can be found that appear to state the law as it is represented in the above-cited article, e.g.,
New Furniture & Undertaking Co. v. Tri-County Burial Club, 194 Ark. 1045, 109 S.W.2d
146 (1937) (breach of warranty regarding any fact material to the risk will avoid a policy);
National Liberty Ins. Co. v. Spharler, 172 Ark. 715, 290 S.W. 594 (1927) (substantial compliance with warranty sufficient even in the absence of statute), but in most of these cases the
statements were dicta or explainable in terms of the warranties involved; while they may
indicate impatience with the strictness of the "black-letter" rules, they fall short of rejecting
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ment of a rule is one thing; however, its application is quite another,
and in applying the rules as to the effect of misrepresentations made
to procure insurance the Arkansas Supreme Court often achieved
results differing from those the rules appeared to call for.
A.

Warranties
It is readily apparent that the law of warranty, as stated, is draconian. An insured could lose all protection under a policy for a
slightly inaccurate statement made in the negotiations leading to issuance of the policy, though the statement was made in perfect good
faith, and that despite the fact that the insurer was not misled by the
statement in any way prejudicial to it. The classic answer to the
argument that such a result would be unjust was that if the insured
did not wish the result, he should not have agreed to make it a term
of the policy that his statement was warranted to be true; the parties
control the terms of their contracts, and the courts simply enforce
the agreements as made by the parties. 2 ' However, the supreme
court early recognized the unreality of this argument. Aside from
the question whether the average policyholder could be expected to
understand warranty terms, his practical ability to bargain for their
deletion was slight; the insurers, in reality, determined the terms of
insurance contracts unilaterally.22 In consequence, the Arkansas
cases, though not repudiating the standard warranty doctrine,
sought and found numerous ways to soften its impact.
First, the decisions were insistent that any warranty be created
by the terms of thepolicy when a written contract of insurance was
made, as was usually the case. Thus, it was not enough to create a
warranty by having the applicant for insurance sign an application
form which stated that he warranted statements appearing on the
form to be true, no matter how clearly worded the provision might
be. The written policy subsequently issued had to contain the warranty, or at least incorporate the terms of the application by reference or attachment of a copy of the application.23 This requirement
the precedents announcing those rules. It is the thesis of this paper that the pre-Insurance
Code cases dealing with warranties sought to avoid the harsher effects of the traditional
rules by a variety of techniques, rather than make overt changes in the established doctrine,
an observation which is helpful in appraising the effect of the 1959 Insurance Code.
21. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Ward, 65 Ark. 295, 45 S.W. 1065 (1898). See
also Sun Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dudley, 65 Ark. 240, 45 S.W. 539 (1898) (promissory warranty).
22. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 186 Ark. 121, 52 S.W.2d 620 (1932); People's Fire
Ins. Ass'n v. Goyne, 79 Ark. 315, 96 S.W. 365 (1906).
23. Unionaid Life Ins. Co. v. Munford, 180 Ark. 1048, 24 S.W.2d 966 (1930); Modem
Woodmen of American v. Whitaker, 173 Ark. 921, 293 S.W. 1045 (1927); American Life &

24
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may have been based on the parol evidence rule, 24 but no consideration was given to the doctrine recognized elsewhere in contract law
that a condition precedent to the formation of the contract may be
shown by parol evidence. 2 The strict rule applied to insurance warranties probably served the practical purpose of lessening the possibility of surprise to a policyholder who recalled little of the terms of
the application he had signed.
Assuming that this initial hurdle in the way of a successful warranty defense was surmounted, the insurer might encounter the argument that the language of the policy or incorporated application
did not sufficiently show an intention to elevate representations
made by the applicant to the status of warranties. Ostensibly, this
presented a straightforward question of contract interpretation.
However, a rule consistently applied to insurance contracts was that
doubts as to meaning should be resolved against the insurer, 26 and
the pertinence of this rule was at times quite frankly stated to be to
avoid the harshness of the operation of warranties. 27 By broad application of this contraproferentem doctrine, it was often possible to
Accident Ass'n v. Walton, 133 Ark. 348, 202 S.W. 20 (1918); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Johnson, 105 Ark. 101, 150 S.W. 393 (1912). See also United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Maxwell, 152 Ark. 64, 237 S.W. 708 (1922) (promissory warranty).
Insurance written by fraternal benefit societies was distinguished by a doctrine that the
constitution and by-laws of the society were part of the contract of insurance and the insured
member was bound by them whether he was aware of them or not and even if the certificate
of insurance did not refer to them. Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World v. Newsom,
142 Ark. 132, 219 S.W. 759 (1920); Supreme Royal Circle of Friends of the World v. Morrison, 105 Ark. 140, 150 S.W. 561 (1912) (noting possible qualification where constitutional or
by-law provisions conflict with terms of certificate issued to member); Woodmen of the
World v. Hall, 104 Ark. 538, 148 S.W. 526 (1912); Woodmen of the World v. Jackson, 80
Ark. 419, 97 S.W. 673 (1906).
24. Cf. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Maxwell, 152 Ark. 64, 237 S.W. 708
(1922).
25. Graham v. Remmel, 76 Ark. 140, 88 S.W. 899 (1905); see Atkins v. Garner, 222 Ark.
470, 261 S.W.2d 266 (1953).
26. Maccabees v. Gann, 182 Ark. 1141, 34 S.W.2d 456 (1931); Modern Woodmen of
American v. Whitaker, 173 Ark. 921, 293 S.W. 1045 (1927); Lincoln Reserve Life Ins. Co. v.
Smith, 134 Ark. 245, 203 S.W. 698 (1918); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 105 Ark.
101, 150 S.W. 393 (1912); Title Guar. & Sur. Co. v. Bank of Fulton, 89 Ark. 471, 117 S.W.
537 (1909); Providence Life Assurance Soc'y v. Reutlinger, 58 Ark. 528, 25 S.W. 835 (1894).
27. Maccabees v. Gann, 182 Ark. 1141, 34 S.W.2d 456 (1931); Modern Woodmen of
America v. Whitaker, 173 Ark. 921, 293 S.W. 1045 (1927); Title Guar. & Sur. Co. v. Bank of
Fulton, 89 Ark. 471, 117 S.W. 537 (1909). A reinforcing reason for the rule was that the
insurer had chosen the wording of the policy. American Life & Accident Ass'n v. Walton,
133 Ark. 348, 202 S.W. 20 (1918); Title Guar. & Sur. Co. v. Bank of Fulton, 89 Ark. 471, 117
S.W. 537 (1909). The thought presumably was that the insurer had spelled out all the protection it wanted, so doubts regarding meaning could legitimately be resolved in favor of the
insured.
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conclude that statements which the insurer contended were the subjects of warranties were "mere representations". 28
In Title Guaranty& Surety Co. v. Bank of Fulton,29 for example,
an application for a fidelity bond covering a bank's cashier was accompanied by an "Employer's Declaration" in which the bank asserted that the cashier had always performed his duties faithfully
and that his accounts were correct in every particular at the time of
the most recent audit. The Declaration recited that, "The above and
foregoing statements and representations are made for the purpose
of inducing the Title Guaranty & Surety Company to execute said
bond", and the bond itself recited: "Whereas, the Employer has
heretofore delivered to the Company certain representations and
promises relative to the duties and accounts of the Employee, and
other matters, it is hereby understood and agreed that those representations and such promises

. . .

shall constitute part of the basis

and consideration of the contract hereinafter expressed."3 A claim
was subsequently made on the bond, and the insurer's investigation
apparently revealed that the cashier's accounts had not been correct
at the time of the audit referred to in the Declaration, though the
bank officials who conducted the audit had failed to discover the
irregularities. On the insurer's appeal from a judgment for the
bank, the court held that the statements in the Employer's Declaration were mere representations and that the judgment appealed
from was correct because the evidence warranted a finding that the
statements in the Declaration were made in good faith. The court
reasoned that statements made in connection with an application for
a policy become warranties only if the policy so provides; that if the
insurer intends to make such statements warranties, the policy must
say so in express terms, or at least expressly provide that it is to be
void if the statements are incorrect; and that it was not sufficient to
include in the policy a provision that statements made in the appli28. An occasional case did not fit the pattern. See, e.g., Capital Fire Ins. Co. v. King, 82
Ark. 400, 102 S.W. 194 (1907) (compare opinion for the court with dissenting opinion).
Moreover, 1925 Ark. Acts 139, § 14 declared that statements made by applicants for insurance to assessment companies organized under the act should be construed as warranties.
This statute was applied in Southern Burial Ins. Co. v. Baker, 199 Ark. 468, 134 S.W.2d 1
(1939). Section 14 of the act was repealed by 1959 Ark. Acts 148, § 698.
On the other hand, the problem was eliminated in some policies by express provisions
of the policies that statements made in the applications for them should be deemed representations and not warranties. See, e.g., American Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Edenfield, 228 Ark.
93, 306 S.W.2d 321 (1957).
29. 89 Ark. 471, 117 S.W. 537 (1909).
30. Id at 474, 117 S.W. at 538.
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cation should be the basis of the contract of insurance or form part
of that contract, nor would it help that the policy recited that such
statements were part of the consideration for the issuance of the policy. The policy had to be so worded that "it cannot be construed
otherwise" than as making representations in the application warranties. 3' It subsequently developed that even express use of the
word "warrant" did not guarantee a finding that a warranty was
intended. 2
If the policy language did make statements of the applicant
warranties, the next issue might be: what was warranted? For example, assuming that by the terms of the policy the insurer's obligation was dependent on the truth of statements made by the applicant
for insurance, that obligation might be dependent on the literal truth
of the statements or on the statements having been made in the be-

lief that they were true. This presented a question of interpretation
of the contract, and again the principle of contraproferentem called
for resolving doubts against the insurer.33 Even if the applicant's
31. Id at 480, 117 S.W. at 540. See also Lincoln Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 134
Ark. 245, 203 S.W. 698 (1918); Southern Sur. Co. v. Barham, 133 Ark. 220, 202 S.W. 231
(1918). Even more remarkable is a statement, though dictum, in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Johnson, 105 Ark. 101, 150 S.W. 393 (1912), that "the language of the application shows
that the answers to the questions propounded. . . were intended by the parties to be representations merely, and not warranties," Id. at 105, 150 S.W. at 394, when the application
declared that, "Every answer must be true or the policy will be void." Id at 102, 150 S.W. at
394.
32. Modern Woodmen of America v. Whitaker, 173 Ark. 921, 293 S.W. 1045 (1927).
See also American Life & Accident Ass'n v. Walton, 133 Ark. 348, 202 S.W. 20 (1918),
which quotes with approval from an Illinois case, Spence v. Central Accident Ins. Co., 236
Ill. 444, 86 N.E. 104 (1908), in which it was held that a policy recital that the policy was
issued "[iun consideration of the warranties and agreements in the application for this policy" was insufficient to incorporate the application and any warranty language in it into the
policy. Cf. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Maxwell, 152 Ark. 64, 237 S.W. 708
(1922).
33. Southern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Pillow, 206 Ark. 769, 177 S.W.2d 763 (1944); Southern
Ins. Co. v. Floyd, 174 Ark. 372, 295 S.W. 715 (1927); Modern Woodmen of America v.
Whitaker, 173 Ark. 921, 293 S.W. 1045 (1927). Compare Progressive Life Ins. Co. v. Preston, 194 Ark. 84, 105 S.W.2d 549 (1937); Springfield Life Ins. Co. v. Slaughter, 183 Ark. 692,
38 S.W.2d 13 (1931). Of course, if the applicant's statement was expressly one of belief, it
would not be grounds for avoidance unless made in bad faith. Equitable Sur. Co. v. Bank of
Hazen, 121 Ark. 422, 428, 181 S.W. 279, 281 (1915).
Cases involving "delivery in good health" clauses, policy clauses providing that the
insurance would not take effect unless the insured was in good health (sometimes, "sound
health") at the time of delivery of the policy (or perhaps at the time of issuance of the
policy), have varied in their treatment of such clauses. Taken literally, they create conditions precedent to the formation of the contract and are most naturally read as conditioning
the insurer's obligation on the actual good health of the insured at the time specified. Some
cases have so treated the clauses. National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Young, 200 Ark. 955,
141 S.W.2d 838 (1940); National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 198 Ark. 277, 128
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good faith belief that he was telling the truth were immaterial, there
could be doubt as to what facts were represented. Where the statement was made in response to the insurer's question, dual problems
of interpretation were presented: (1) what information was asked
for, and (2) what information was given? By narrow construction of
questions, it could often be concluded that the responses asserted a
good deal less as fact than the literal wording of the questions and
answers would suggest. Thus, broad questions as to ailments of applicants or proposed insureds, or prior medical attendance, were frequently held to involve representations relating only to serious
ailments or attendance of serious ailments,34 and questions about
S.W.2d 695 (1939) ("warranty of sound health"); Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Tanner,
175 Ark. 482, 300 S.W. 927 (1927) (referring to the clause as a warranty). See also Life &
Casualty Ins. Co. v. McCrae, 193 Ark. 890, 103 S.W.2d 929 (1937) (clause expressly providing that insured's knowledge of the state of his health was immaterial). In other cases, the
clauses have been held not to be warranties and not to afford the insurer a defense unless the
insured did not honestly believe himself to be in good health at the time specified. Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Mahaffey, 215 Ark. 892, 224 S.W.2d 21 (1949); Lincoln Reserve Life Ins. Co.
v. Smith, 134 Ark. 245, 203 S.W. 698 (1918). In the Mahaffey case Matthews, and apparently
Young as well, were distinguished on the ground that those cases had involved nonmedical
policies, ,:e., policies issued without prior physical examination of the insured. The thought
seemed to be that the insurer had to rely on policy terms for its protection where no medical
examination was required prior to the issuance of the policy, whereas if there was a medical
examination, the insurer had the opportunity to find out for itself the true condition of the
insured's health, so a reading of the good health clause less favorable to the insurer was
justified in the latter case. (The Mahqffey case suggests a still further distinction, that where
a medical examination is conducted, the good health clause of the policy is directed only at
diseases and injuries developing or discovered by the insured after the physical examination.
See Denenholtz & Curtis, The Good Health Clause, 1964 PROCEEDINGS, ABA SECTION OF
INSURANCE, NEGLIGENCE & COMPENSATION LAW 263.) The Tanner case would be consistent with the distinction, as it involved a nonmedical policy. It is not clear from the report
whether the Smith case involved a policy issued after medical examination, but the case did
involve another factual element that seemed to confuse the handling of delivery in good
health clauses. In Smith the insurer relied for defense, not only on a delivery in good health
clause, but also on the falsity of statements concerning health appearing in the application
for the policy as representations of the applicant. The court concluded that the policy language did not raise those representations to the level of warranties and that the representations would not be grounds for avoiding the policy unless they had been made in bad faith.
The court then declared, without explaining why, that the question whether the insurer was
excused from liability by the delivery in good health clause "turns also upon the good faith
and apparent state of health of the insured at the time of delivery and acceptance of the
policy." 134 Ark. at 250, 203 S.W. at 700. In several subsequent cases involving similar
facts, representations in applications were treated as not warranties and not grounds for
avoidance if made in good faith, and no independent significance was accorded to delivery
in good health clauses in the policies. Universal Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Stuart, 219 Ark.
863, 245 S.W.2d 219 (1952) (nonmedical policy); Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 186
Ark. 1019, 57 S.W.2d 555 (1933) (not clear that nonmedical policy involved); American
Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Chavey, 185 Ark. 865, 50 S.W.2d 245 (1932) (nonmedical policy).
34. Southern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Pillow, 206 Ark. 769, 177 S.W.2d 763 (1944); Woodmen
of the World Life Ins. Soc'y v. Reese, 206 Ark. 530, 176 S.W.2d 708 (1943) (four-inch space
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previous use of alcohol or drugs were usually treated as referring to
habitual use only. 35 Similarly, though the "black-letter" law was
that a breach of warranty gave the insurer a defense without regard
to whether the facts represented made the risk to the insurer appear
smaller than it was in fact, a question asked by the insurer could be
construed as calling for an answer revealing only facts that would
substantially increase the risk.36
provided for answer in application form); Arkansas State Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 166 Ark.
490, 266 S.W. 449 (1924); National Americans v. Ritch, 121 Ark. 185, 180 S.W. 488 (1915);
Des Moines Life Ins. Co. v. Clay, 89 Ark. 230, 116 S.W. 232 (1909); Franklin Life Ins. Co. v.
Galligan, 71 Ark. 295, 73 S.W. 102 (1903). Compare Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v.
Farmer, 65 Ark. 581, 47 S.W. 850 (1898) (dissenting opinion); Providence Life Assurance
Soc'y v. Reutlinger, 58 Ark. 528, 25 S.W. 835 (1894).
35. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y v. Reese, 206 Ark. 530, 176 S.W.2d 708
(1943); Knights of Maccabees v. Anderson, 104 Ark. 417, 148 S.W. 1016 (1912); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Shane, 98 Ark. 132, 135 S.W. 836 (1911); Franklin Life Ins. Co. v.
Galligan, 71 Ark. 295, 73 S.W. 102 (1903) (also treating question regarding use of tobacco as
referring to habitual use). In Des Moines Life Ins. Co. v. Clay, 89 Ark. 230, 116 S.W. 232
(1909), the following questions and answers appeared in an application for life insurance:
Q. "Do you use wine, spirits, malt liquors, or other alcoholic beverages?" A. "No." Q. "If
not, state how long you have been a total abstainer." A. "All my life." Q. "State kind used
and how much in any one day at the most." A. "None." Q. "How frequently do you use the
amount stated?" A. "No time." Q. "Do you use either of them daily." A. "No." Evidence
tended to show that the insured drank at times and had been intoxicated, but not that he
used intoxicants habitually. The trial court instructed the jury that whether there was a
breach of warranty depended on whether the insured was addicted to the customary or
habitual use of alcoholic beverages. Approving this instruction, the supreme court said:
"These questions and answers must be read in connection with, and are explanatory of each
other, and when thus read . . . they relate to the customary or habitual use of intoxicants
and not to occasional or exceptional use." 89 Ark. at 232, 116 S.W. at 232. Thus, even the
representation that the applicant was a teetotaler was not false! The court's ruling appears
contrary to Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. American Nat'l Bank, 74 Ark. 1, 84 S.W. 789 (1905).
36. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Parker, 188 Ark. 39, 64 S.W.2d 556 (1933); American
Bonding Co. v. Morrow, 80 Ark. 49, 96 S.W. 613, 117 Am. St. Rep. 72 (1906). See also
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Avant, 167 Ark. 307, 268 S.W. 20 (1925) (promissory war-

ranty).
The great variety of questions asked of applicants by insurers presents many questions
of interpretation, of course. Those referred to in the text at notes 34-36 are merely common
examples. Other instances include: Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Payton, 128
Ark. 528, 194 S.W. 503 (1917) (question in fire insurance application regarding previous
refusals to insure the same property construed to refer to refusals by companies or agents
engaged in writing the same kind of insurance as that applied for); National Americans v.
Ritch, 121 Ark. 185, 180 S.W. 488 (1915) (negative answer to question whether applicant for
life insurance had "consulted or been under the care of any physician" within the past five
years not false by reason of fact that applicant had, within the five year period, taken a
physical examination in connection with application for pension, even though examining
physician had discovered insured was suffering from chronic rheumatism and was in rundown condition); Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias v. Davis, 90 Ark. 264, 119 S.W. 257
(1909) (where insured warranted that he used intoxicants only occasionally and in applying
for change of beneficiary eight years later the warranty was repeated, latter warranty referred to use of intoxicants at time policy originally issued); Nabors v. Dixie Mut. Fire Ins.
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There might also be a question whether the representation warranted true was a representation of the insurance applicant. This
was likely to arise in a case where the agent soliciting the application or a medical examiner had filled in answers to questions in the
application forms which were not answers actually supplied by the
applicant. It might be held that the applicant was not responsible
for the false assertions appearing in the application, 37 and that they
afforded the insurer no defense for that reason.3 8
Even if the representation were that of the applicant for insurance, there was likely to be an issue whether the warranty of its truth
was breached,3 9 that is whether the representation was false. The
burden of proof rested with the insurer on this question of fact, no
matter if the insurer was the plaintiff or defendant in the action; 40 a
Co., 84 Ark. 184, 105 S.W. 92 (1907) (question in application for fire insurance whether there
was other insurance on the property not falsely answered by "no" answer, where there was a
policy issued by another company for a term overlapping that of the policy applied for but
issuance of the policy applied for constituted breach of promissory warranty in prior policy).
37. In Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Farmer, 65 Ark. 581, 47 S.W. 850 (1898), the
examining physician, after the applicant had signed the application, inserted answers in
blanks in the medical examination form regarding prior illnesses of the applicant and prior
medical attendance. Despite an assumption that the physician was the agent of the applicant in filling out the form, the court treated the question whether there was a breach of
warranty of the truthfulness of the answers as turning on whether the applicant had authorized the insertions or adopted them after they had been made. The wording of the warranty
is not given.
Logically, since a warranty operates as a condition of the insurer's obligation, the question whether the applicant authorized or adopted answers written into the application by
another would be irrelevant unless the warranty was so worded as to limit its operation to
the applicant's own answers. However, in any case where the warranty language was not
absolutely clear, the contraproferentem principle could be invoked to justify that reading.
See Mississippi Life Ins. Co. v. Meadows, 161 Ark. 71, 255 S.W. 293 (1923).
The burden was on the insurer to prove that the representations in the application were
those of the insurance applicant. National Annuity Ass'n v. McCall, 103 Ark. 201, 146 S.W.
125 (1912).
38. Cases of this sort were more likely to be handled by resort to doctrines of waiver
and estoppel. See, e.g., Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Martin, 188 Ark. 306, 65 S.W.2d 551
(1933); Walker v. Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n, 140 Ark. 192, 215 S.W. 598 (1919).
39. The expression "breach of warranty" is somewhat misleading since the critical question is not whether the breaching party has incurred liability to the insurer, but rather
whether the insurer is excused from its own obligation by a condition of its promise, but the
usage is convenient and commonly employed.
40. Southern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Pillow, 206 Ark. 769, 177 S.W.2d 763 (1944); Woodmen
of the World Life Ins. Soc'y v. Reese, 206 Ark. 530, 176 S.W.2d 708 (1903); National Annuity Ass'n v. McCall, 103 Ark. 201, 146 S.W. 125 (1912); Nabors v. Dixie Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
84 Ark. 184, 105 S.W.92 (1907).
The law was less settled regarding the burden of proof concerning the state of the insured's health when a delivery in good health clause was involved. Such policy clauses were
usually so worded as to condition the taking effect of the contract of insurance on payment
of premium and delivery (or issuance) of the policy while the insured was in good (or
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rule inconsistent with the general doctrine that in an action to enforce a contract the burden is on the plaintiff to establish satisfaction
of all conditions precedent.4 The insurer's burden was increased in
cases involving personal insurance by the statute treating as privileged information acquired by medical attendants while rendering
professional services to patients,42 and, although the privilege could
be waived, waivers were narrowly construed.43
"sound") health. The cases appeared to be in agreement that the burden was on the party
seeking to uphold the effectiveness of the contract to prove the payment of premium and
delivery (or issuance), but they differed as to whether that party also had the burden of
showing that the insured was in good (or sound) health at the time of delivery (or issuance)
of the policy. Taking the position that the burden was on the party seeking to uphold the
validity of the contract was Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. Boiling, 186 Ark. 218, 53 S.W.2d 1 (1932),
which relied on New York Life Ins. Co. v. Mason, 151 Ark. 135, 235 S.W. 422 (1921), a case
in which the issue was whether the policy had been delivered. Taking the view that the
insurer had the burden of proof on the good health issue were Old American Ins. Co. v.
Hartsell, 176 Ark. 666, 4 S.W.2d 25 (1928), and Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World v.
Cole, 192 Ark. 326, 91 S.W.2d 250 (1936).
41. See 5 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 667A (3d ed.
1961); 3A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS, §§ 749-750 (1960). See also Williams v. Newkirk, 121
Ark. 439, 181 S.W. 304 (1915); John A. Gauger & Co. v. Sawyer & Austin Lumber Co., 88
Ark. 422, 115 S.W. 157 (1908). The special rule regarding burden of proof with respect to
satisfaction of insurance warranties, generally accepted in the United States, has been explained as required to relieve persons suing on insurance contracts from an intolerable burden, without which relief a great many policyholders would be unfairly deprived of effective
insurance protection. See W. VANCE, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF INSURANCE, § 75 (3d ed.
1951).
42. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Owen, 111 Ark. 554, 164 S.W. 720 (1914). The statute
appeared as ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-607, until it was repealed in 1975 and replaced by rule
503 of the Arkansas Uniform Rules of Evidence.
43. In American Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Edenfield, 228 Ark. 93, 306 S.W.2d 321
(1957), the application for insurance on the life of the applicant provided: "To whom it may
concern: I hereby request and authorize you to disclose, whenever requested to do so by
American Republic Life Insurance Company, or its representative, any and all information
and records concerning my condition when under observation by you." Apparently, no
physician was named in the application as having treated the applicant, and the application
contained a denial that the applicant had suffered from any mental or physical impairment.
The court held that the quoted language did not constitute a waiver of the statutory privilege; applying contraproferentem, it reasoned that the wording did not clearly inform the
insured that he was waiving the benefit of laws that would prevent his doctors from testifying regarding information they obtained while treating him professionally. In the same case
it was held that the beneficiary had not waived the privilege by submitting a proof of death
in which she expressly authorized "any physician, hospital or other person to give to the
Company any information concerning the health or insurability of the Deceased, and
hereby specifically waive all grounds of defense or objections based on rights of confidential
relationship or privileged communication between Physician or Hospital and Patient." The
court read this waiver as "limited for the purpose of adjustment and settlement of the claims
on the policies and [not to] extend to the use of such information in a suit on the policies."
Id at 100, 306 S.W.2d at 325.
(This case, and Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Owen, Ill Ark. 554, 164 S.W. 720 (1914), in-
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Proof of violation of the warranty by the insurer did not guarantee it exemption from liability, for there remained possibilities of
waiver and estoppel, nullifying the effect of the breach of warranty.
In case after case it was held that insurers had lost warranty defenses, or at least that the evidence justified findings of fact leading
to that conclusion, on one or the other of these grounds" (which
were seldom distinguished).4 5 The most common basis for their application was evidence that an agent of the insurer who dealt with
the applicant, in taking the application or administering a medical
examination, had learned4 6 of facts disclosing false representations
volved misrepresentation, rather than breach of warranty, but there is no reason to suppose
that the insurer did not encounter the same difficulties in warranty cases.)
44. Waiver and estoppel were used much more sparingly where the insurer's defense
was not breach of warranty but lack of coverage. In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Minton,
188 Ark. 456, 66 S.W.2d 627 (1933), where the plaintiff sought disability benefits under a
group policy, and by the terms of the certificate issued to him he was entitled to such benefits
if he became disabled while insured and prior to his 60th birthday, the plaintiff prevailed in
the trial court on proof that, although he was over 60 when the certificate was issued, an
agent of the insurer, sent to explain the program prior to issuance of the certificate, had
assured him that his age would not disqualify him for disability benefits. Reversing and
dismissing, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that parol evidence could not be used to vary
the terms of the contract and that doctrines of waiver and estoppel could not be used to
avoid that rule. Cases involving noncompliance with conditions of the validity of the policy
were distinguished. Bankers Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Hemby, 217 Ark. 749, 233 S.W.2d 637 (1950),
is similar. However, a distinction was drawn between terms affirmatively defining coverage
and terms excepting loss from a particular cause from a broader definition of coverage,
waiver and estoppel being available to nullify excepted cause provisions. See also American
Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Hale, 172 Ark. 958, 291 S.W. 82 (1927), casting doubt on the soundness of
the holding in National Life Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 161 Ark. 597, 256 S.W. 378 (1923), where
an excepted cause provision was strictly applied, even though the applicant for insurance
had made a related misrepresentation which the insurer would probably not have been able
to use as a defense because of waiver or estoppel. In National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v.
Shibley, 192 Ark. 53, 90 S.W.2d 766 (1936), the Hale case is referred to as disapproving the
holding of Jackson.
45. E.g., Pate v. Modem Woodmen of America, 129 Ark. 159, 195 S.W. 1070 (1917)
("waiver by estoppel"); People's Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Goyne, 79 Ark. 315, 96 S.W.365 (1906)
(waiver apparently used as synonym for estoppel); German Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 53 Ark. 494,
14 S.W. 672 (1890) (employing both terms); Insurance Co. v. Brodie, 52 Ark. 11, 11 S.W.
1016 (1889) (basing decision on estoppel but quoting cases invoking waiver). A careful distinction was made in Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World v. Newsom, 142 Ark. 132,
219 S.W. 759 (1920), where the court was faced with a statute which it treated as precluding
a finding of waiver but construed as leaving open the possibility of estoppel. (The case did
not involve misrepresentation or breach of warranty, but the opinion clearly considers the
law discussed as applicable to such cases.)
46. There were suggestions in the cases that an agent might be treated as having knowledge he did not actually possess, which would be imputed to the insurer. The earliest Arkansas case dealing with misrepresentation in procurement of insurance, Insurance Co. v.
Brodie, 52 Ark. 11, 11 S.W. 1016 (1889), stated that an estoppel could arise against an insurer, preventing it from defending on the basis of falsity of answers in the application for
insurance, where the insurer's agent writes false answers in the application "with notice or
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which appeared in the completed application forms. The agent's
knowledge would be attributed to the insurer as his principal, and
the insurer, having issued a policy with such knowledge, would be
held to have waived the breach of warranty or to be estopped from
using it as a defense.47 There was a limitation that the agent must
knowledge of the inaccuracy of the answers written" and the company afterwards issues a
policy and receives the premium, if the falsity of the answers is not asserted until after a loss
within policy coverage has occurred. However, the cases did not go far with the notice idea.
Some cases invoked the imputed knowledge doctrine where the insurer's agent filled in
answers to questions in an appliation form without consulting the applicant and apparently
without actual knowledge of the truth, e.g., Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y v. Sanders, 201 Ark. 478, 145 S.W.2d 28 (1940); Maloney v. Maryland Cas. Co., 113 Ark. 174, 167
S.W. 845 (1914), but in these cases it was usual to use as an alternative rationale that the
false statements were not statements of the applicant but of the insurer's own agent; moreover, in these cases the agent had actual knowledge which, if imputed to the insurer, should
trigger waiver or estoppel as readily as the agent's knowledge of the falsity of the answers,
viz., knowledge of a lack of information.
In an occasional case the court came closer to extending the concept of notice beyond
knowledge. In Mutual Aid Union v. Blacknall, 129 Ark. 450, 196 S.W. 792 (1917), an application for life insurance contained false representations that the applicant did not have kidney disease or rheumatism, but there was evidence that when the insurer's agent took the
application and filled in the answers, he could see that the applicant was suffering from
serious physical and mental ailments. A recovery on the policy was approved. The court
reasoned that the knowledge of the agent was imputable to the insurer, and it implied that it
did not matter whether the agent knew of the falsity of the specific answers in the application if he knew that the applicant was suffering from ailments which would make him an
unfit subject for insurance. In Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 186 Ark. 121, 52 S.W.2d 620
(1932), the court appeared to treat a soliciting agent's knowledge that the insured had been
in an insane asylum as notice that the insured had been treated for a serious disease, so that
the agent could be treated as knowing of the falsity of a representation that the insured had
not been treated by a physician for a serious disease prior to issuance of the policy.
By contrast, in Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Wilmans, 214 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Ark.
1963) (a case decided after enactment of the Insurance Code but apparently uninfluenced by
it) a federal district judge, applying Arkansas law, declined to rule that the general agent for
an automobile insurer, who issued a renewal policy containing the same declarations as
appeared in the original policy, should be deemed to have had notice that those declarations
were no longer true because he could have acquired such knowledge by questioning the
named insured.
47. The cases are numerous. Examples are: DeSoto Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 208 Ark.
795, 187 S.W.2d 883 (1945) (soliciting agent); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Long, 186
Ark. 320, 53 S.W.2d 433 (1932) (medical examiner); Home Mut. Benefit Ass'n v. Rowland,
155 Ark. 450, 244 S.W. 719 (1922) (soliciting agent); Mutual Aid Union v. Blacknall, 129
Ark. 450, 196 S.W. 792 (1917) (soliciting agent); King v. Cox, 63 Ark. 204, 37 S.W. 877
(1896) (knowledge of general agent); Providence Life Assurance Soc'y v. Reutlinger, 58
Ark. 528, 25 S.W. 835 (1894) (knowledge of medical examiner); Insurance Co. v. Brodie, 52
Ark. 11, 11 S.W. 1016 (1889) (knowledge of soliciting agent).
In Southern Burial Ins. Co. v. Baker, 199 Ark. 468, 134 S.W.2d 1 (1939), it was held that
a waiver or estoppel could not be based on the knowledge of the agent taking the application
for insurance where the policy was issued by an assessment company organized under Act
139 of 1925. This decision was purportedly distinguished, but effectively overruled, in
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DeSoto Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 208 Ark. 795, 187 S.W.2d 883 (1945). (The 1925 statute
was repealed in 1959. 1959 Ark. Acts 148, § 698.)
The applicability of the reasoning discussed in the text to cases where the claimed
waiver or estoppel was based on the knowledge of an officer of a local lodge of a fraternal
benefit association was a question of some difficulty. It was accepted doctrine that the constitution and by-laws of such an association became part of the contract of insurance between the association and its members, see note 23 supra, and on this basis it was held that if
the constitution or by-laws prescribed the terms on which insurance would be provided and
also forbade officers of local lodges to waive such terms, the officers of local lodges had no
power to waive the provisions of the constitution and by-laws dealing with the substance of
the contract between the association and a member. Woodmen of the World v. Hall, 104
Ark. 538, 148 S.W. 526 (1912). In the Hall case, however, the court was willing to recognize
an estoppel against such an association to rely on a breach of warranty of the truth of answers given in a member's application for insurance, where the physician of a local lodge
administered an insurance physical examination and had knowledge of the falsity of the
answers given to him in the course of the examination; the theory was that the physician
would be acting as agent of the association in conducting the examination, and his knowledge of facts pertinent to his agency duties would be imputed to the insurer. The court
decided, though, that the evidence did not show such a case. The dictum in Hall was followed in Peebles v. Eminent Household of Columbian Woodmen, I l l Ark. 435, 164 S.W.
296 (1914), where it was held that when the clerk of a local lodge had authority to deliver a
benefit certificate to a member only if he was in good health at the time of delivery, and the
clerk delivered the certificate knowing that the member was not in good health, the clerk's
knowledge would be imputed to the association, and by continuing to accept payments of
premiums thereafter, the association became estopped to claim forfeiture of the insurance by
reason of the breach of the warranty of good health. Pate v. Modem Woodmen of America,
129 Ark. 159, 195 S.W. 1070 (1917), and Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World v. Anderson, 133 Ark. 411, 202 S.W. 698 (1918), appeared to recede from the doctrine of the Peebles
case, though they were distinguishable on their facts. Finally, in Sovereign Camp Woodmen
of the World v. Newsom, 142 Ark. 132, 219 S.W. 759 (1920), the Arkansas Supreme Court
undertook to settle the law. After exhaustive discussion of the Arkansas cases, as well as
cases from other jurisdictions, the court ruled that officers of local lodges, in performing
their official duties, were agents of the parent association; that principles of agency law applicable to agents of the same general character of ordinary insurance companies applied;
that knowledge of such agents possessed while they were engaged in the discharge of their
duties and pertinent to those duties was to be treated as the knowledge of the association;
and that waiver and estoppel principles based on acts of the association taken with such
imputed knowledge were just as applicable as in other insurance cases. Unfortunately the
court, in making this ruling, had overlooked a statute, 1917 Ark. Acts 462, governing fraternal benefit associations, which provided in § 20: "The constitution and laws of the society
may provide that no subordinate body, nor any of its subordinate officers or members shall
have the power or authority to waive any of the provisions of the law and constitution of the
society, and the same shall be binding on the society, and each and every member thereof
and on all beneficiaries of members." When this law was called to the court's attention, the
court conceded that any waiver of provisions of the constitution and by-laws of a fraternal
benefit association by officers of a subordinate lodge was precluded by the statute, if the
organization's internal law prohibited such waivers, but it construed the statute as not touching the question whether an estoppel could arise from the behavior or knowledge of officers
of local lodges. (The Act of 1917 was repealed by 1959 Ark. Acts 148, § 698, but § 20 of the
1917 act was replaced by an almost identically worded section of the 1959 Insurance Code,
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-4722 (1980).) It would seem that if the agency doctrine that knowledge of an agent acquired within the scope of his agency is imputed to his principal is applicable to officers of local lodges of fraternal benefit societies, as was held in Newsom, the
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have had 48 or acquired49 such knowledge while acting within the
scope of his agency, but even a soliciting agent whose authority was
limited to seeking applications for insurance, assisting applicants to
complete the applications, and transmitting those applications to
higher authority for acceptance or rejection (a type of agent often
said in other contexts to have no power to bind the insurer contractually and whose knowledge was said not to be imputable to the
insurer) 50 qualified as the insurer's alter ego in these breach of warranty cases. 5 There was also a principle that the insurer would not
conduct of the parent association with such imputed knowledge could just as readily be
found to be a waiver of provisions of the association's by-laws and constitution as it could be
found to give rise to an estoppel, despite the statute, for the waiver would not be an attempted waiver by any subordinate lodge or its officers but rather by the parent organization. At any rate, subsequent cases treated fraternal benefit associations like other insurers
for purposes of finding that such an association had lost a defense based on provisions of its
constitution or by-laws by reason of knowledge of officers or agents of local lodges possessed
or acquired while they were performing their official duties, without worrying about the
statute. See, e.g., Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y v. Sanders, 201 Ark. 478, 145
S.W.2d 28 (1940); Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World v. Cole, 192 Ark. 326, 91 S.W.2d
250 (1936); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Long, 186 Ark. 320, 53 S.W.2d 433 (1932).
"Waiver" terminology was sometimes used. Springfield Mut. Ass'n v. Atnip, 169 Ark. 968,
279 S.W. 15 (1925).
48. See Home Mut. Benefit Ass'n v. Rowland, 155 Ark. 450, 244 S.W. 719 (1922);
Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Galligan, 71 Ark. 295, 73 S.W. 102 (1903).
49. Woodmen of the World v. Hall, 104 Ark. 538, 148 S.W. 526 (1912); Phoenix Ins. Co.
v. Flemming, 65 Ark. 54, 44 S.W. 464 (1898).
50. E.g., Holland v. Interstate Fire Ins. Co., 229 Ark. 491, 316 S.W.2d 707 (1958) (alleged waiver of breach of continuing warranty by soliciting agent's knowledge of breach and
assurance that policy was good despite breach when collecting premiums after issuance of
policy); Sadler v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 185 Ark. 480, 47 S.W.2d 1086 (1932) (action to
reform fire insurance policy to include loss-payable clause in favor of plaintiffs, on ground
that insurer's soliciting agent had told plaintiffs that the policy, which had been issued but
retained in the agent's possession, contained such a clause, as he had promised, prior to
issue, that it would).
51. E.g., Walker v. Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n, 140 Ark. 192, 215 S.W. 598 (1919)
(knowledge of soliciting agent of falsity of statement of applicant's age, as shown in application for insurance, attributable to insurer despite recital in application that such knowledge
of agent should not validate insurance); People's Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Goyne, 79 Ark. 315, 96
S.W. 365 (1906) (policy stipulation that no representative of insurer had power to waive any
policy provision except by writing attached to policy ineffective to prevent knowledge of
soliciting agent regarding truth of matters falsely inserted by him in applications for insurance from being attributed to insurer); Sprott v. New Orleans Ins. Ass'n, 53 Ark. 215, 13
S.W. 799 (1890) (though agent a solicitor, not a general agent for the insurer, insurer responsible for inaccuracy of diagram of premises to be covered by fire insurance which was made
by solicitor and forwarded to insurer by its general agent along with application signed by
prospective insured, even though application recited that solicitor was agent of applicant in
preparing diagram); Insurance Co. v. Brodie, 52 Ark. 11, 11 S.W. 1016 (1889) (agent's
knowledge imputed to insurer where agent authorized to fill in blank applications for insurance does so with "notice or knowledge" of inaccuracy of answers written, even though
policy provided that applicant was responsible for agent's representations).
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be deemed to have the knowledge of its agent, and could avoid a
policy, if the agent and the applicant had colluded to keep the truth
from the insurer, 2 but that doctrine did not apply unless the applicant was guilty of actual fraud; 53 his signing of an incomplete application form,54 signing a completed one without reading it-' or
having it read to him,56 or failing to read over the application when
a copy of it was returned to him with the policy57 were readily forgiven. Waiver and estoppel could deprive the insurer of a warranty
defense in a number of other ways as well.5
52. Fayetteville Mut. Benefit Ass'n v. Tate, 164 Ark. 317, 261 S.W. 634 (1924); Mutual
Aid Union v. Blacknall, 123 Ark. 377, 185 S.W. 465 (1916), subsequent appeal, 129 Ark. 450,
196 S.W. 792 (1917). See also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Routon, 207 Ark. 132, 179 S.W.2d 862
(1944) (misrepresentation).
53. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Long, 186 Ark. 320, 53 S.W.2d 433 (1932);
Home Mut. Benefit Ass'n v. Rowland, 155 Ark. 450, 244 S.W. 719 (1922). In Providence
Life Assurance Soc'y v. Reutlinger, 58 Ark. 528, 25 S.W. 835 (1894), although it was said
that an estoppel against an insurer would not result from its agent's knowledge of a breach
of affirmative warranty if the applicant certified the truth of a false answer knowing that it
appeared in the application or if the applicant, after delivery of the policy, discovered that
the agent had inserted false answers in the application and remained silent, it was held that
where the applicant relied on the agent's judgment as to what was an appropriate answer to
a question in the application, the collusion limitation did not apply. But see Home Ins. Co.
v. North Little Rock Ice & Electric Co., 86 Ark. 538, 111 S.W. 994 (1908) (dictum that
knowledge of agent is not imputed to principal where agent is known to insured to have
personal interest which might induce him to keep matter concealed from principal).
54. Walker v. Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n, 140 Ark. 192, 215 S.W. 598 (1919).
55. Southern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Heggie, 206 Ark. 196, 174 S.W.2d 931 (1943); Callicott v.
Dixie Life & Accident Ins. Co., 198 Ark. 69, 127 S.W.2d 620 (1939); Liverpool & London &
Globe Ins. Co. v. Payton, 128 Ark. 528, 194 S.W. 503 (1917); People's Fire Ins. Ass'n v.
Goyne, 79 Ark. 315, 96 S.W. 365 (1906); Southern Ins. Co. v. Hastings, 64 Ark. 253, 41 S.W.
1093 (1897).
56. Capital Fire Ins. Co. v. Montgomery, 81 Ark. 508, 99 S.W. 687 (1907).
57. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Martin, 188 Ark. 306, 65 S.W.2d 551 (1933); Life &
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 186 Ark. 121, 52 S.W.2d 620 (1932); Walker v. Illinois Bankers'
Life Ass'n, 140 Ark. 192, 215 S.W. 598 (1919). The willingness in warranty cases to overlook
the insured's failure to read the policy after receiving it stands in marked contrast to the lack
of sympathy shown for policyholders who were caught by surprise by other insurance policy
terms. See American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Otis, 122 Ark. 219, 183 S.W. 183 (1916); Remmel v.
Griffin, 81 Ark. 269, 99 S.W. 70 (1907) (policyholder who applied for 10-payment life insurance policy but received 20-payment policy bound by premium note if he failed to read
policy within reasonable time after receiving it and inform insurer of his rejection promptly
thereafter). (More recent cases suggest a retreat from this stern position, by showing a readiness to find that the insurer misled the insured into believing that the policy issued was in
accord with the policyholder's expectation. Providental Life Ins. Co. v. Clem, 240 Ark. 922,
403 S.W.2d 68 (1966); Lawrence v. Providential Life Ins. Co., 238 Ark. 981, 385 S.W.2d 936
(1965); Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y v. Counts, 221 Ark. 143, 252 S.W.2d 390
(1952).)
58. An insurer could be estopped from taking advantage of a breach of warranty by
reason of its adjuster's having discovered facts showing breach in the course of his investigation of a claim on the policy, followed by a request for proofs of loss without contention that

UALR LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4:17

Arkansas was by no means unique in the employment of these
techniques for mitigating the harshness of the black-letter warranty
law. Courts throughout the United States were accomplishing the
same purpose in these ways,59 and more. 61 Arkansas cases are fothe policy was unenforceable for breach of warranty. German Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 53 Ark.
494, 14 S.W. 672 (1890). If the insurer, after issuing a policy, learned facts inconsistent with
a warranty but took no action to cancel the policy before loss occurred, the insurer was
deemed to have waived the forfeiture, or to have become estopped to assert it. Eminent
Household of Columbian Woodmen v. Heifner, 160 Ark. 624, 255 S.W. 29 (1923); GermanAmerican Ins. Co. v. Harper, 75 Ark. 98, 86 S.W. 817 (1905). Insurer defenses based on
failures to answer questions in insurance applications or on conflicting answers were rejected
on the ground that issuance of the policy despite such evident defects in the applications
amounted to a waiver of the defects. Security Mut. Ins. Co. v. Berry, 81 Ark. 92, 98 S.W. 693
(1906); Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Farmer, 65 Ark. 581, 47 S.W. 850 (1898). See
also Southern Ins. Co. v. Floyd, 174 Ark. 372, 295 S.W. 715 (1927), implying that where an
application for life insurance failed to reveal prior attendance by a physician in answer to a
question calling for that information, but the answer to another question revealed the illness
for which the physician treated the applicant, and the answer to a third question calling for
the names of two physicians who knew the applicant named the physician who gave the
treatment, the insurer had notice of the correct answer to the question concerning prior
attendance by physicians since the information given would have enabled the insurer to
learn the truth.
In at least one case in which there was a breach of warranty of the truth of an answer to
a question in the application for insurance it was held that the insurer lost the defense because its soliciting agent knew the true facts when he delivered the policy. State Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Latourette, 71 Ark. 242, 74 S.W. 300 (1903). In cases where the insurer's defense was
based on a delivery in good health clause, the defense was sometimes lost because an agent
of the insurer with authority to deliver the policy knew when he made delivery that the
insured was not in good health. Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World v. Cole, 192 Ark.
326, 91 S.W.2d 250 (1936); Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Ridout, 147 Ark. 563, 228 S.W. 55
(1921).
59. See E. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW, chs. 7, 8, 11 (2d ed. 1957); W.
VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE,

ch. 7, §§ 71, 73, 75, and ch. 9 (3d ed.

1951); Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with PolicyProvisions (pts. 1-2), 83 HARV.
L. REV. 961, 1281 (1970).
60. In other jurisdictions a breach of warranty might fail to give the insurer the protection it sought because the policy would be treated as "divisible" or "severable," the breach
of warranty being treated as exempting the insurer from responsibility as to only a portion of
the total coverage of the policy. See E. PATTERSON, supra note 59, at § 70. Only one Arkansas case discussing this possibility with regard to an affirmative warranty has been found,
and there the court declined to find the policy divisible. In Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Public Parks
Amusement Co., 63 Ark. 187, 37 S.W. 959 (1896), a judgment for the plaintiff in an action to
enforce a policy of fire insurance was reversed and a new trial ordered because of error in
instructions. The jury had been told that if the insured held a few items of property covered
by the policy under contracts of conditional sale, he nevertheless had an insurable interest in
such property, and if the insured, in applying for the policy, had represented himself as
owner of the property, that would not defeat recovery on the policy. The policy provided
that it should be void if the interest of the insured in the property be other than sole and
unconditional ownership. The supreme court held that the insured was not the "sole and
unconditional owner" of property held on conditional sale, and that even if that were true of
only a portion of the property covered, the violation of the policy condition would render
the policy entirely void. "The contract was entire and indivisible. . . . It was all exposed
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cused on here because it was against the background of this elaborate body of case law that the mandates of the 1959 Insurance Code
were enacted.
B. Misrepresentation
Where mere representations were involved, the doctrine was
that a representation by an applicant for insurance would not be
grounds for avoidance of a policy unless it was substantially untrue,
material, and fraudulent. Given these limitations on the misrepresentation defense, one might expect that the courts would feel little
need to employ the devices found in warranty cases as means of
mitigating the rigors of the formal doctrine. However, the Arkansas
misrepresentation cases generally followed the precedents involving
to one risk, and the consideration for the policy was a specified sum. The fact that separate
amounts of insurance were apportioned to separate items or classes of property did not make
the policy divisible." Id at 202,%37 S.W.at 963. The court relied on McQueeny v. Phoenix
Ins. Co., 52 Ark. 257, 12 S.W. 498 (1889), a case involving breach of a promissory warranty,
or continuing condition, in a policy of fire insurance to the effect that the policy should be
suspended during any period when "the above mentioned premises shall become vacant or
unoccupied." The policy covered two buildings 30 feet apart within the same enclosure,
both owned by the insured, one of which he occupied as his residence, the other being held
for rent. A single premium was charged for the policy, which was in the amount of $1,000,
apportioned 60% on the residence and 40% on the rental house. Both houses were destroyed
by fire at a time when the rental property was unoccupied. The insurer paid the loss on the
residence only, and the insured brought suit on the policy for the remainder of the loss. The
trial court denied recovery, apparently holding that each house was a separate "premises"
within the meaning of the policy and that if either building became unoccupied that suspended the insurance on that building. The supreme court considered the lower court's
holding to rest on a finding that the policy, "though entire in form is divisible in substance,"
which it held to be erroneous, invoking what it considered to be the general contract rule
that if a single consideration is paid, the contract is entire, even though its subject be several
distinct items, and the court saw no reason why that rule should not apply to insurance
contracts. The court then held that, treating the contract as entire, the "premises" referred to
in the policy would not be unoccupied as long as either building was occupied. The singleconsideration test of divisibility was rejected, however, in Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Larey, 125
Ark. 93, 188 S.W. 7 (1916), also involving a promissory warranty, which held that a fire
insurance policy covering store buildings owned by two persons as tenants in common, and
issued in the names of both owners, was not avoided as to the interest of one of the named
insureds by reason of the sale of the other's interest to a third person, despite a policy term
that "[i]f any change, other than by the death of an insured, take place in the interest, title, or
possession of the subject of insurance. . . the entire policy shall be void." The reasoning by
which the contract was found divisible is not clear, but the opinion suggests that since the
insurer would have no liability to the insured who sold his interest in the property, nor to the
third person who had acquired that interest, and there was, apparently, no change in the
possession of the property, the insurer would not be prejudiced by treating the policy as still
in force as to the other insured. Chief Justice McCullough dissented, pointing to the McQueeny and Public ParksAmusement Co. cases as settling the Arkansas rule, and also arguing that the language of the policy clause itself made the contract indivisible.
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warranties in fixing the meaning of representations 6 and in applying doctrines of waiver and estoppel.62
The requirement that a representation be substantially false if it
were to give the insurer a defense did not come into sharp focus in
the decisions as a distinct issue.63 It was likely to be finessed
61. Doubts regarding meaning of insurers' questions were resolved against the insurers.
Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y v. Reese, 206 Ark. 530, 176 S.W.2d 708 (1943). See
also Almond v. Countryside Cas. Co., 329 F. Supp. 137 (W.D. Ark. 1971), afl'dmem., 455
F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1972) (a case decided after the Insurance Code became effective but involving a policy of a type that seems not to be affected by the Code insofar as misrepresentation is concerned). General questions concerning health and freedom from particular
diseases were construed as calling for statements of opinion. Bankers' Reserve Life Co. v.
Crowley, 171 Ark. 135, 284 S.W. 4 (1926). See also Title Guar. & Sur. Co. v. Bank of
Fulton, 89 Ark. 471, 117 S.W. 537 (1909) (representations in Employer's Declaration accompanying application for fidelity bond read as representations of the condition of the employee's accounts "as it was then understood" and the character of the employee "as then
known to the employer"). General questions about prior illnesses or medical treatments
were taken to refer to serious illnesses or treatment for serious illnesses. Woodmen of the
World Life Ins. Soc'y v. Reese, 206 Ark. 530, 176 S.W.2d 708 (1943); Federal Life Ins. Co. v.
Hase, 193 Ark. 816, 102 S.W.2d 841 (1937). See also Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v.
Cotter, 72 Ark. 620, 83 S.W. 321 (1904). Questions regarding prior use of alcohol or drugs
would be construed as referring to habitual use. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Cotter,
81 Ark. 205, 99 S.W. 67 (1906). See also John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Ramey, 200
Ark. 635, 140 S.W.2d 701 (1940) (representation that female applicant for nonmedical life
insurance policy had not been treated for any disease or disorder within the past five years
not grounds for avoidance because applicant had been in a hospital for the birth of a child
during that period; opinion not clear whether ruling is based on interpretation of representation or finding that fact not revealed was immaterial).
62. Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v. Trantham, 214 Ark. 791, 217 S.W.2d 924 (1949); Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Martin, 188 Ark. 306, 65 S.W.2d 551 (1933); Maccabees v. Gann, 182
Ark. 1141, 34 S.W.2d 456 (1931); Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co. v. Parker, 181 Ark. 213, 25
S.W.2d 10 (1930); Old Colony Life Ins. Co. v. Julian, 175 Ark. 359, 299 S.W. 366 (1927);
Home Mut. Benefit Ass'n v. Mayfield, 142 Ark. 240, 218 S.W. 371 (1920); American Life &
Accident Ass'n v. Walton, 133 Ark. 348, 202 S.W. 20 (1918); Mutual Reserve Fund Life
Ass'n v. Cotter, 81 Ark. 205, 99 S.W. 67 (1906). See also Reliable Life Ins. Co. v. Elby, 247
Ark. 514, 446 S.W.2d 215 (1969), and Interstate Fire Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 256 Ark. 986, 511
S.W.2d 471 (1974); both of these cases involved policies issued after the effective date of the
1959 Insurance Code, but they were decided on the apparent assumption that the Code had
no relevance to the misrepresentation issues and were reasoned along the lines of pre-Code
cases.
In view of the rule that misrepresentation would not be grounds for avoidance unless
the applicant made it with knowledge of its falsity and intent to deceive, it might be expected
that there would be caution in the application of waiver or estoppel to cut off such a defense
lest fraud be encouraged, but such concern is not evident in the cases. It may be said, however, that in most of the cases applying these cut-off doctrines, it was not clearly established
that the applicant had been guilty of deliberate fraud.
63. The case of Old American Life Ins. Co. v. McKenzie, 240 Ark. 984, 403 S.W.2d 94
(1966), in discussing Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Witt, 161 Ark. 148, 256 S.W. 46 (1923),
suggests that the Witt case was one in which the representation was found not to be substantially false. In Witt an applicant for life insurance, answering a question about prior illness,
revealed that he had had an operation for appendicitis in 1917 with no complications and
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good results, giving also the name and address of the doctor who attended him. When
action was brought to enforce the policy issued on that application, the insurer asserted that
the policy had been obtained by misrepresentation, in that the applicant had not revealed
the fact that he was confined to his house by sickness for more than thirteen weeks in 1918.
The evidence was that the 1918 illness was "the result of a malarial condition followed by an
operation for appendicitis and adhesions," the operation being the 1917 appendectomy revealed in the application for the insurance. Judgment for the plaintiff was upheld, the court
observing that since the 1917 operation and the identity of the attending physician had been
shown on the application, "the company had an opportunity to investigate and satisfy itself
whether the operation and the illness incident thereto had materially affected his health and
longevity." 161 Ark. at 152, 256 S.W. at 48. If this case does illustrate a meaning of substantial falsity, the concept involved is difficult to distinguish from waiver or estoppel, as those
concepts have been developed in the Arkansas cases.
There has been a statutory rule since 1899, applicable only to policies of fire insurance
on personal property, that substantial compliance with the terms of the policy, including
warranties, suffices. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3237 (1980). One might expect cases decided
under this statute to throw some light on the meaning of "substantial". Unfortunately, the
cases applying the statute, with one possible exception, involved compliance with promissory warranties, and their relevance to the question whether a misrepresentation is "substantially" untrue is conjectural. The case coming closest to this question is National Liberty
Ins. Co. v. Spharler, 172 Ark. 715, 290 S.W. 594 (1927), where the insurer defended an
action on the policy by asserting breach of a sole and unconditional ownership clause. The
policy covered a stock of merchandise and the fixtures of a store, and it was shown that some
of the items covered were held by the insured under a contract of conditional sale on which
a small balance remained unpaid at the time of the fire. The opinion of the court asserts that
the insured did not know that the vendor retained title to these items. It had previously been
held that a conditional vendee of personal property was not the sole and unconditional
owner of such property. See note 60 supra. The opinion in Spharler indicates dissatisfaction with that ruling, pointing out that the purpose of a sole and unconditional ownership
clause is to confine protection to those on whom the loss would inevitably fall but for the
insurance, but the case holds that even if the clause was violated, the policy provision was
substantially complied with in this case:
[I]t would be unreasonable to hold that when an insurance company writes a policy
insuring a stock of merchandise and fixtures, the policy would be void because
there might be one or two articles in the store which the assured had bought on
conditional sale, the vendor retaining title, and especially in view of the fact that
the assured did not know that the seller retained title. The insurance agent inspected all the stock and had an opportunity to know about it.
172 Ark. at 720, 290 S.W. at 596-97. Although the basis of this decision is obscured by the
references to the insured's ignorance of the facts constituting breach and the agent's opportunity to learn of the breach, the case is consistent with other substantial compliance cases in
treating certain breaches of warranty as too trivial to provide the insurer with a defense,
though where the line should be drawn was not clarified. See Royal Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 122
Ark. 243, 183 S.W. 198 (1916); Arkansas Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Woolverton, 82 Ark. 476, 102
S.W. 226 (1907). Another consistent theme of the substantial compliance cases was that if
the acts of the insured gave the insurer the protection it sought to gain by inclusion of the
policy provision in question, there was substantial compliance with the policy requirement,
even though not literal compliance. See, e.g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Avant, 167
Ark. 307, 268 S.W. 20 (1925); Queen of Arkansas Ins. Co. v. Forlines, 94 Ark. 227, 126 S.W.
719 (1910); Security Mut. Ins. Co. v. Woodson, 79 Ark. 266, 95 S.W. 481 (1906); People's
Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Gorham, 79 Ark. 160, 95 S.W. 152 (1906). The confinement of insurers'
defenses to breaches which defeated the assumed purposes of the contract clauses involved
could just as easily be accomplished, without the aid of the statute, by interpretation of the
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through the process of interpretation of the representation.6' A further reason for little attention to the substantiality element probably
was that it is difficult to separate from the materiality requirement.65
There was surprisingly little exploration of the meaning of the
term material. The term was often used as if its meaning was selfevident, 66 and the cases that did afford some guidance lacked precision.
Professor Edwin Patterson's studies of English and American
cases led him to conclude that the test of materiality centered on the
question of the relevance of the fact or facts misrepresented to the
insurer's action on the application for insurance, but that the cases
varied in their test of relevance.67 Most significantly, he found a
division of authority with regard to whether the relevance was to be
tested by reference to the usual practices of the insurer that actually
issued the policy (an individual insurer standard) or on the basis of
the usual practices of insurers as a class (a prudent insurer standard). While he favored the individual insurer standard (and the
New York legislature was persuaded to adopt it),68 Professor Patterson conceded that the prudent insurer standard appeared to be favored by the greater number of courts. Secondly, he found a
variation in regard to the degree of relevance of the facts misrepresented. Some cases asked, in effect, what the insurer might have
done if it had known the truth, rather than what the insurer would
have done. The "might" test obviously could lead to the conclusion
that a fact was material even though the insurer probably would
have made the very same contract even if it had known the truth,
but it appeared to be adopted to dispose of cases where knowledge
of a fact concealed by a misrepresentation would have led to investigation by the insurer (or a prudent insurer) but final action on the
application would have depended on the results of the investigation,
policy language, see Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Jordan, 234 Ark. 627, 353 S.W.2d 536
(1962) (involving record-keeping requirements of a burglary policy on a merchant's stock of
goods), so the real impact of the statute appears to have been to call for tolerance of small
breaches, even if they could be seen to be somewhat prejudicial to the insurers.
64. See cases cited note 61 supra.
65. Indeed, Professor Patterson contended that, "The doctrine of substantial compli-

ance is . . . another way of saying that an immaterial misrepresentation does not avoid the
contract." E. PATTERSON, supra note 59, at 402.
66. E.g., Southern Sur. Co. v. Barham, 133 Ark. 220, 202 S.W. 231 (1918); Title Guar. &
Sur. Co. v. Bank of Fulton, 89 Ark. 471, 117 S.W. 537 (1909); Mutual Reserve Fund Life
Ass'n v. Cotter, 81 Ark. 205, 99 S.W. 67 (1906).
67. This summary of Professor Patterson's analysis is drawn from E. PATrERSON, supra
note 59, at § 82.
68. N.Y. INS. LAW § 149(2) (McKinney 1966).
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as where a representation is made in an application for life insurance which conceals prior medical treatment or hospitalization.
Professor Patterson advocated as preferable the adaptation of the
"would" test to this situation by assuming that the insurer, by its
investigation, would have discovered what the insured's medical attendants discovered
(and this adaptation was, in effect, adopted in
69
New York).

Still further refinement of the materiality concept is needed, for
there is also a question of what action the insurer (or a prudent insurer) would (or might) have taken. Is it essential to a finding of
materiality that it appear that knowledge of the truth would (or
might) have led to total refusal to insure, or is it enough that the
insurer would (or might) have offered a policy on different terms
than that actually issued or have demanded a higher premium than
the one actually charged? The latter appears to be the sounder
test.7 °
Another problem that has arisen in connection with the materiality requirement in other states has been whether, where the question arises after a loss giving rise to a claim on the policy has
occurred, it is pertinent to inquire whether the facts concealed by the
misrepresentation were a cause of the loss. A causal connection requirement was rejected by the majority of jurisdictions at common
law. 7
The Arkansas cases provided the merest hints as to how most of
these questions were to be answered. It is evident from the frequent
use of the phrase "material to the risk" 72 that the concern was with
the question whether the misrepresentation made the risk to be assumed by the insurer appear to be smaller than it was,7 3 but it was
not entirely clear that the matter was to be determined on the basis
of the reality of the situation and could not be controlled by agreement between insurer and applicant. 74 Whether an individual in69. Id § 149(4).
70. See id § 149(2).
71. See E. PATTERSON, supra note 59, at §§ 72, 83.
72. E.g., American Life & Accident Ass'n v. Walton, 133 Ark. 348, 202 S.W.20 (1918);
National Annuity Ass'n v. Carter, 96 Ark. 495, 132 S.W. 633 (1910); Providence Life Assurance Soc'y v. Reutlinger, 58 Ark. 528, 25 S.W. 835 (1894). See McBath v. American Republic Ins. Co., 208 Ark. 764, 187 S.W.2d 954 (1945) ("material to insurability").
73. See National Annuity Ass'n v. Carter, 96 Ark. 495, 132 S.W. 633 (1910).
74. In Inter-Ocean Cas. Co. v. Huddleston, 184 Ark. 1129, 45 S.W.2d 24 (1932), the
applicant agreed, by signing the application, that the representations she made in it were
"material representations," yet the court ruled, on the basis of testimony given at the trial,
that some of those representations were not material. Some doubt as to the authority of that
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surer or a prudent insurer standard was to be used was not directly
addressed, though occasional passages in the opinions seemed to
lean toward an individual insurer test.7 5 The would or might distinction was also left unexplored, though occasional statements were
suggestive of a "would" test,7 6 adapted to take care of the problem
arising from representations which would not themselves control the
insurer's decision but could lead to investigation. 7 The cases afcase on the point under discussion is raised, however, by McBath v. American Republic Ins.
Co., 208 Ark. 764, 187 S.W.2d 954 (1945). There a trial court, sitting without a jury, gave
judgment in favor of the insurer in an action to enforce a disability policy, on the ground
that the insured had procured the policy by fraudulent representations that he was then in
"sound health" and had not been "sick or hurt" within the past three years. The evidence
showed that the insured was suffering from hypertension when he applied for the insurance
and had been in a hospital for treatment of that condition within the three year period
preceding his application for the insurance. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the court
should take judicial notice that high blood pressure is neither a disease, nor a "grave ailment" as the trial court had found, but the judgment was affirmed. The court was willing to
concede that hypertension was "seemingly" not regarded by medical authorities as a disease
in itself, but pointed to a provision in the policy excluding coverage for certain diseases,
including hypertension, unless they had their origin six months after the contract was made
or, in case of reinstatement, six months after reinstatement. "It follows," said the court,
"that McBath concealed from the Company facts material to his insurability." 208 Ark. at
768, 187 S.W.2d at 956. The case can be read as meaning that if the policy (or, presumably,
the application) treats a fact as material, no independent inquiry into materiality is in order.
Another possible interpretation, however, is that the policy provision was treated as circumstantial evidence of the insurer's attitude toward the relevance of hypertension to insurability, which the trial court could accept as establishing materiality in a situation where it could
not be declared as a matter of law that the fact was not material.
75. See Royal Neighbors of America v. Tate, 186 Ark. 1138, 1142, 57 S.W.2d 1055,
1056 (1933) ("[T]he policy would not have been issued if the true disclosures had been made
"); Brotherhood of Am. Yeomen v. Fordham, 120 Ark. 605, 609,
to the questions asked ..
180 S.W. 206, 208 (1915) ("If the association had known that the insured had had a severe
attack of typhoid fever in . . . 1905 . . . it probably would have made a more searching
inquiry as to his condition at the time he made the application for the insurance. At least it
could have done so."); Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Beck, 84 Ark. 57, 104 S.W. 533 (1907)
("Where the matter inquired of would affect the question of the assumption by the company
of the risk, then the warranty is material .... "). These three cases were warranty cases, in
which materiality was not, according to the black-letter law, an essential element of the
insurer's defense. It is remarkable that the cases involving warranties offer more guidance to
the meaning of material than those involving pure misrepresentation.
76. See Woodmen of the World v. Brown, 194 Ark. 219, 106 S.W.2d 591 (1937) (also a
warranty case, where the court appeared to attach significance to testimony by the secretary
of the insurer that the policy would not have been issued if correct information had been
given); Royal Neighbors of America v. Tate, 186 Ark. 1138, 57 S.W.2d 1055 (1933).
77. In Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Owen, Ill Ark. 554, 164 S.W. 720 (1914), there was
evidence that an applicant for insurance on his own life made a representation that he had
not been treated by any physician other than a Dr. Mount within the preceding five years.
There was also evidence that a Dr. Brown had treated the applicant during that time. The
insurer contended that even if Dr. Brown's treatments had been only for temporary disturbances the insurer had a right to know of them, in order that it might make such further
investigation as it saw fit, and that the concealment of these treatments was a material mis-

1981]

INSURANCE

43

forded little insight into the precise reaction of the insurer to misrepresented facts that would stamp them as material.7 8 And the
precedents were ambiguous with regard to the necessity of causal
connection between facts concealed by misrepresentation and actual
loss. 7 9
Reliance by the insurer on the misrepresentation is also usually
said to be essential to a successful defense,"° in accordance with the
representation, which should defeat recovery on the policy. The court ruled that even if it
were conceded that the representation was made and was false, it could not be said that the
undisputed evidence established that if the truth had been told, the company would have
learned that the applicant suffered from heart trouble. Judgment on a verdict for the plaintiff for recovery on the policy was affirmed. The test employed appears to be the one advocated by Professor Patterson. See text at note 69 supra. (The ruling on the materiality point
in the Owen case is somewhat obscured by emphasis in the opinion on the additional point
that a misrepresentation must be made with intent to deceive if it is to give the insurer a
defense.)
78. As has been indicated, there was one case, involving breach of warranty, which
declared, in apparent reference to materiality, that the policy would not have been issued if
true answers to the insurer's questions had been given. Royal Neighbors of America v. Tate,
186 Ark. 1138, 57 S.W.2d 1055 (1933). And in another case the court appeared to attach
significance to testimony by an officer of the insurance company that the policy would not
have been issued if correct information had been given. Woodmen of the World v. Brown,
194 Ark. 219, 106 S.W.2d 591 (1937). However, the court did not say that materiality depended on such a finding and could not be established by proof that if the insurer had
known the truth it would have issued a policy on different terms from the one actually
issued.
79. In Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Beck, 84 Ark. 57, 104 S.W. 533 (1907), an action on
a life insurance policy, it was firmly declared that if "the matter inquired into would affect
the question of the assumption by the company of the risk, then the warranty is material,
notwithstanding the death may have been from the accident or other cause totally disconnected with the question inquired of." 84 Ark. at 59, 104 S.W. at 533. The statement was
made regarding a warranty based on statements made in the application for the policy, and
it would seem that the court had in mind the same concept of materiality as would apply to a
misrepresentation not warranted to be true. Royal Neighbors v. Tate, 186 Ark. 1138, 57
S.W.2d 1055 (1933), was equally positive on the point. However, the only misrepresentation
case to discuss the matter pointed the other way. Inter-Ocean Cas. Co. v. Huddleston, 184
Ark. 1129, 45 S.W.2d 24 (1932). There suit was brought on a health insurance policy to
recover benefits for sickness from malaria occurring after the policy was issued. In the application for the policy the insured had represented that she had never had "any ... disease
or infirmity," and had not had medical treatment during the preceding three years. At trial
the insured admitted, and her physician testified, that she had been treated for malaria in the
year preceding the application, though the physician also testified that the insured had been
cured of that infection and that the malaria attack which gave rise to the claim on the policy
was a new infection. Affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, the supreme court found the
misrepresentation not to be material, on the basis of the physician's testimony. "There was
no relation whatever between the two attacks of malaria, but they were due to separate bites
of mosquitoes, so the first was not material to the second." 184 Ark. at 1132, 45 S.W.2d at
25.
80. R. KEETON, BASic TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 5.7(b) (1971); E. PATTERSON, EsSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW § 75 (2d ed. 1957).
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general contract law applicable to misrepresentation. 8' It might be
thought inherent in the concept of materiality, at least where materiality is tested by considering what the actual insurer would have
done if the truth had been known, but that is not necessarily so, for
an insurer might enter into a contract under misapprehension of
material fact but be misled, not by the applicant's misrepresentation,
but by the results of its own investigation or by information supplied
by a third party for whose conduct the applicant is not responsible.82
The Arkansas cases recognized a requirement of reliance, 83 but no
case has been found in which it was a crucial issue.84 The sort of
fact situation which would raise the issue probably did not often
occur.
It is likely that the reason for the sparseness of Arkansas authority on the meaning of material was that this element of a misrepresentation defense was overshadowed by the requirement that
the representation have been made with knowledge of its falsity and
intent to deceive the insurer. If such knowledge and intent were
absent, the question of materiality was moot, and if such fraudulent
intent were shown, it would probably be a rare case in which the
misrepresentation was immaterial. The intent-to-deceive requirement may also help to explain the lack of emphasis on the rule that
a representation must be substantially untrue to be grounds for
81.

RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 476(l), Comment c (1932); RESTATEMENT (SEC-

OND) OF CONTRACTS § 306(1), Comment c (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1976).

82. See R. KEETON, supra note 80.
83. National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Threlkeld, 189 Ark. 165, 70 S.W.2d 851 (1934);
Bankers Reserve Life Co. v. Crowley, 171 Ark. 135, 284 S.W. 4 (1926). See Missouri State
Life Ins. Co. v. Witt, 161 Ark. 148, 256 S.W. 46 (1923).
84. In American Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Edenfield, 228 Ark. 93, 306 S.W.2d 321
(1957), there is a passage in the opinion for the court which suggests that the insurer's misrepresentation defense was being rejected for lack of reliance. The insurer contended that
the applicant for insurance on his own life had made a misrepresentation that he was free of
heart disease to induce issuance of the policy. The applicant had submitted to a physical
examination by the insurer's physician at the time of the application. The court observed
that the examining physician's signed report indicated no murmurs or enlargement of the
heart and advised the risk without qualification. The insurer's underwriter testified, "If it is
a medical policy we rely on what our physician says about a man." Id at 96, 306 S.W.2d at
323. This falls well short of establishing that the disposition of the appeal adverse to the
insurer was on the ground of lack of reliance by the insurer on the representation. The court
did not discuss the significance of the underwriter's testimony. Even though it did indicate

reliance on the medical examiner's report, there may have been reliance on the applicant's
representation as well. See R. KEETON, supra note 80. Moreover, the disposition of the
case, judging from the opinion as a whole, appears to have been on the ground that the
insurer's evidence was insufficient to establish that the applicant for insurance had knowingly misrepresented his heart condition.
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avoidance and the relative insignificance of the reliance requirement.
Certainly the most formidable obstacle to a successful misrepresentation defense was the insistence on actual fraud on the part of
the applicant. Though a probable majority of American cases rejected such a requirement in insurance cases, 85 and it may not have
been essential in Arkansas to justify rescission of other contracts for
misrepresentation,8 6 the Arkansas insurance cases unyieldingly required that knowledge of falsity of the representation and intent to
deceive be established by the insurer by a preponderance of the evidence.87 The burden was heavy because of the need to prove the
actual state of mind of the applicant for the insurance, who might
no longer be living at the time of the trial, 8 and it was increased in
some cases by the legal prohibition of disclosure by medical attendants of information obtained in their professional capacities.89 In
any case at law where the evidence was not conclusive the question
was settled by the trier of fact and most often adversely to the insurer.90 It is scarcely surprising that the reported cases in which in85. See E. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW §§ 76, 77 (2d ed. 1957); W.
§ 67 (3d ed. 1951); R. KEETON, BASIC
TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 5.7(a) (1971); Magaw, Representations in the Law of Lfe Insurance, Parts I & II, 11 TEMP. L.Q. 463 (1937), 12 TEMP. L.Q. 55 (1937). This is in accord
with the prevailing American rule as to contracts in general. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
§ 476(1), Comment b (1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CorTrrRACTs § 306(l), Comment b
(Tent. Draft No. 11, 1976); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 9-14
(2d ed. 1977).
86. Standards Motors Fin. Co. v. Mitchell Auto Co., 173 Ark. 875, 293 S.W. 1026 (1927)
(dictum). But see Handford v. Handford, 218 Ark. 133, 234 S.W.2d 764 (1950).
87. See Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y v. Reese, 206 Ark. 530, 176 S.W.2d 708
(1943); Old Colony Life Ins. Co. v. Julian, 175 Ark. 359, 299 S.W. 366 (1927); Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Owen, 111 Ark. 554, 164 S.W. 720 (1914). Indeed, the insurer had the burden of
proof on all elements of the misrepresentation defense. See Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v.
Witt, 161 Ark. 148, 256 S.W. 46 (1923) (approving instruction that burden was on insurer, in
action on a life policy, to show that false, material representations, which induced issuance
of the policy, were made to it by the insured knowingly, willfully, and with intent to defraud
the company); American Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Edenfield, 228 Ark. 93, 306 S.W.2d 321
(1957); National Life & Accident Co. v. Threlkeld, 189 Ark. 165, 70 S.W.2d 851 (1934).
88. Most notably in cases of life insurance, of course.
89. See cases cited notes 42 & 43 supra.
90. Of 33 Arkansas Supreme Court decisions prior to 1959 in which the opinions indicate that the question of fraudulent intent on the part of the applicant for insurance was
considered by the trier of fact, findings of fraud were made at the trial level in only three.
McBath v. American Republic Ins. Co., 208 Ark. 764, 187 S.W.2d 954 (1945) (judgment for
insurer by court sitting without jury affirmed); Hohenschutz v. Knights of Columbus, 208
Ark. 358, 186 S.W.2d 177 (1945) (judgment on verdict for insurer affirmed); Wilbon v.
Washington Fidelity Nat'l Ins. Co., 181 Ark. 1127, 182 Ark. 57, 29 S.W.2d 680 (1930) (judgment reversed for error in instructions). In two of the cases decided adversely to the insurer
VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE
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surers escaped liability by reason of misrepresentation were rare.
C.

Concealment

Closely related to the misrepresentation defense, but distinguishable from it because it does not involve affirmative deceptive
action by the applicant for insurance, is what has been referred to as
the defense of concealment, based on the applicant's failure to volunteer material information even though the insurer has made no
inquiry calling for such information. 9 ' The generally accepted doctrine in the United States has been that such failure to make voluntary disclosure can be grounds for avoidance of the insurance
contract; but, where marine insurance is not involved, only if the
insurer is ignorant of the facts and the applicant knows the facts,
realizes that they are material and believes the insurer to be ignorant
of them. In other words, the insurer has a defense if the information
is fraudulently withheld from it and the insurer is prejudiced.92 The
rare Arkansas
cases involving such facts seemed consistent with this
3

view.

9

by the trier of fact, the judgments were reversed on the ground that fraud was established as
a matter of law. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Routon, 207 Ark. 132, 179 S.W.2d 862 (1944); Pacific
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Butler, 190 Ark. 282, 78 S.W.2d 813 (1935). It does not follow, of
course, that the pattern of decision in unappealed cases corresponded.
91. Use of the term concealment to describe failure to volunteer information is common
in insurance law. See E. PATTERSON, supra note 85, ch. 10; W. VANCE, supra note 85, ch. 7,
pt. II; R. KEETON, supra note 85, § 5.8. In the general law of contracts, however, it is more
commonly used to describe affirmative conduct designed to prevent another person from
learning facts. See E. PATTERSON, supra note 85, § 87; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 471,
Comment f; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 303, Comment a (Tent. Draft No.
11, 1976); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 85, §§ 9-20.
92. See E. PATTERSON, supra note 85, §§ 87, 89; W. VANCE, supra note 85, §§ 61, 62; R.
KEETON, supra note 85, § 5.8; Harnett, The Doctrine of Concealment: A Remnant in the Law
ofInsurance, 15 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 391 (1950). In regard to marine insurance, the law
has been less indulgent toward the insured, permitting the insurer to avoid on the basis of
the applicant's knowledge of material facts which are unknown to the insurer even though
the applicant was unaware of the materiality of the facts and of the insurer's ignorance of
them. See E. PATTERSON, supra note 85, §§ 87, 88; Harnett, supra, at 400.
93. See United States Annuity & Life Ins. Co. v. Peak, 122 Ark. 58, 182 S.W. 565
(1916). Robert Peak made application to United States Annuity for a policy of insurance on
his own life and was examined by the company's physician. Among the questions asked in
the medical examination form was whether the proposed insured's urine showed albumen or
sugar. On the basis of his examination of a sample of what he believed to be Peak's urine,
the physician answered "no" to the question. Three days after having had his examination,
Peak was examined by another physician for insurance with another company. The second
physician found albumen in Peak's urine, as well as other indications of illness, concluded
that Peak was suffering from Bright's disease, and told Peak of his diagnosis. Peak became
alarmed, but he did not inform United States Annuity of the development. The United
States Annuity policy Peak had applied for was subsequently issued. Peak died five months
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A somewhat specialized type of concealment problem is
presented by a case where the applicant for insurance makes a truthful representation to the insurer at the time he applies, but before
the policy is issued he becomes aware of facts which would render
his prior statement false if it were repeated. Here, the majority of
American courts have held (where marine insurance is not involved)
that the applicant's failure to inform the insurer of the new developments is governed by the same rule as is applied in other cases of
concealment.94 The minority position allows the insurer to avoid
the contract if the facts are material and unknown to the insurer,
even though the applicant does not realize their materiality, his silence being treated as misrepresentation.9 5 No Arkansas case exactly on point has been found,9 6 but in view of the Arkansas
requirement of fraudulent intent to justify avoidance even for an
affirmative misrepresentation, it seems a foregone conclusion that
the Arkansas Supreme Court would not have endorsed the minority
rule.
D. Limiting Effect of Contract Clauses
The provisions of the insurance policy may operate to limit the
later of Bright's disease. When action was brought to enforce the policy the jury was instructed to determine whether Peak had obtained the policy by fraud, either by failing to
reveal to the insurer that he had Bright's disease after he learned of it, or by furnishing the
defendant's physician with a specimen of urine that was not his own. The verdict was for
the plaintiff and judgment was rendered accordingly. The supreme court reversed, in part
because of error in admission of certain evidence, but also because the undisputed evidence
showed that Peak knew he had Bright's disease, "and the failure to disclose his knowledge
that he had chronic Bright's disease was an intentional concealment on his part of a material
fact, and his failure to communicate it to the company avoided the policy." 122 Ark. at 67,
182 S.W. at 567. The cause was not dismissed, however, but remanded for new trial. Retrial
again produced a verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and this time the judgment was affirmed, on the ground that the evidence in the second trial permitted the inference that Peak
did not believe he had Bright's disease. United States Annuity & Life Ins. Co. v. Peak, 129
Ark. 43, 195 S.W. 392 (1917). Cf. Great Southern Fire Ins. Co. v. Burns & Billington, 118
Ark. 22, 175 S.W. 1161 (1915). But see Williams v. Farmers & Merchants Ins. Co., 327 F.
Supp. 1109 (W.D. Ark. 1971), apparently taking the position by dictum, that an applicant
for a policy of fire insurance, making oral application to the insurer's agent, has no duty to
volunteer information when the agent has asked no question calling for it. (The case arose
from facts which occurred after the effective date of the 1959 Insurance Code, but the decision appears not to have been influenced by the Code. The judgment was partially reversed
on other grounds in 457 F.2d 37 (8th Cir. 1972).) No Arkansas case presenting a concealment issue with respect to marine insurance has been found.
94. See E. PATTERSON, supra note 85, §§ 81, 89; Harnett, supra note 92 at 406-07.
95. See E. PATTERSON, supra note 85, § 81; Harnett, supra note 92 at 404.
96. The Peak case, discussed in note 93 supra, does not appear to have involved an
original representation by the applicant which would have been false if repeated.
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effect of a breach of warranty or misrepresentation. Two types of
policy clauses were of particular significance in the Arkansas cases
prior to the 1959 Insurance Code, incontestability clauses and age
adjustment clauses.
An incontestability clause (or incontestable clause) is a provision in an insurance policy, most commonly a policy of life insurance, that immediately 97 or after a specified lapse of time, 98 the
policy is to be incontestable except for specified causes. Although
the Arkansas cases were not numerous, and were concerned primarily with other questions raised by incontestability clauses, they
seemed to assume that once the policy had become incontestable
under such a clause, defenses of breach of affirmative warranty99
and misrepresentation in procurement of the policy'0 were no
longer available to the insurer.10 '
97. National Annuity Ass'n v. Carter, 96 Ark. 495, 132 S.W. 633 (1910). But see Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Cranford, 161 Ark. 602, 257 S.W. 66 (1923) (dictum suggesting
that an incontestability clause is not valid unless it allows the insurer a reasonable time to
investigate grounds for contest).
98. Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Cranford, 161 Ark. 602, 257 S.W. 66 (1923) ("after
one year"); Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 157 Ark. 499, 248 S.W. 897 (1923)
... ).
("After the policy shall be in force for one full year from the date hereof.
99. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 157 Ark. 499, 248 S.W. 897 (1923), is
ambiguous regarding whether the insurer's defense was breach of warranty or misrepresentation. The statement of facts refers to the defense as misrepresentation, but the opinion
concludes with a statement that since the incontestability clause had not cut off the defense
the trial court should have submitted to the jury the question of the "alleged breach of
warranty." The case clearly assumes that the defense would have been cut off if the period
of contestability had expired. American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Stutchman, 208 Ark. 1023, 185
S.W.2d 284 (1945), carries an implied holding that a defense based on a delivery in good
health clause, see note 33 supra, is cut off by expiration of the period of contestability.
100. The implied holding of Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Cranford, 161 Ark. 602, 257
S.W. 66 (1923), is that a misrepresentation defense is invalid when the policy has become
incontestable. In Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n v. Hamilton, 188 Ark. 887, 67 S.W.2d 741
(1934), the incontestability clause was treated as barring a misrepresentation defense, the
court stating that such a clause is "effectual to waive all defenses" except those reserved in
the clause. See also dissenting opinion in American Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Turman, 254
Ark. 456, 495 S.W.2d 866 (1973).
101. National Annuity Ass'n v. Carter, 96 Ark. 495, 132 S.W. 633 (1910), is difficult to
decipher. In an action on a death benefit certificate which provided that benefits should be
incontestable from the date of the certificate, the insurer set up a defense of misrepresentation. Affirming a judgment on a verdict for the plaintiff, the court noted that the insurer had
not pleaded breach of warranty but added that, if it had, the defense would have been of no
avail in view of the incontestability clause in the certificate, which, being the latest expression by the parties of the terms of their contract, would nullify any warranty provision in the
application for the policy. The court then ruled that the lower court had correctly submitted
to the jury the question whether the alleged misrepresentations were material to the risk.
The case thus appears to treat the incontestability clause as effective to bar a breach of
warranty defense but not a misrepresentation defense. As has been noted, see note 100
supra, there is more recent authority to the contrary with respect to the misrepresentation
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An age adjustment clause, also typically found in life insurance
policies, usually provides that if the age of the insured has been misstated, the amount of insurance is to be reduced to the amount
which the premiums paid would have purchased at the insured's
true age. It is probable, though no Arkansas case addressed the
question, that such a clause would override a warranty based on a
representation of age, on the ground that inconsistency between the
two policy provisions would create an ambiguity which should be
resolved against the insurer. On the other hand, the cases were in
agreement that fraudulent misrepresentation of age could nullify an
age adjustment clause, 0 2 because such fraud would make the entire
contract (including the age adjustment clause) voidable. 0 3 The
cases dealing with such clauses were more concerned with other
questions of interpretation" ° and estoppel. 05
II.

THE ARKANSAS INSURANCE CODE

Act 148 of 1959' ° brought together a number of earlier statutes
dealing with insurance and introduced much new law, in a comprehensive "Code."'0 7 It was concerned with far more than misrepresentations in procurement of insurance, but only those features of it
bearing fairly directly on misrepresentation are discussed here.
One advantage of statutory law is that it is much easier for the
legislature to turn the law in a new direction than it is for precedentconscious judges, who must, in any event, make changes in piecemeal fashion as appropriate cases come before them. To be successful, however, the legislature must mark out clearly the new path to
be followed. The 1959 Insurance Code appears to have been intended to reform the law of misrepresentation, but the road signs,
regrettably, leave much to be desired.
defense. If the Carter case has not been overruled sub silentio, it probably must be considered as limited to cases involving incontestability clauses which, by their terms, make the
policy incontestable as soon as it is issued.
102. Smith v. National Life & Accident Co., 183 Ark. 852, 39 S.W.2d 319 (1931); Lincoln
Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 134 Ark. 245, 203 S.W. 698 (1918).
103. See Smith v. National Life & Accident Co., 183 Ark. 852, 39 S.W.2d 319 (1931).
104. See Ponder v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 201 Ark. 179, 143 S.W.2d 1115
(1940); Lincoln Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 134 Ark. 245, 203 S.W. 698 (1918).
105. See Smith v. National Life & Accident Co., 183 Ark. 852, 39 S.W.2d 319 (1931);
Walker v. Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n, 140 Ark. 192, 215 S.W. 598 (1919).
106. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-2001 to -4920 (1980).
107. Section 1 of the Act designated its short title as "Arkansas Insurance Code." ARK.
STAT. ANN.§ 66-2001 (1980).
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Of prime importance is section 275, I0s which provides:
(1) All statements in any application for a life or disability
insurance policy or annuity contract, or in negotiations therefor,
by or in behalf of the insured or annuitant, shall be deemed to be
representations and not warranties. Misrepresentations, omissions, concealment of facts, and incorrect statements shall not
prevent a recovery under the policy or contract unless either:
(a) Fraudulent; or
(b) Material either to the acceptance of the risk, or to
the hazard assumed by the insurer; or
(c) The insurer in good faith would either not have issued the policy or contract, or would not have issued a policy or contract in as large an amount or at the same premium
or rate, or would not have provided coverage with respect to
the hazard resulting in the loss, if the true facts had been
made known to the insurer as required either by the application for the policy or contract or otherwise.
(2) If, in any action to rescind any policy or contract or to
recover thereon, any misrepresentation with respect to a medical
impairment is proved by the insurer, and the insured or any other
person having or claiming a right under the contract, shall prevent full disclosure and proof of the nature of the medical impairment, the misrepresentation shall be presumed to have been
material.
A.

Effect of Section 275 on the Law of Warranties

The first sentence of subsection (1) may appear at first glance to
consign to outer darkness the entire law of insurance warranties,
and this impression is strengthened by the almost total disappearance of references to warranties from cases decided since the Insurance Code went into effect. A closer reading reveals, however, that
the impact of the sentence is considerably more restricted.
First, it applies only where policies of life or disability insurance or annuity contracts are involved. That scope is substantial,
for the terms "life insurance" ° and "disability insurance,"" 0 par108. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3208 (1980). This section, like most of those in the Insurance
Code, became effective January 1, 1960. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 55-2001, Note (1980).
109. "Life insurance" is defined as "insurance on human lives. The transaction of life
insurance includes also the granting of endowment benefits, benefits for expenses incurred in
connection with death, additional benefits in event of death or dismemberment by accident
or accidental means, additional benefits in the event of the insured's disability, and optional
modes of settlement of proceeds of life insurance. Transaction of life insurance does not
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ticularly the latter, are broadly defined in the Code. Still, the sentence leaves untouched a number of important types of insurance
contracts. It does not affect property insurance of any sort, " and a
variety of types of insurance which may be thought of as falling
between the traditional categories of personal and property insurance, such as liability insurance" 12 and fidelity bonds, are outside its
scope. 1 3 As to these forms of insurance, section 275 is irrelevant,
and the pre-Code common law of warranties presumably continues
to be applicable," 4 except as modified1 5by occasional provisions in
other sections of the Insurance Code.'
Second, the abolition of warranties is limited to warranties
based on "statements in any application" for a contract within the
scope of the sentence, "or in negotiations therefor." The word statements is somewhat ambiguous but probably means statements of
fact." 6 That appears to be assumed in the following sentence,
preventing recovery under a policy, where subparagraph (c) provides a test based on what the insurer would have done "if the true
include workmen's compensation, as defined in section 76(l)(c) [§ 66-2405(l)(c)]." ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 66-2402 (1980).
110. "Disability insurance" is defined as "insurance of human beings against bodily injury, disablement or death by accident or accidental means, or the expenses thereof, or
against disablement and expense resulting from sickness, and every insurance appertaining
thereto. Transaction of disability insurance does not include workmen's compensation, as
defined in section 76(l)(c) [§ 66-2405(l)(c)]." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-2403 (1980).
111. See Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Jordan, 234 Ark. 627, 353 S.W.2d 536 (1962) (burglary insurance).
112. See MFA Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dixon, 243 F. Supp. 806 (W.D. Ark. 1965) (finding that
the truth of the applicant's representation was a condition of the validity of an automobile
liability policy; Arkansas substantive law seemingly applicable, though conclusion reached
without citation to Arkansas authority in circumstances where Arkansas case law would
point to opposite conclusion).
113. It should be noted also that the definitions of "vehicle insurance," "liability insurance," "burglary insurance," and "malpractice insurance" in subsection (1) of § 76 of the
Insurance Code, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-2405(1) (1980), include provision of benefits that
would also come within the definitions of "life insurance" and "disability insurance," see
notes 109, 110 supra. Section 76(2) provides: "Provision of medical, hospital, surgical and
funeral benefits, and of coverage against accidental death or injury, as incidental to and part
of other insurance as stated under subdivisions (a) (vehicle), (b) (liability), (d) (burglary),
and (j) (malpractice) of subsection (1) shall for all purposes be deemed to be the same kind
of insurance to which it is so incidental, and shall not be subject to provisions of this code
applicableto life or disability insurances." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-2405(2) (1980) (emphasis
added).
114. See Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Jordan, 234 Ark. 627, 353 S.W.2d 536 (1962).
115. Eg., section 698 makes "substantial compliance" with terms, conditions, and warranties of policies of fire insurance on personal property sufficient to justify recovery on the
policies. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3237 (1980).
116. But see E. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW § 83 (2d ed. 1957).
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facts had been made known to the insurer.""' 7 If the word statements means statements of fact, the law of promissory warranties is
not altered." 8 Nor are affirmative warranties abolished unless they
are warranties of the truth of statements made in the application for
the policy or in negotiations for it. It would seem, for example, that
a "delivery in good health" clause, a provision in the policy that the
insurance is not to take effect unless the insured is in good health at
the time the policy is delivered to him, whether termed a warranty
or not," 9 should not be affected by section 275.120
A third limitation on the scope of the first sentence of section
275 is that the statements which are not to be treated as warranties
are statements made "by or in behalf of the insured or annuitant."
Insured is not a defined term in the Insurance Code, and as generally used it could at times refer to either of two persons. If, for example, A were to apply for a policy of insurance, to be issued to
him, covering the life of B, either A or B might be considered the
insured.' 2 Does the first sentence of section 275 refer to statements
made by or in behalf of A or B? From the standpoint of Arkansas'
pre-Code law of warranties and misrepresentations, the focus has
usually been on statements made by the applicant for the policy,
and statements of others have been of significance only if such
others could be regarded as agents of the applicant.' 22 A case could
easily arise, however, where the applicant should, in principle, be
held responsible for statements of one who was not his agent. If, for
example, B, cooperating with A in his effort to obtain a policy, answered questions of the insurer as part of the application procedure,
B's statements should be considered within the scope of the statute,
since those statements would be understood by all parties to the
117. Insurance Code § 275(1)(c), quoted in text supra at note 108.
118. See Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Jordan, 234 Ark. 627, 353 S.W.2d 536 (1962)
("book warranty" of burglary policy on merchant's stock of goods).
119. For the erratic history of delivery in good health clauses in Arkansas, see notes 33
and 40 supra.
120. Such a clause was involved in Reliable Life Ins. Co. v. Elby, 247 Ark. 514, 446
S.W.2d 215 (1969). Although the court held the clause to provide no defense in the circumstances of the case, affirming the chancellor's decision that the insurer had waived it, the
court did declare that such a clause is "valid and enforceable," and no mention was made of
§ 275 of the Insurance Code. See also E. PATrERSON, supra note 116 at § 83. It has been

earlier noted, supra note 33, that pre-Code cases in Arkansas sometimes simply ignored
delivery in good health clauses; that continues to be true. See American Pioneer Life Ins.
Co. v. Turman, 254 Ark. 456, 495 S.W.2d 866 (1973).
121. See E. PATTERSON, supra note 116, § 34 at 2, suggesting use of the term cestui que
ie to designate the person whose life is the subject of the insurance.
122. See note 9 supra.
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transaction as being made to induce the issuance of the policy. If
insured means applicant, B's statements could readily be treated as
being made in behalf of the insured, and thus within the statutory
rule.
That this is the correct reading of insured is suspect, though,
because of the way the word is used in other, related sections of the
Insurance Code. Section 271,123 which deals with the requirement
of an insurable interest to validate personal insurance, quite clearly
employs the term insured with reference to the person whose life or'
body is the subject of the insurance, as distinguished from the person procuring the insurance,1 24 and the same is true of section
273,125 concerning the form of applications for life and disability
insurance.1 26 In the case suggested above, if A is the moving party
in procuring the insurance, and the application is made by him,
even if it is done with B's consent, it would appear that if insured
has the same meaning in section 275, no statement made by A
would be one made by or in behalf of the insured. Yet it seems
unlikely that the legislature meant to exclude statements made by
the insurance applicant from the scope of the principal section of the
123. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3204 (1980).
124. The statute provides in pertinent part:
(1) Any individual of competent legal capacity may procure or effect an insurance contract upon his own life or body for the benefit of any person. But no
person shall procure or cause to be procured any insurance contract upon the life
or body of another individual unless the benefits under such contracts are payable
to the individual insured or his personal representatives, or to a person having, at
the time when such contract was made, an insurable interest in the individual in-

sured.
(2) If the beneficiary, assignee, or other payee under any contract made in
violation of this section receives from the insurer any benefits thereunder accruing
upon the death, disablement or injury of the individual insured, the individual
insured or his executor or administrator, as the case may be, may maintain an
action to recover such benefits from the person so receiving them.
(3) "Insurable interest" with reference to personal insurance includes only
interest as follows: . . .
(b) . . . a lawful and substantial economic interest in having the life, health
or bodily safety of the individual insured continue . ...
Id
125.

ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3206 (1980).

126. The statute provides in pertinent part:
No life or disability insurance contract upon an individual, except a contract of
group life insurance or of group or blanket disability insurance, shall be made or
effectuated unless at the time of the making of the contract the individual insured,
being of competent legal capacity to contract, applies therefor or has consented
thereto in writing, except in the following cases:
(1) A spouse may effectuate such insurance upon the other spouse.
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Insurance Code dealing with the effect of false representations made
to procure insurance. It may be significant that sections 271 and 273
consistently qualify the word insured by the use of the phrase individual insured, while section 275 speaks only of the insured; the difference in wording suggests a difference in substance, and the best
guide to its meaning in section 275 would
be the law forming the
127
section.
the
for
background
historical
Notwithstanding these limitations, the effect of the first sentence of section 275 is to make unnecessary in a very significant
number of cases the elaborate battery of court-developed devices to
mitigate the harshness of the black-letter law of warranty (described
in Part I.A., supra).128 Where misrepresentations are involved in
those cases, the insurer cannot change the rules of the game as to
their effect by
policy provisions treating the representations as war29
ranted true.1

B.

Effect of Section 275(1) on the Law of Misrepresentation

The second sentence of section 275 presents numerous
problems.
1. Scope.- Policies and ContractsAffected
There is, first, the problem of what types of policies or contracts
it applies to. The sentence begins: "Misrepresentations . . . shall
not prevent a recovery under the policy or contract unless . .. .
The phrase "policy or contract" is most naturally read as referring
127. Only one case has involved the problem thus far. In Dopson v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 244 Ark. 659, 426 S.W.2d 410 (1968), a husband applied to the insurer for a rider to
his hospitalization policy to extend coverage to his wife. The wife, in her husband's presence, answered questions of the agent taking the application for the rider, and the agent
entered those answers on the application form. The court appeared to treat the husband as
the "insured," but to regard him as guilty of making "incorrect statements" under § 275 of
the Insurance Code.
128. See Old American Life Ins. Co. v. McKenzie, 240 Ark. 984, 403 S.W.2d 94 (1966).
The statute appears to have been overlooked in Interstate Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Ellinberg, 242 Ark. 596, 414 S.W.2d 857 (1967).
129. A possible route to avoidance of the rule of this sentence of § 275(1) would be for
the insurer to provide in the policy that its validity is conditioned on the truth of some or all
statements made by or in behalf of the insured to procure the policy, and to argue that a
condition is to be distinguished from a warranty, § 275 applying only to the latter. Such a
distinction has sometimes been drawn by courts of other states. See, e.g., Ballard v. Globe &
Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 237 Mass. 34, 129 N.E. 290 (1921). This device would be a patent
attempt at evasion, rather than legitimate avoidance, of the statutory rule, and it would be
difficult to sustain in Arkansas, where the leading cases have identified warranties with conditions. See, e.g., Providence Life Assurance Soc'y v. Reutlinger, 58 Ark. 528, 532-33, 25
S.W. 835, 836 (1894) (quoted in text at note 8 supra).
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to a policy or contract of a type referred to in the preceding sentence: a life or disability policy or an annuity contract. Policies of
of life
property insurance and other policies which are not policies
30
or disability insurance appear to be outside its scope.
This question has been raised in the cases but not settled. Old
Republic Insurance Co. v. Alexander' was an action for rescission
of an accident insurance policy, in which the insured counterclaimed for policy benefits for loss of a foot as a result of an accidental gunshot wound. The action was brought on grounds of
misrepresentation on the part of the insured in his application for
the policy, and the counterclaim was resisted on the same basis. The
opinion for the court by Justice Fogleman fairly clearly assumed
was applicable, as did the concurring opinion of
that section 275(1)
32
Smith.
Justice
33
In the subsequent case of Motors Insurance Corp. v. Tinkle
the action was brought by the named insured to enforce a physical
damage automobile insurance policy, the plaintiff claiming benefits
for accidental loss of a pick-up truck. On appeal from a judgment
for the plaintiff, the principal issue was whether misrepresentations
made in the application for the policy were material. The insurer
relied on section 275(1) of the Insurance Code and was met with the
argument that the section did not apply because the policy in suit
was not one of life or disability insurance. The insurer pointed to
the Alexander case as one in which the court had treated the statute
as applicable to an accident policy. Noting this dispute in a footnote, Chief Justice Harris dismissed it with a comment that, "It is
not really necessary to discuss the apparent conffict in deciding the
instant case." '3 He then disposed of the materiality issue adversely
to the insurer by drawing heavily on the reasoning of the majority
opinion in Alexander. It may be that it was thought unnecessary to
decide whether section 275(1) applied because the reasoning in Alexander was considered not to be based on the statute, or it may have
been assumed that the Alexander reasoning, even if based on the
130. See Almond v. Countryside Cas. Co., 329 F. Supp. 137 (W.D. Ark. 1971), aff'd
mem., 455 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1972) (automobile liability policy; § 275 not mentioned); Interstate Fire Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 256 Ark. 986, 511 S.W.2d 471 (1974) (fire insurance; § 275 not

mentioned).
131. 245 Ark. 1029, 436 S.W.2d 829 (1969).
132. Id at 1043, 436 S.W.2d at 837.

133. 253 Ark. 620, 488 S.W.2d 23 (1972).
134. Id at 625 n.5, 488 S.W.2d at 27 n.5.
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statute, was equally appropriate for cases not governed by section
275.
While both Alexander and Tinkle involved contracts that could
be described as accident insurance policies, the policies are readily
distinguishable. The Alexander case was concerned with a policy of
personal accident insurance and falls within the definition of "disability insurance" in section 74 of the Code;' 35 it would, therefore, be
clearly within the scope of section 275(1). The policy in Tinkle, on
the other hand, at least the portion of it involved in the litigation,
was one of insurance against accidental damage to property,136not
within the definitions of life insurance and disability insurance of
the Insurance Code, and thus not within the coverage of the second
sentence of section 275(1) if the sentence is read as restricted to life
and disability insurance.
To say that the second sentence of section 275(1) does not apply
to insurance other than life or disability insurance is not to say that
the statute is entirely irrelevant to other policies. Where no other
provision of the Insurance Code deals with the same subject matter,
the conditions under which misrepresentations will render other
policies voidable continue to be governed by common law. There is
no reason why the courts could not be guided by the rules of section
275(1), if they consider the statutory rules to reflect principles that
are just as soundly applied to insurance policies not within the scope
of the statute, or if they conclude that the statute amounts to a declaration of Arkansas public policy that goes beyond the limits of its
stated rules. The Tinkle decision may have been reasoned along
such lines.
2. Scope. Application in Absence of Misrepresentationor
Concealment
The second sentence of section 275(1) probably also refers to
misrepresentations made in any application for insurance or an annuity contract, or in negotiations therefor, by or in behalf of the
insured or annuitant, as the first sentence expressly does. It seems
the most natural reading, in view of the inclusion of both sentences
in the same paragraph, and it seems to be assumed in the concluding
words of subparagraph (c).
The propriety of this reading is cast into doubt, however, by the
opinion for the court in American Family Life Assurance Co. v.
135. See note 110 supra.
136. See notes 109 and 110 supra. See also note 113 supra.
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Reeves. There an applicant for medical expense insurance covering both himself and his wife gave negative answers to the following
questions: "1. To the best of your knowledge, does any member of
the family group to be insured now have or ever had cancer? 2. To
the best of your knowledge, has any member of the family group to
be insured ever had: (a) lumps, growths or swellings; . . . ?,,13s
When the applicant's wife was found to be suffering from cancer ten
months after the policy was issued, his claim for policy benefits was
denied, and suit was brought on the policy. The insurer pleaded
that the plaintiff had made misrepresentations in his application
which were fraudulent and material to the risk, and that if the true
facts had been known the certificate of insurance would not have
been issued covering plaintiffs wife.
At trial the insurer introduced evidence that the plaintiffs wife
had had her left eye removed because of a malignant tumor seven or
eight years prior to the issuance of the policy. Plaintiff testified that
neither he nor his wife had ever been told that the eye was removed
because of a cancerous condition, and that, although he had been
eye had been required by a growth, he
aware that the removal of13the
9

had not seen the growth.

On appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff, the supreme court
reversed and remanded. Justice Holt's opinion observed that the
lower court's judgment necessarily involved a finding that the plaintiff had not been guilty of fraud and held that finding supported by
the evidence. He also noted that the questions asked by the insurer
were prefaced by the words, "to the best of your knowledge," and
concluded from that language that the answers given could not be
misrepresentations. But then Justice Holt held that the insurer
could have a defense under section 275(l)(c) of the Insurance Code:
The appellant, however, pleaded at trial and asserts on appeal
its affirmative defense, pursuant to subsection (c) of § 66-3208
that had the true facts been known, the certificate of insurance
would not have been issued to insure Mrs. Reeves. As noted
above, subsection (c) provides that recovery may be prevented if
"[tihe insurer in good faith would ... not have issued the policy

...if the true facts had been made known to the insurer as required either by the application for the policy or contract or
otherwise." Logically, in the circumstances of the case at bar,
this affirmative defense cannot be construed to be affected by the
137. 248 Ark. 1303, 455 S.W.2d 932 (1970).
138. Id at 1304, 455 S.W.2d at 934.
139. Id at 1308, 455 S.W.2d at 935.
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"[t]o the best of your knowledge" qualifying phrase in the questions of the application. The "true facts" referred to in subsection (c) relate to whether or not there was a pre-existing
malignant growth, as contended by appellant, and not to whether
the appellee had actual knowledge of this condition."
This passage is intriguing. The holding appears to be that if the
insurer asks the applicant whether, to the best of his knowledge, any
person to be insured has ever had cancer, lumps, growths or swellings, and he gives a negative answer which is true as far as he
knows, though the applicant cannot be found guilty of either fraud
or misrepresentation, section 275(l)(c) of the Insurance Code nevertheless provides the insurer with a defense, if the insurer can establish that one of the persons to be insured did in fact have a
malignant growth and that it would have refused to issue a policy
covering that person if it had known of the growth. The reasoning is
not spelled out in the majority opinion, but it may be, as Justice
Fogleman inferred, rooted in the words "or otherwise" in subparagraph (c). Justice Fogleman's dissenting opinion in Reeves pointed
out that section 275(l)(c) "relates only to risks which would have
been refused, or which would have been accepted only on a conditional or limited basis, or at a higher premium, if the true facts had
been made known to the insurer 'as required either by the application for the policy or contract or otherwise.' ",141 Since the application for the policy required only an answer to the best of the
applicant's knowledge, and since the majority opinion acknowledged that there was substantial evidence that plaintiff had answered to the best of his knowledge, Justice Fogleman inferred that
the "premise of the majority opinion" was that the true facts referred to in subparagraph (c) were facts required otherwise than in
the application for the policy, and he seemed to understand the majority opinion to mean that the insurer required facts to be true in
any case where the existence of those facts would be regarded by the
of whether the
insurer as materially increasing the risk, regardless
42
facts.1
such
disclose
to
asked
been
had
applicant
If Justice Fogleman's interpretation of the majority opinion (or
the interpretation which this reviewer has attributed to him) is correct, the case holds that the scope of the second sentence of section
275(1) is considerably broader than the first, in that it can apply to
140. Id
141. Id at 1310, 455 S.W.2d at 937 (Fogleman, J., dissenting).
142. Id
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afford the insurer a defense in the absence of any misrepresentation
made by the applicant for the insurance or in his behalf, either in
the application for the policy or in negotiations for it.
It is difficult to believe that so broad a reading of the statute
will prevail. It involves a drastic departure from prior law, with no
indication of legislative intent to work such a change, other than the
ambiguous "or otherwise" wording in section 275(l)(c) of the Insurance Code. That ambiguity can be quite satisfactorily resolved from
the context in which the words appear. As Justice Fogleman
demonstrated in his dissenting opinion in the Reeves case, 14 3 the
words "or otherwise" in paragraph (c) acquire a more restricted
meaning when section 275(1) is read as a whole. The first sentence
refers to statements of an insured or annuitant, or in his behalf,
made in an application for a policy or annuity contract or in negotiations therefor. When paragraph (c) of the second sentence speaks
of the "true facts . . . as required either by the application for the
policy or contract or otherwise," the words "or otherwise" are seen
to have been included with reference to the words "or in negotiations therefor" of the first sentence, and if there have been no negotiations, apart from the application, in which the insurer required
information of the insured or annuitant, the insurer can have a defense under paragraph (c) only if false information is given which
has been called for by the application. If, as in Reeves, the applicant
is asked to state facts in the application to the best of his knowledge,
and he does so, the fact that his knowledge is inconsistent with the
objective facts should not make the policy or contract voidable.
3. Scope: Application to Failureto Volunteer Information
A closely related problem regarding the scope of the second
sentence of section 275(1) is raised by the description of its subjectmatter as "[m]isrepresentations, omissions, concealment of facts,
and incorrect statements." The first sentence refers only to statements. The additional wording in the second sentence suggests that
it is broader in scope.
Most challenging is the explicit inclusion of concealment of
facts. As has been noted,'" Arkansas cases prior to the Insurance
Code, in accord with American cases generally where marine insurance was not involved, did not appear to treat failure to volunteer
information, commonly called concealment, as grounds for avoid143. Id
144. See text at notes 92-96 supra.
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ance of an insurance contract unless the information was withheld
with awareness of its materiality and with intent to deceive the insurer. Yet under section 275(1) concealment of facts does not prevent recovery on a policy unless it is either fraudulent or material.
It has already been held that the statute provides the insurer a defense on the basis of material misrepresentations even if they are not
made with fraudulent intent, on the reasoning that the fraudulent
and material requirements are stated in the alternative.1 45 If concealment of facts in section 275(1) means simple failure to volunteer
information, the statute makes a change in the law which can be
highly prejudicial to insurance policyholders and their beneficiaries.
No reason is apparent why the Arkansas General Assembly should
have wished to adopt so harsh and novel a rule, but the statutory
language must be accounted for.
The historical background of the section offers a clue to the
meaning of concealment of facts and suggests that it is quite a different concept from the concealment of the pre-Code insurance law.
As the discussion in Part I has shown, the Arkansas law prior to the
Insurance Code was tortured by a desire of the courts to relieve
against the harshness of the traditional law of insurance warranties,
as well as an apparent feeling of a need to prevent the law of nonwarranted misrepresentations from imposing undue burdens on insurance policyholders and their beneficiaries. With respect to misrepresentations, the Arkansas law was more protective than that of
the majority of American states in its insistence that misrepresentations be fraudulent in order to make an insurance contract voidable,
while the requirement of materiality remained ill-defined, quite
likely because it was overshadowed by the requirement of fraudulent intent. Section 275(1) can be seen against this background to
have as its probable purposes: (1) abolition of warranty doctrine as
governing the effect of misrepresentations, (2) elimination of fraudulent intent as a prerequisite to avoidance for misrepresentation
(thereby bringing Arkansas law into line with that of the majority of
American jurisdictions), and (3) provision of a compensating clarification of the materiality requirement.
Since these purposes do not call for modification of the traditional law of concealment, it is not likely that that law was intended
to be affected by the statute. Reading concealment of facts consistently with the inferable purposes of the statute would be that the
phrase is used to refer to concealment in the nature of misrepresen145. See note 156 mfra.
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tation, a failure to give information which has the effect of actively
misleading the insurer by implied misrepresentation. It could well
be applied, for example, to a case where an insurer asked an applicant to list all surgical operations he had had within the past five
years, and the applicant's leaving the space for an answer blank,
when in fact he had had open-heart surgery within the five year
period. The insurer could reasonably understand the answer to be
none. Failure to answer here is not a simple failure to volunteer
information; it is a failure to give required information, which implies that such information does not exist.' 46 As another example,
an applicant for life insurance may be asked: "Have you, within the
past five years, had medical treatment for any illness or injury? Describe all such treatments." If he answers only, "Broken leg, June
1978," he implies that the broken leg is the sole illness or injury for
which he has been treated during that period, and if the truth is that
he was also treated within the five years for a severe heart attack, his
representation is false.
The text of the statute can be found to support this narrow
reading of concealment of facts. As has been noted in the discussion
of the Reeves decision, the first sentence of section 275(1) is expressly limited in scope to statements made in any application for a
life or disability policy or annuity contract, or in negotiations therefor, and the probability is that the second sentence is intended to be
similarly limited, an inference reinforced by the fact that subparagraph (c) provides the insurer a defense on a showing that it would
not have issued the same policy on the same terms if the true facts
had been made known to the insurer as required either by the application for the policy or contract or otherwise. The assumption appears to be that the second sentence of section 275(1) applies only to
course of
cases where information was required by the insurer in 4the
7
the negotiations leading to the issuance of the policy.'1
146. Such concealment may, however, not afford the insurer a defense, for it may be held
that the insurer, by accepting the application without insisting that the blank be filled, assumes the risk of its ignorance of the matters to which the question relates. See Independent
Fire Ins. Co. v. Horn, 343 So. 2d 862 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
147. See Roess v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 383 F. Supp. 1231 (M.D. Fla. 1974),
which employs similar reasoning to conclude that failure to inform the insurer of facts cannot afford the insurer a defense under a Florida statute very similar to Arkansas's, if the
insurer did not raise the subject in the application for the policy or otherwise in negotiations
preceding issuance of the policy, but asserts that the statute does not preclude a finding of
fraudulent concealment under common-law principles. In Disposable Serv., Inc. v. ITT Life
Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1971) the court treated the Florida statute as applying to a

case where a proposed insured's physical condition changed adversely between the time of
application for the policy and the time of payment of the first premium, on which the pol-

62
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It may be objected that if concealment of facts has so narrow a
meaning the phrase is superfluous, for misrepresentations is adequate to cover the situations involved, as is the additional reference
to omissions. The point must be conceded. It is to be noted, however, that incorrect statements seem no less redundant; it is difficult
to imagine when an incorrect statement would not also be a misrepresentation. This overlapping terminology can probably best be accounted for as not uncommon drafting overkill, the objective being
to emphasize the idea that misrepresentation, broadly conceived, is
the subject of the sentence.
The Arkansas cases thus far have given little attention to the
breadth of field described in section 275(1) by the words
"[m]isrepresentations, omissions, concealment of facts, and incorrect
statements" 148 but are consistent with the reading suggested above
as far as they go. They appear to treat the terms misrepresentations
and incorrect statements as interchangeable,' 49 and to regard omissions as answers to insurers' questions which are either incomplete
or false, I 50 the equivalent of misrepresentations. 15 1 Concealment of
icy's effectiveness depended. The court considered the applicant's failure to inform the insurer of the material change within the statute, whether his silence be treated as "passive
misrepresentation, 'omission," or "concealment of facts," and asserted that his good faith
and lack of knowledge of the seriousness of the change were immaterial. The two cases are
not necessarily inconsistent, since the information withheld in DisposableServices did relate
to facts of a kind that had been inquired about in the application for the insurance.
In Industrial Indem. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Cos., 93 Idaho 59, 454 P.2d
956 (1969), the Idaho Supreme Court appeared to assume that failure by an applicant to
supply information not inquired about by the insurer was not within the coverage of Idaho's
misrepresentation statute, which is worded much like § 275(1) of the Arkansas Insurance
Code, and that common-law principles of concealment governed whether the insurer had a
defense.
148. The only non-Arkansas case that has attempted a comprehensive examination of
the meanings of these terms is Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 416 P.2d 935 (Okla.
1965), applying an Oklahoma statute quite similar to Arkansas's. Unfortunately, the definitions adopted in that case are drawn largely from common-law definitions appearing in
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, and they are distorted by the insistence of the Oklahoma court
that there can be no defense under the statute unless the applicant has knowledge or should
have knowledge of the truth at the time of his "misrepresentation," 'omission," "concealment of facts," or "incorrect statement." See note 156 infra.
149. See, e.g., the cases involving statements of good health made in applications for
credit life insurance: Ford Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 262 Ark. 881, 563 S.W.2d 399 (1978)
("incorrect statements"); National Old Line Life Ins. Co. v. People, 256 Ark. 137, 506
S.W.2d 128 (1974) ("misrepresentation," and all of the above cases cited as involving "misrepresentations" under Insurance Code § 275); American Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 255
Ark. 949, 504 S.W.2d 356 (1974) ("incorrect statement"); American Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v.
Turman, 254 Ark. 456, 495 S.W.2d 866 (1973) ("misrepresentation"); Union Life Ins. Co. v.
Davis, 247 Ark. 1054, 449 S.W.2d 192 (1970) ("incorrect statement").
150. See Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 245 Ark. 934, 436 S.W.2d 97 (1969) (literally false
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facts has not been used in a way that sheds much light on its mean-

ing,

52 but

no case has presented facts involving pure failure to vol-

unteer information.
4. Determination of Falsity of Representation

That a representation is false is, of course, a necessary fin din!'
to make the rules of the second sentence of section 275(1) applicable, and the statute provides no instructions on how the finding is to
be made. Pre-Code decisions remain viable precedents. Thus, it
may be expected that questions asked by an insurer of an applicant
for insurance will still be construed strictly against the insurer. 53 It
may be anticipated also that some representations will still be
treated as merely statements of opinion or belief, false only if the
persons making them do not honestly hold the opinions represented; 54 to this extent, fraudulent intent continues to be a require"no" answers to questions about prior symptoms, ailments and treatments referred to as
"omissions" or "incorrect statements"); Old American Life Ins. Co. v. McKenzie, 240 Ark.
984, 403 S.W.2d 94 (1966) (incomplete statement of medical history given by applicant for
personal accident and hospitalization insurance said to involve "omissions").
151. In National Old Line Ins. Co. v. People, 256 Ark. 137, 506 S.W.2d 128 (1974), both
McKenzie and Smith were referred to as involving misrepresentation under Insurance Code

§ 275.
152. In Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 245 Ark. 1029, 436 S.W.2d 829 (1969), an
applicant for personal accident insurance answered "yes" to a question asking whether he
had ever had an operation and gave details of two operations but failed to mention heart
surgery he had undergone, although arguably the application form called for details of it.
The insurer contended that the insured was guilty of "concealment or omission" under Insurance Code § 275. The court found it unnecessary to decide whether there was concealment or omission within the meaning of the statute, ruling that even if it were so, it could not
be held as a matter of law that the information withheld was material to the risk. A chancellor's decree for recovery of policy benefits was affirmed. In National Old Line Ins. Co. v.
People, 256 Ark. 137, 506 S.W.2d 128 (1974), the Alexander case is cited as dealing with
misrepresentation.
153. See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Baker, 245 Ark. 853, 435 S.W.2d 780 (1968), where a
negative answer to a question whether an applicant for hospital and surgical expense insurance had ever had, or been advised that he had, "[any disease of the.., urinary or gall
bladder" was held not false, though it was shown that the applicant had had prostrate gland
trouble. The insurer argued that the question referred to any disease of the urinary system,
but the court held that the question asked only about the urinary bladder, adding that even
if the question were treated as referring to the urinary system, persons not familiar with
medical terminology "might well never connect this with trouble from the prostrate gland."
245 Ark. at 857 n.3, 435 S.W.2d at 783 n.3.
154. See Union Life Ins. v. Davis, 247 Ark. 1054, 449 S.W.2d 192 (1970) (representation
that one is in "good and sound health" not false if made in the justifiable belief that he is
free of symptoms which should cause reasonable apprehension of disease materially affecting the risk, though chancellor's finding of falsity upheld). See also Old Republic Ins. Co. v.
Alexander, 245 Ark. 1029, 436 S.W.2d 829 (1969) (representation of freedom from "heart
trouble"; though application called for answer to the "best of your knowledge and belief,"
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ment for voidability of an insurance contract on grounds of
misrepresentation. It is probable as well that the courts will continue to look beyond the literal meanings of assertions of fact by
applicants for insurance and will construe them in the light of the
insurers' assumed purposes for seeking information. 5 5 By these
techniques, it is possible to conclude that misrepresentation defenses
fail, without the necessity of wrestling with the complexities of section 275.
5. Abolition of Requirement of FraudulentIntent
Assuming that there has been a misrepresentation, omission,
concealment of fact, or incorrect statement within the scope of section 275(1) (the single term misrepresentation will hereafter be used
for the sake of brevity), it "shall not prevent a recovery under the
policy or contract unless either" of several conditions is met. Since
one of these is that the misrepresentation be fraudulent and the
other requirements, stated disjunctively, do not use the term fraudulent or any equivalent expression, it seems clear that section 275
does away with the major obstacle to a successful misrepresentation
defense under pre-Code law, the requirement that any non-warranted misrepresentation have been made with awareness of its falsity and intent to deceive. And so it has been held. 6
opinion for court appears to take position that representation would be interpreted as statement of opinion even in absence of such language in the insurer's question). But see National Old Line Ins. Co. v. People, 256 Ark. 137, 506 S.W.2d 12 (1974) (opportunity to so
construe representation of "good health" passed up). American Family Life Ins. Co. v.
Reeves, 248 Ark. 1303, 455 S.W.2d 932 (1970), discussed in text supra at note 137, is not
contra, as it rules (erroneously, it is believed) that there need be no misrepresentation at all.
In other states with similar statutes this seemingly obvious proposition has not uniformly been accepted. See discussion of Florida, Georgia and Oklahoma cases, infra note
156. Butsee Dean v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 96 Idaho 772, 536 P.2d 1122 (1975); Lentz v.
Prudential Ins. Co. ef America, 164 Mont. 197, 520 P.2d 769 (1974); and later Florida cases
discussed in note 156 infra.
155. See Interstate Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Ellinberg, 242 Ark. 596, 414 S.W.2d 857
(1967), where the court accepted the argument of the plaintiff, in an action to enforce a
policy of life insurance, that the insurer could not escape liability on the basis of answers
given in the application to questions regarding prior ailments and medical treatments, if the
ailment not disclosed was a "mere temporary, trifling or unimportant affliction," although
judgment on a verdict for plaintiff was reversed, at least partly because the evidence showed
treatments for ailments that were not merely temporary, trifling, or unimportant.
156. American Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Turman, 254 Ark. 456, 495 S.W.2d 866 (1973);
Life & Cas. Ins. Co. of Tenn. v. Smith, 245 Ark. 934, 436 S.W.2d 97 (1969). The conclusion
was not reached without some difficulty. This effect of the statute was overlooked in Continental Cas. Co. v. Campbell, 242 Ark. 654, 414 S.W.2d 872 (1967), and Dopson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 244 Ark. 659, 426 S.W.2d 410 (1968), reached the conclusion by a
circuitous route. A passage in the opinion for the court in Marshall v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
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Logically, the converse appears equally clear: a fraudulent but
253 Ark. 127, 484 S.W.2d 892 (1972), suggests that fraudulent intent is required, but its
meaning is difficult to pin down because the report of the case does not indicate what questions were asked by the insurer nor what statements the applicant and his wife made to the
soliciting agent.
In most other states with similar statutes in which the question has been considered, it
has been decided the same way, though sometimes with surprising effort.
In Florida a conflict of lower appellate court decisions was resolved by the supreme
court in 1967 with a ruling that neither intent to deceive nor knowledge of the falsity of
representations made in an application for insurance was essential to preclude recovery on
the policy. Indeed, the court, by indicating approval of a Second District Court of Appeals
decision, Douglas v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 191 So. 2d 483 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966), appeared to say that its ruling would be applicable even to an answer to a question calling for
an answer to the best of the applicant's knowledge. Life Ins. Co. v. Shiffiet, 201 So. 2d 715
(Fla. 1967). However, the Florida court appears to have receded from the extreme position
that a statement of opinion made in good faith can be ground for avoidance. National
Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Permenter, 204 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1967) (concurring opinion of Ervin, J., approved by a majority of the justices). See Hyman v. Life Ins. Co. of N. America,
481 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1973); Garwood v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of United States,
299 So. 2d 163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
In Georgiaalso, lower appellate court decisions requiring knowledge of falsity of representations to be shown in order to avoid a policy for misrepresentation by the applicant were
repudiated by the supreme court, the court declaring that the statute renders material misrepresentations grounds for avoidance even if the representations are made in good faith.
United Family Life Ins. Co. v. Shirley, 242 Ga. 235, 248 S.E.2d 635 (1978). The case involved representations which appear to have been statements of opinion only, and the case
thus appears to take the position that such statements may be grounds for avoidance if the
opinions are erroneous and the matters to which they relate are material, even though the
opinions are expressed in good faith. See also Mercer v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 283 F. Supp.
873 (M.D. Ga. 1967) (good faith and lack of knowledge of falsity immaterial even where
applicant makes representations "to the best of my knowledge and belief").
Any requirement that material misrepresentations of fact be fraudulent has been rejected in Maryland, Hofman v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 400 F. Supp. 827 (D. Md.
1975); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. McBriety, 240 Md. 738, 230 A.2d 81 (Ct. App. 1967); in
Montana, American Indem. Co. v. Elespuru, 302 F. Supp. 878 (D. Mont. 1969); and in South
Dakota, Shepard v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 437 F. Supp. 744 (D.S.D. 1977). As to Idaho,
see Wardle v. International Health & Life Ins. Co., 97 Idaho 668, 551 P.2d 623 (1976), which
assumes that there is no such requirement.
The Oklahoma cases, on the other hand, appear to insist on knowledge of falsity, or at
least reason to know of it. Brunson v. Mid-Western Life Ins. Co., 547 P.2d 970 (Okla. 1976);
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 416 P.2d 935 (Okla. 1965). These cases seem to be
influenced by an unexamined assumption that the statute precludes any distinction between
statements of fact and expressions of opinion. The only Utah case to address the question is
Burnham v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 24 Utah 2d 277, 470 P.2d 261 (1970), where it is flatly
asserted that false representations do not provide a defense unless they were knowingly
made with intent to deceive, but the statement is made on the basis of holdings under an
earlier and differently worded statute.
Arizona cases also require that representations be fraudulent in order to be grounds for
avoidance, but the Arizona statute, though superficially resembling those of Arkansas and
the other states mentioned above, is significantly different, in that the three subparagraphs
are not set forth disjunctively in Arizona; consequently they have, quite understandably,
been construed as setting up cumulative requirements. Smith v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins.
Co., 107 Ariz. 112, 483 P.2d 527 (1971). The requirement of fraud has been watered down,
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non-material misrepresentation makes the contract voidable.' 57 The
term fraudulent is not defined in the Insurance Code but seems
likely to be construed as referring to the pre-Code idea of a representation made with knowledge of its falsity, or at least indifference
to its truth, and with intent to deceive the insurer. It has been urged
that statutes of other states using the terms fraudulent and material
in the alternative should not be taken literally, the argument being
that a misrepresentation that does the insurer no harm should not
justify avoidance merely because it was made with deceptive intent." 8 The force of this argument varies, however, with the test
used to determine the materiality of the misrepresentation. If the
test employs an individual insurer standard,'59 asking what the actual insurer would have done if it had known the truth, it is difficult
indeed to justify a rule that a misrepresentation which is not material by this test gives the insurer a defense if it was fraudulently
made, for the insurer would presumably be unable to demonstrate
reliance on the representation in these circumstances. On the other
hand, the prudent insurer standard 6° determines materiality on the
basis of the prevailing practices of insurers generally, and it is conceivable that the actual insurer could be induced to issue a policy by
a misrepresentation which was not material by this test. In such a
case, if the false representation were made with intent to deceive the
insurer, since it accomplished the desired result, it is not difficult to
accept the conclusion that the party seeking to uphold the validity of
the policy should not be heard to argue that the insurer's reliance
was unreasonable because other insurers would not have relied.
The light that these observations shed on the correct reading of section 275(1) of the Arkansas Insurance Code cannot be assessed,
however, until the Code's treatment of materiality is explored.
6. Materiality of Misrepresentation
In the absence of fraud, section 275(1) provides that misrepresentation shall not prevent a recovery under the policy or contract
unless it is either:
however, by a construction that "legal fraud" (knowledge of the truth, without intent to
deceive) suffices. Marine v. Allstate Ins. Co., 12 Ariz. App. 229, 469 P.2d 121 (1970); Continental Cas. Co. v. Mulligan, 10 Ariz. App. 491, 460 P.2d 27 (1969).
157. See Life & Cas. Co. v. Smith, 245 Ark. 934, 436 S.W.2d 97 (1969) (dictum).
158. See E. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW § 84 (2d ed. 1957); R. KEETON,
BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 6.5(c)(1) (1971).
159. See text at notes 67-69 supra.
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(b) Material either to the acceptance of the risk or to the hazard
assumed by the insurer; or (c) the insurer in good faith would
either not have issued the policy or contract, or would not have
issued a policy or contract in as large an amount or at the same
premium or rate, or would not have provided coverage with respect to the hazard resulting in the loss, if the true facts had been
made known to the insurer as required either by the application
for the policy or contract or otherwise.
It will be noted that paragraph (b) employs the word material
without defining it, although it indicates that materiality may be
tested by its relevance to acceptance of the risk or to the hazard
assumed by the insurer. That different tests of materiality are contemplated is evident from the wording, "material either to . . . or
. . . ." The difference between these two applications of material
has been considered under similarly worded statutes of other states.
A leading authority has suggested that materiality to the hazard assumed by the insurer involves an objective test of the bearing of the
fact misrepresented on an insurer's decision to accept the risk, in
other words a prudent insurer test of materiality, while materiality
to the acceptance of the risk could imply either an individual insurer
or a prudent insurer test, but that since the statutory wording contemplates different tests, the phrase material to the acceptance of the
risk should be understood as adopting an individual insurer test as
an alternative to the prudent insurer test, the insurer thereby being
enabled to establish materiality either by reference to industry standards or by proof of its own higher standards. 6 '
There is little need to wrestle with the question whether material to the acceptance of the risk in paragraph (b) of the Arkansas
statute adopts an individual insurer standard of materiality, since
paragraph (c) in effect spells out an individual insurer test of materiality. The more important question is whether paragraph (b) authorizes use of a prudent insurer test as an alternative to the individual
insurer test, as it appears to do.16 2 Some support for this interpretation can be found in Arkansas cases, though there has been no dis161. See E. PATTERSON, supra note 158, § 73 at note 128, and § 83 at note 105.
162. This position appears to have been taken in Idaho, under a statute worded much
like Arkansas's. Industrial Indem. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Cos., 93 Idaho 59,
454 P.2d 956 (1969). See also Wardle v. International Health & Life Ins. Co., 97 Idaho 668,
551 P.2d 623 (1976). Maryland and South Dakota cases support this view as well. Shepard
v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 437 F. Supp. 744 (D.S.D. 1977); Hofmann v. John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 400 F. Supp. 827 (D. Md. 1975); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. McBriety, 246
Md. 738, 230 A.2d 81 (Ct. App. 1967); Herdman v. National Reserve Life Ins. Co., 87 S.D.
389, 209 N.W.2d 364 (1973).
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cussion of the distinction. In Union Life Insurance Co. v. Davis, 163
where the court was reviewing a chancellor's decree for specific performance by the insurer of a contract of credit life insurance, and
the decree was reversed, the court found that a representation of the
insured in the application for the policy that he was in "good and
sound health" was false, and, further, that the misrepresentation satisfied section 275(1)(b) as concealing facts which would "materially
affect the hazard assumed by the insurer."' 64 The court appeared to
take judicial notice of the materiality of the misrepresentation,
which suggests
that an objective test of materiality was being em165
ployed.
This reading of paragraph (b) does not resolve the problem of
whether a fraudulent but non-material misrepresentation is sufficient to make a policy voidable. Where the individual insurer test of
materiality is used, it seems that it should not, but it would be appropriate under a prudent insurer test, if the insurer can prove actual reliance on the misrepresentation. The answer most consistent
with the statutory language would be that a fraudulent non-material
misrepresentation can be grounds for avoidance, regardless of the
test of materiality used, but that it is not grounds for avoidance unless the insurer proves actual reliance on the misrepresentation.
Section 275 does not speak of reliance, but it should be regarded as
silent on the necessity of reliance rather than as negating it by implication. 166 The section does not purport to be a complete codification
of the law of misrepresentation in procurement of insurance, even as
to the types of insurance within its scope; 67 it limits itself to laying
down some rules to change or clarify specific features of the prior
law. A requirement that the insurer prove reliance on the misrepresentation, in addition to its materiality, was recognized in prior Arkansas law, as well as in the law of other states, 68 and there is
163. 247 Ark. 1054, 449 S.W.2d 192 (1970).
164. Id at 1060, 449 S.W.2d at 195.
165. See also American Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Turman, 254 Ark. 456, 495 S.W.2d 866

(1973), and the cases dealing with the good faith requirement in paragraph (c), discussed in
the text infra at notes 172-175.

166. See the concurring opinion of Justice Smith in Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Alexander,
245 Ark. 1029, 1043, 436 S.W.2d 829, 837 (1969).
167. Similar statutes in other states have been treated as either incorporating a reliance
requirement or allowing it to be added to the statutory requirements. Unionmutual Stock
Life Ins. Co. of America v. Wilkerson, 367 So. 2d 964 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978); World Ins. Co.
v. Posey, 227 So. 2d 67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Fecht v. Makowski, 172 So. 2d 468 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Morris v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 143 Ga. App. 617, 239
S.E.2d 187 (1977).
168. See text at notes 80-84 supra.
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nothing in section 275 to suggest legislative intention to abolish the
reliance requirement. Retention of the requirement should prevent
an insurer which has not been harmed by a fraudulent misrepresentation from using it as a defense to liability.
Paragraph (c) of section 275(1) is essentially a spelling out of an
individual insurer, "would" test of materiality,' 69 though it is not
free of problems of interpretation. The significance of the concluding words, "as required either by the application for the policy or
contract or otherwise," has already been discussed. 170 A second
problem is the meaning of the reference to good faith: "The insurer
in goodfaith would either not have issued the policy or contract
....

"

Good faith is another undefined term in the Insurance

Code, and its use in other statutes sometimes carries a meaning of
purely subjective honesty, while at other times it includes an objective element of reasonableness. 17 1 Its meaning in Insurance Code
section 275(l)(c) is not obvious.
A probable explanation for the inclusion of the good faith qualification can be found in the nature of the test of materiality involved. The question to be answered is a hypothetical one: what
would the insurer have done if it had known facts it did not actually
know when it issued the policy in suit? The burden is on the insurer
to prove that it would not have issued the policy, at least not on the
same terms. 172 Should it be enough to sustain this burden for the
insurer to produce testimony of an underwriting official of the company that the policy would not have been issued or would have been
issued on different terms, or should the insurer be required to prove
that it has followed a consistent practice that would normally lead to
rejection of the application or to offering a policy on terms varying
from those of the policy applied for? The former would open the
door to establishment of a misrepresentation defense by evidence
that might well reflect capricious judgment on the part of the insurer
and is hardly a satisfactory basis for answering a hypothetical question of such importance. What is needed is convincing evidence of
169. See text at notes 68-69 supra.
170. See text at notes 137 and 147 supra.
17 1. For example, the Uniform Commercial Code in its general provisions defines good
faith as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned," ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-120(19) (1961), but for the purpose of the article on sales of goods, "'Good faith' in the case
of a merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards
of fair dealing in the trade." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-2-103(l)(b) (1961).
172. American Family Life Assurance Co. v. Reeves, 248 Ark. 1303, 455 S.W.2d 932
(1970); Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Catterson, 247 Ark. 263, 445 S.W.2d 109 (1969); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 245 Ark. 1029, 436 S.W.2d 829 (1969).
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consistent practice by the insurer, to provide a solid basis for an
inference as to what the insurer would have done in circumstances
that did not exist. The Arkansas cases applying section 275 have
clearly taken this attitude. 73 Viewed in this light, the good faith
requirement of paragraph (c) has an objective requirement of consistency of practice by the individual insurer.
However, the Arkansas Supreme Court has found more in the
good faith requirement. In Lfe & Casualty Insurance Co. v.
Smith 174 Justice Brown noted that paragraph (c) does not use the
word material but does require good faith on the part of the insurer,
and commented, "If the matter omitted or incorrectly stated could
logically have no bearing on the assumption of the risk then it could
not be successfully argued that the insurer's 'good faith' defense
should prevail."'' 75 In that case it was held that the insurer had produced sufficient uncontradicted evidence to establish a defense
under section 275(1)(c), and a judgment on a verdict for the plaintiff
for recovery under the policy was reversed and the case dismissed. 176
In the subsequent case of American Family Life Assurance Co. v.
Reeves 177 Justice Brown's observation in Smith was picked up and
treated as a requirement that the insurer, to establish a defense
under section 275(l)(c), prove materiality to the risk. The action
was one to recover on a group cancer policy covering the plaintiff
and his wife, the wife having died of cancer after issuance of the
policy, and it resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff. In the course
of the trial the court refused to admit the testimony of a soliciting
agent of the defendant who had the duty of explaining the group
policy to the members of the group to be insured and of forwarding
their applications to the insurer. The insurer (according to Justice
Holt, writing for the supreme court) 178 made an offer of proof by the
173. See, e.g., Combined Ins. Co. of American v. Yates, 253 Ark. 963, 490 S.W.2d 134
(1973); Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Catterson, 247 Ark. 263, 445 S.W.2d 109 (1969); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 245 Ark. 1029, 436 S.W.2d 829 (1969). This is not to say,

however, that such proof will always be required; in some cases the materiality of a misrepresentation has appeared so clear that the court took judicial notice of it. See American
Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Turman, 254 Ark. 456, 495 S.W.2d 866 (1973); Union Life Ins. Co. v.
Davis, 247 Ark. 1054, 449 S.W.2d 192 (1970).
174. 245 Ark. 934, 436 S.W.2d 97 (1969).
175. Id at 937, 436 S.W.2d at 99.

176. Id at 939, 436 S.W.2d at 100.
177.

248 Ark. 1303, 455 S.W.2d 932 (1970).

178. Justice Fogelman, dissenting, understood the offer of proof differently. Id at 1312,
455 S.W.2d at 938.
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agent that the agent had been directed not to send to the home office
any application with an affirmative answer to either of two questions (which had been answered negatively, and arguably falsely, in
the plaintiffs application). The court held that the proferred testimony was admissible, apparently as tending to show that the insurer
would not have provided coverage for the plaintiffs wife if it had
known the truth, and the exclusion of the evidence was held to be
prejudicial error. However, the court observed that the offer of
proof was "deficient as to materiality" with regard to one of the two
questions to which the testimony related. The question was whether
any member of the family group to be insured had ever had, to the
knowledge of the applicant, "lumps, growths or swellings," and the
insurer's evidence had been found sufficient to show that the wife
had had a growth of which the applicant had knowledge. Justice
Holt wrote, "In order to prevail in its subsection (c) defense, appellant must show that the growth was material to its risk,"'

9

and then

quoted Justice Brown's observation in the Smith case. The implication appears to be that in order to establish a defense under section
275(l)(c) the insurer must show, not only that if it had known the
truth it would not have issued the same policy, but also that its decision would have been a reasonable one, and presumably reasonableness would be judged by application of a prudent insurer
standard.
If that is the proposition for which Reeves stands, the third subparagraph in subsection (1)of section 275 is regarded by the Arkansas court as combining a prudent insurer test of materiality with an
individual insurer test, the insurer being required to satisfy both
tests to make out a defense. However, that reading is quite inconsistent with the second subparagraph of the same subsection, which, as
has been shown, permits the insurer to defend by establishing materiality either way. A reading of good faith which limits its objective
requirement to proof of consistent practice by the individual insurer
supporting its contention that it would have behaved differently if
the truth had been known does not nullify the law laid down in
paragraph (b).
7. Is a Causal Connection Test Incorporated?
A question that has proved highly troublesome has been
whether, after a loss within policy coverage has occurred, the insurer
can avoid liability for benefits payable under the terms of the policy
179. Id at 1309, 455 S.W.2d at 936.
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by proof of a material misrepresentation where the fact concealed
by the misrepresentation was not a cause of the loss for which benefits are sought. Prior to the 1959 Insurance Code, the Arkansas law
was not clear on this matter. 180 Does section 275 clarify the law?
The cases have vacillated in their response.
The first case to consider the issue was Dopson v. Metropolitan
Life InsuranceCo. '8 This was an action against the insurer for specific performance of a hospitalization policy, in which the chancellor
found that the insured, when he applied for extension of the coverage of the policy to include his wife, had made a misrepresentation
concealing the fact that his wife had suffered from back trouble, and
that the misrepresentation was material to the risk. On appeal the
plaintiff argued that the decree in favor of the insurer was improper
because no causal connection had been shown between the back
trouble concealed and the back trouble that led to the hospitalization for which policy benefits were sought. The plaintiff relied on
' as
the pre-Code case of Inter-Ocean Casualty Co. v. Huddleston 82
holding that such causal connection was required. The court responded that "our holding in the Huddleston case has been modified
to the extent that a recovery will be denied where the 'omissions' or
'incorrect statements' are such that the company would not have
provided coverage with respect to the hazard resulting in the loss
had it known the true facts."' 18 3 (The insurer had introduced evidence that if it had known of the wife's prior back trouble, it would
not have extended coverage to her without an exclusion of benefits
for back trouble.) The decree denying relief to the plaintiff was affirmed. 84 The Dobson case thus definitely rejected a causal-connection requirement, and based its rejection on section 275(l)(c) of the
Insurance Code.
In a case decided later the same year, Reserve Life Insurance
Co. v. Baker,'85 the court appeared to reverse itself. An action to
enforce a hospital and surgical expense policy resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff. The insurer contended on appeal that the policy was voidable because the insured had given a negative answer to
a question asking whether he had, within the previous five years,
received medical or surgical treatment. He had in fact been treated
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

See text at note 79 supra and cases discussed in note 79.
244 Ark. 659, 426 S.W.2d 410 (1968).
184 Ark. 1129, 45 S.W.2d 24 (1932), discussed in note 79 supra.
244 Ark. at 662, 426 S.W.2d at 411.
Id at 858, 435 S.W.2d at 783.
245 Ark. 853, 435 S.W.2d 780 (1968).
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within that period for low back pain on one occasion and for dizziness, sore throat and nasal congestion on another. The court rejected the insurer's argument on the ground that the answer made
by the applicant for the insurance, "though not correct, was not a
material misrepresentation, because appellee had not, within the last
five years, consulted the physician about the difficulty which occasioned the operation [for which policy benefits were sought]."'' 8 6 No
authority was cited.
In the following year Old Republic Insurance Co. v. Alexander 87 was decided. Here an insurer brought suit in chancery for
rescission of a contract of personal accident insurance on the ground
that issuance of the policy had been induced by a misrepresentation
in the application for the insurance that the would-be insured had
never had heart trouble and a further misrepresentation which concealed the fact that he had undergone chest surgery. The insured
counterclaimed for policy benefits for loss of a leg by reason of an
accidental gunshot wound. The chancellor refused rescission of the
policy and granted the relief sought by the counterclaim. The
supreme court affirmed the decree, finding that the evidence did not
establish a misrepresentation of freedom from heart trouble and, as
to the alleged misrepresentation regarding prior operations, that
even if misrepresentation were assumed to have occurred, the insurer had failed to prove either the materiality of the misrepresentation under section 275(l)(b) of the Insurance Code or that it would
not in good faith have issued the policy if it had known the truth,
under section 275(l)(c). 8 8 (The insurer apparently did not contend
that the misrepresentation was fraudulent.)
Justice Smith filed a concurring opinion (joined by Chief Justice Harris, the author of the opinion for the court in the Baker
case), contending that even if the insurer had succeeded in proving a
misrepresentation of freedom from heart trouble, the judgment on
the counterclaim for policy benefits should be affirmed, because the
evidence showed that there was no causal relation between the heart
condition and the gunshot wound and ensuing loss of limb.' 89 He
argued that section 275(1) of the Insurance Code prescribes only
minimum requirements for a successful misrepresentation defense
and should not be read as meaning that every fraudulent or material
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id
245 Ark. 1029, 436 S.W.2d 829 (1969).
Id at 1042, 436 S.w.2d at 836.
Id at 1043, 436 S.W.2d at 837.
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misrepresentation prevents recovery, and that the court could add a
requirement, where actual loss within policy coverage had occurred
prior to the insurer's attempt to avoid the contract, of a demonstration that the fact misrepresented was a cause of the loss. He asserted, further, that such a requirement should be imposed, to avoid
encouraging ex postfacto litigation and unjust enrichment of insurers. If the insurer could avoid liability for a loss by showing a material misrepresentation having no connection with the loss, the
insurer could "repudiate the policy whenever a loss occurred but
.. .pocket the premiums with impunity when the policy proved to
be of no value to the insured or his beneficiaries."'' 90 Justice Smith
could not believe the legislature intended such a result. He distinguished the Dopson case since in that case the claim was for hospitalization due to back trouble, and the misrepresentation had related
to prior back trouble: "Hence the necessary causal connection between the misrepresentation and the loss was shown to exist."' 9'
The Alexander decision was followed by two cases in which a
causal-connection requirement seemed to be assumed. In Marshall
v. PrudentialInsurance Co. of America'92 a chancery court decreed
rescission of a hospitalization insurance policy covering a husband
and wife and rejected the insureds' claim for policy benefits, on a
finding of material misrepresentation in procurement of the policy.
Affirming the decree, Chief Justice Harris noted that the record
showed that the application had failed to reveal that the wife had
suffered "female disorders," but he considered that "further discussion of these ailments is not required since the hospitalization [for
' 93
which policy benefits were sought] was occasioned by phlebitis."'
In American PioneerLife Insurance Co. v. Smith 194 an applicant for
credit life insurance represented that he was in good health, and
undisputed evidence was produced at trial that the applicant/insured had suffered from and been hospitalized for diabetes
mellitus and remained on medication for it until his death. The evidence established also that the insured had had a heart attack which
resulted in his retirement, and that he continued to see his doctor
regularly and to take three different medications for the heart condition until he died. Reversing a judgment for the plaintiff in an action on the policy, the court found misrepresentation and
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 1044, 436 S.W.2d at 838.
Id at 1044-45, 436 S.W.2d at 838.
253 Ark. 127, 484 S.W.2d 892 (1972).
d at 128, 484 S.W.2d at 893.
255 Ark. 949, 504 S.W.2d 356 (1974).
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materiality as a matter of law, observing with regard to materiality:
"Not only did the expert testify that the policy would not have been
issued had the true facts been correctly stated but the autopsy reports [sic] shows the immediate cause of death as congestive heart
failure."' 195
The causal connection requirement was finally given intensive
consideration in 1974, in the case of NationalOld Line Insurance Co.
v. People,196 and won the approval of the majority of the court. Justice Smith, the author of the concurring opinion advocating the requirement in the Alexander case, 197 now spoke for the majority of
the court in declaring it to be the law.
The case involved credit life insurance. Mr. and Mrs. People
bought a car, promising to pay some $5,000 of the price in 36 installments, and the husband obtained, through the car dealer, a policy of
insurance on his own life for the amount of the debt. The application and policy were combined in a single document, and the policy
became effective at once, though by its terms it could be rejected by
the insurer within 30 days. Although no specific question was asked
of People about his health, he was required to sign the application,
which contained a printed declaration that he was in good health. 198
People died about nine months after the policy was issued, and
his wife made no further payments on the installment purchase contract. When the finance company holding the contract brought suit
against her for the unpaid balance of the debt, Mrs. People crosscomplained against the credit life insurer to enforce the policy. The
insurer denied liability on the ground that People had obtained the
policy by a false and fraudulent statement that he was in good
health. At trial there was undisputed evidence that People was not
in good health when he applied for the insurance; he was being
treated for diabetes and high blood pressure and both of these conditions had existed for at least four years. The evidence, however,
did raise a question of fact whether these ailments were contributing
causes of his death, which was attributed in the death certificate to
kidney disorders, his doctor having testified that there was no indication of kidney ailments until well after the date of issuance of the
policy. 199 Judgment was rendered on a verdict in favor of Mrs. People, and the insurer appealed, contending that it was entitled to a
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id at 950, 504 S.W.2d at 357.
256 Ark. 137, 506 S.W.2d 128 (1974).
245 Ark. 1029, 436 S.W.2d 829 (1969).
256 Ark. at 137-38, 506 S.W.2d at 128.

199. This, at any rate, was asserted to be so in the recital of the facts in the opinion for
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directed
verdict or judgment n.o. v. for want of any genuine issue of
fact. 2°°
The judgment was affirmed. Though the undisputed evidence
showed that People was not in good health when he applied for the
insurance, the jury might have found that People acted in good faith
in signing the application, and the jury could have found that People's death was not caused by either the diabetes or the high blood
pressure he had at the time of the application. In answer to the
insurer's argument that under section 275 of the Insurance Code
there need be no causal connection between a matter misrepresented
in the application for the insurance and the ultimate cause of the
death of the insured, Justice Smith wrote: "We do not so interpret
the statute upon which the appellant relies.""'' After reviewing nine
prior cases decided under the Insurance Code, and finding that none
of them had passed on the issue raised by the insurer, he concluded
that the question of statutory construction was an open one, and
further, that the common law authorities on the issue were rendered
irrelevant by the Insurance Code, which "was a comprehensive revision of our law in that field and is to be interpreted according to the
usual principles of statutory construction.

'2 2

Justice Smith then de-

clared it to be "our conclusion that, under the Code, the insurer
must show a causal relation between the applicant's misrepresentation and the eventual loss. '"2°3 He found that paragraph (c) of sec-

tion 275(1) to some extent carries that implication:
"The insurer in good faith.

. .

would not have provided cover-

age with respect to the hazard resulting in the loss, if the true
facts had been made known." Thus, it would be a defense to the
insurer, in a back injury case, to show that if the applicant had
disclosed a history of back trouble it would have excepted that
hazard from the policy. In fact, that was precisely the insurer's
proof in the Dopson case, .

.

. where the insurer prevailed by

offering proof that "it would not have issued the rider without an
exclusion relative to Mrs. Dopson's back." Yet if Mrs. Dopson's
claim had been for a broken leg, an exclusion of coverage with
respect to her back would not have afforded the insurer a defense
to the claim. 2 4
the majority of the court. Justice Byrd, dissenting, thought differently. See discussion in
text following note 204 infra.
200. 256 Ark. at 137-38, 506 S.W.2d at 128-29.
201. Id at 140, 506 S.W.2d at 129.
202. Id at 141, 506 S.W.2d at 130.
203. Id
204. Id at 141-42, 506 S.W.2d at 130-31.
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The opinion also asserted that "[flairness and reason support
the view that a causal connection should be essential,

20 5

since a

contrary rule would make possible a successful denial of liability by
an insurer on a showing that the insured was suffering from diabetes
when he made his representation of good health, even though his
death was caused by a stroke of lightning or by being run over by a
car. And these considerations of fairness were considered "especially pertinent to a credit life insurance policy like the one before
206

US."

This was a short-time policy, to remain in force for only three
years. The company made no medical examination of the applicant, relying upon him either to refuse to sign the application if
he was not in good health.

. .

or to "clip a note" to the applica-

tion, explaining his health condition. The appellant had the burden of proving its affirmative defense, but it made no effort to
show that the automobile salesman who took People's application made any explanation of the printed form or of the significance of the representation of good health. If People had lived
for three years the insurer would have sustained no loss. In the
circumstances it is plainly unjust to permit the company to deny
liability on the basis of a misrepresentation that had no connection with People's death (or so the jury might have found) and
that would have provided no defense to the insurer if the policy
had excluded coverage for loss resulting from the undisclosed ailments.2 o7
Chief Justice Harris filed a concurring opinion in the People
case, 2 0 8 agreeing that under the Insurance Code the insurer must
show a causal connection between misrepresentation and loss, and
advising credit life insurers that if they want to avoid liability on
policies procured by fraud, they would do well to ask specific questions of their applicants calling for information which could not be
misrepresented without fraud.
Justice Byrd filed a strong dissent. 20 9 He took issue with the

majority's interpretation of the law, arguing that, (1) the majority
opinion cited no authority for its construction of Insurance Code
section 275 as requiring a causal connection between misrepresentation and loss, (2) although in some states there are statutes expressly
205. Id at 142, 506 S.W.2d at 131.

206.
207.
208.
209.

Id
Id
Id at 143, 506 S.W.2d at 131.
Id at 144, 506 S.W.2d at 132.
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requiring such causal relation, every state with a statute similar to
Arkansas' had construed it as not so requiring, (3) the textwriters
were unanimous that materiality of a misrepresentation does not depend on causal connection between it and any loss that might occur,
(4) section 275 of the Insurance Code had made it possible for life
insurance to be economically written without the expense and delay
of requiring a medical examination of the insured, a relatively short
incontestable clause being required 21 1 to "prevent the seeming injus-

tice that would arise when an individual has paid premiums for a
considerable time and during which time the insurer has had the
benefit of the premiums," 2 1 ' (5) in most litigation it is debatable
whether the fact misrepresented contributed to the loss, and "logic
and reason would dictate that we should not be in the position of
quibbling over whether a misstatement contributed to the loss involved in an insurance contract,

' 21 2

and (6) the majority's interpre-

tation of the statute was not just "because it will increase the
premium rate of life insurance to the honest insured to the bounty of
those who misstate the facts in making their applications-for after
all life insurance is an actuarial business based upon the business
written not necessarily the life of every individual.

' 21 3

Finally, Jus-

tice Byrd was of the opinion that even if the causal connection requirement were accepted, the testimony21 4of the plaintiff's own
witnesses established such causal relation.

The reasoning of the opinion for the court in the People case is
interesting, especially since its author shifted from his reasoning in
Alexander,21 5 that section 275 of the Insurance Code does not deal
with the causal connection question but that such a requirement
should be imposed as a matter of supplementary common law, to a
finding that section 275 mandates the causal connection requirement. The only language pointed to in Justice Smith's opinion in
People as supporting his conclusion is a portion of paragraph (c) of
210. The statute provides in pertinent part:
There shall be a provision that the policy (exclusive of provisions relating to disability benefits or to additional benefits in the event of death by accident or accidental means) shall be incontestable, except for nonpayment of premiums, after it has
been in force during the lifetime of the insured for a period of two (2) years from
its date of issue.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3304 (1980).
211. 256 Ark. at 147, 506 S.W.2d at 133.
212. Id
213. 256 Ark. at 148, 506 S.W.2d at 134.
214. Id
215. See text notes 187-189 supra.
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section 275(1): "The insurer in good faith.

. .

would not have pro-

vided coverage with respect to the hazard resulting in the loss if the
true facts had been made known . .

,216 Even this he considered

to carry that implication only to some extent.21 7
Whatever tendency the language emphasized by Justice Smith
in paragraph (c) of section 275(1) may have, when lifted out of context to suggest a requirement that a misrepresented fact has contributed to the loss for which policy benefits are sought, fades when the
paragraph is read as a whole. The statute provides that misrepresentations
shall not prevent a recovery under the policy or contract unless
(c) The insurer in good faith would either not have issued the
policy or contract, or would not have issued a policy or contract
in as large an amount or at the same premium or rate, or would
not have provided coverage with respect to the hazard resulting
in the loss, if the true facts had been made known ....218

That the insurer would not have provided coverage for the hazard
causing the loss is only one offour possible actions the insurer might
have taken, if the truth had been known, that will satisfy the test of

the paragraph, and it is difficult indeed to see that a causal connection is impliedly required by any of the others.
Moreover, the Arkansas Supreme Court stands alone in finding
a causal connection requirement in this type of statute. In none of
the seventeen other states that have enacted statutory rules governing misrepresentations in terms closely resembling section 275(1)
of the Arkansas Insurance Code2" 9 has the statute been construed as

incorporating such a requirement, 220 and cases in at least three of
216. 256 Ark. at 140, 506 S.W.2d at 130.
217. 256 Ark. at 141, 506 S.W.2d at 130.
218. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3208(1)(c) (1980) (emphasis added).

219.

ALA. CODE

§ 27-14-7 (1975);

ALASKA STAT.

§ 21.42.110 (1962);

DEL. CODE ANN.,

tit. 18, § 2711 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.409 (West 1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-2409
(1977); IDAHO CODE § 41-1811 (1977); Ky.REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.14-110 (Baldwin 1971);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2411 (1964); MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 374 (1979);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 40-3713 (1961); NEV. REV. STAT. § 687B.110 (1979); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3609 (West 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 58-11-44 (1978); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 31-19-8 (1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3736 (1970); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-

6-7 (1975); Wyo. STAT. § 26-15-111 (1977). The principal differences among these statutes
are in the types of insurance to which they apply, most having broader application than the
Arkansas statute.
220. A Puerto Rican statute closely resembles subsection (1) of § 275 of the Arkansas
Insurance Code, but adds: "when the applicant incurs in [sic] any of the actions enumerated
in paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) of this section, the recovery shall only be prevented if such
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these jurisdictions have rejected that reading. 22 '
Viewing paragraph (c) as a whole, it appears 222 to be a detailed
statement of the individual insurer "would" test of materiality of
misrepresentation, adding up to a general rule that a misrepresentation is material if the insurer, had it known the truth, would either
have refused to insure at all or would have offered a policy on terms
differing from the terms of the policy for which the insured applied.
Yet the language singled out by Justice Smith in People does suggest
that something more is involved. For the insurer to establish a defense under this wording, when a claim on the policy has already
arisen, the insurer must show not merely that knowledge of the truth
would have led it to provide more restricted coverage, but also that
the coverage provided would not have included "the hazard resulting in the loss." Justice Smith seems to have read the quoted phrase
as meaning "the hazard causing the loss." Another possible reading,
however, is "the type of hazard causing the loss." This reading
would be consistent with such cases as Dopson,223 where the insurer
established a defense under the statute by proof that if it had known
the truth about Mrs. Dopson's back trouble, it would have excluded
benefits for back trouble from the coverage of the policy, even
though the insurer demonstrated no causal connection between Mrs.
Dopson's prior back trouble and that which gave rise to the claim
under the policy. If this reading is correct, it in effect calls for reformation of the policy, that is, enforcement of the obligation the insurer would have been willing to assume if it had not been misled as
to material facts.
That inference suggests a legislative purpose which can be consistently applied to all the fact variations mentioned in paragraph
(c), a purpose to modify the drastic pre-statutory effect of material
misrepresentation (as making the contract voidable) by substituting
a rule that the insurer should be held to the terms of the contract it
would have been willing to make if it had known the truth. Thus, if
the insurer shows that knowledge of the truth would have led it to
actions or omissions contributed to the loss that gave rise to the action." P.R.

LAWS ANN.

tit.

26, § 1110 (1976).
221. Georgia, Bourne v. Balboa Ins. Co., 144 Ga. App. 55, 240 S.E.2d 261 (1977) (implication); Jessup v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 117 Ga. App. 389, 160 S.E.2d 612 (1968); Maryland,
Fitzgerald v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 527 (D. Md. 1979); Hofmann v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 400 F. Supp. 827 (D. Md. 1975); Serdenes v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 21 Md. App. 453, 319 A.2d 858 (1974) (dictum); Oklahoma, Vaughn v. American Nat'l

Ins. Co., 543 P.2d 1404 (Okla. 1975).
222. See text at note 167 supra.
223. 244 Ark. 659, 426 S.W.2d 410 (1968). See text at note 176 supra.
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insure in a smaller amount, its liability on the policy should be limited to that amount; and if the insurer shows that, had it known the
truth, it would have charged a higher premium, recovery under the
policy should be reduced by the amount of the additional premiums
the insurer would have received. Only where the insurer proves that
it would not have issued a policy at all if it had known the true facts
should it have a complete defense to liability.
This reading of the statute serves to guard against the sort of
injustice that advocates of the causal connection requirement fear,
and it does so without going to the unnecessary extreme of requiring
proof that a fact concealed by misrepresentation was an actual cause
of loss to the insured. It cannot be regarded as unfair to the insurer,
since it holds the insurer only to the terms of the contract it has
shown that it would have been willing to make if it had had the
correct information, and it prevents the person guilty of misrepresentation from gaining advantage from it. The contract is reformed
to eliminate the distortion of its terms caused by the misrepresentation, without depriving the policyholder of protection he paid for
and which the insurer would have been willing to provide for such
payment.
It may be objected, of course, that this sort of reformation
amounts to holding the applicant for the policy to a contract different from that for which he applied, and one he may not have been
willing to accept if it had been offered to him. That is quite true, but
the remedy here is used to accomplish a restitutionary purpose: prevention of the unjust enrichment of the insured or his beneficiaries
as a result of the insurer having been induced by misrepresentation
to enter into the contract that was actually made.
It may be objected also that provision of the remedy of reformation in this context is contrary to established principles of equity
jurisprudence. It must be conceded that precedent is sparse,"' but if
224. The traditional use of reformation has been to correct mistakes in reducing oral
agreements to writing. In cases of fraudulent misrepresentation regarding the contents or
effect of a writing, reformation might be employed to give the defrauded party benefits as
represented. Both the original and the revised Restatements of Contracts would limit refor-

mation for misrepresentation to such cases. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 491, 505
(1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 308, Comment a (Tent. Draft No. 11,
1976). McClintock found authority for reformation of the terms of a written contract to

correct distortions resulting from fraud in the inducement, H.

MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF
THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 100 (2d ed. 1948), but other writers have questioned the reliability of these precedents, see D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 9.5
(1973); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9-35 (2d ed.

1977), and even McClintock appeared to assume that the remedy was not appropriate for
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the remedy is called for by the statute no case law precedent is necessary.
The most serious criticism of this reading of the statute questions the reading's legitimacy as statutory construction. The courts
of other states having statutes closely resembling section 275(1) of
the Arkansas Insurance Code have been no more inclined to find a
generalized reformation principle implied by the third paragraph
than they have been to discern a causal connection requirement in
its language. Moreover, if the paragraph incorporates a reformation
principle, a problem is posed whether the insurer could avoid it by
relying on the second paragraph, which requires only a finding that
the misrepresentation be "[m]aterial either to the acceptance of the
risk, or to the hazard assumed by the insurer. ' 225 While a showing
of materiality to the acceptance of the risk could be regarded as invoking the third paragraph as well as the second, proof of materiality to the hazard 2assumed
could be made without invoking the third
26
paragraph at all.
No reading of section 275(1) has been found that neatly reconciles all of its wording, but any sound reading must recognize the
stubborn fact that an insurer seeking to establish a defense under the
statute by showing that, if the truth had been known, it would have
issued a policy with more restricted coverage than the one actually
issued must show also that the restriction of coverage would have
excluded the hazard resulting in the loss, if a loss has occurred. If
this is not a causal connection requirement, it is essentially a direction to treat the contract as reformed to afford the coverage the insurer would have been willing to provide if it had not been misled.
And if this treatment of material misrepresentation is appropriate
where the misrepresentation led to issuance of a policy of broader
coverage than otherwise would have been issued, it seems equally
appropriate for cases where the insurer has been induced to issue a
policy in a larger amount or at a lower premium. Certainly nothing
in paragraph (c) forbids that course; if it does not imply that the
reformation device is to be employed whenever the insurer bases its
defense on paragraph (c), it is at least silent on the point, and such
cases of innocent misrepresentation. H. MCCLINTOCK, supra; see D. DOBBS, supra. The

arguments for such sharp limitation of the reformation remedy appear to be based on an
assumption that restoration of the status quo ante is possible through rescission and restitu-

tion, which is not true where a loss within insurance policy coverage has already occurred.
225.

ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3206 (1980).

226. See text at notes 161-164 supra.
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application of the statute would be in order, to achieve consistency
of results.
Extension of the reformation device to cases where the insurer
relies on paragraph (b)'s test of materiality to the hazard assumed is
of more questionable propriety. However, the statute does not affirmatively provide that by demonstrating materiality to the hazard
assumed the insurer necessarily establishes a complete defense. If
the proof is that a prudent insurer, had it known the truth, would
have issued a policy with narrower coverage than the one actually
issued, there is nothing in the language of paragraph (b) to preclude
the court from inquiring whether the narrowed coverage would
have excluded liability for a loss that actually occurred before the
misrepresentation defense was asserted, and denying recovery only
if that loss would have been excluded. Application of paragraph (b)
in parallel fashion to paragraph (c) would promote consistency in
handling misrepresentation cases, and would be desirable for the
same reasons of policy which apply to cases falling under paragraph
(c).
It is not possible to determine the applicability of this reading
of the statute to the facts of the People case, because the report of
the case does not indicate what proof the insurer offered to establish
the materiality of the misrepresentation. Presumably, this aspect of
the evidence was considered irrelevant to the issues raised by the
appeal. The case thus appears to hold that under section 275 a
causal connection between misrepresentation and loss is required in
every case in which an insurer seeks to avoid liability for a loss that
has already occurred on grounds of misrepresentation (at least, if
the misrepresentation is not fraudulent). Although the opinion for
the court does indicate that the public policy arguments for the requirement are "especially pertinent" 227 to credit life insurance issued without medical examination, with little practical opportunity
afforded to the applicant to make full disclosure of his state of
health, and without an explanation being given to him of the terms
of the application and their significance, it would be a strained reading of the opinion to treat its holding as limited to a class of policies
so narrowly defined, since the opinion asserts that section 275 imposes the requirement of causal connection, and no distinction is
drawn in that section between credit life insurance and other forms
of life insurance.228
227. 256 Ark. 137, 142, 506 S.W.2d 128, 131 (1974).
228. Id at 141,506 S.W.2d at 130. See also Southern Security Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 259

UALR LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4:17

While this writer finds it difficult to accept the conclusion that

section 275 of the Insurance Code incorporates a causal connection
requirement, there remains the possibility of such a requirement being imposed in some or all cases as a matter of supplementary common law. As Justice Smith originally argued in his concurring
opinion in the Alexander case, 22 9 the statute is not a complete codification of the law of misrepresentation in procurement of life and
disability insurance and annuity contracts. There is some reason,
however, to infer that the section impliedly rejects a causal connection rule. At the time the Insurance Code was adopted in Arkansas,
there were a few 230 states in which such a rule had been adopted
explicitly by statute, one of them being the neighboring state of Missouri, whose statute dates back a century. 23' The Arkansas General

Assembly thus had available models of clear causal connection legislation which it could have followed if such a requirement had been
desired. Its decision to employ a different formulation of the law,
one which falls far short of giving clear approval to a causal connection rule, arguably implies rejection of such a rule.
If section 275 is considered to be entirely silent on the matter,

however, the advisability of adding it by decision is debatable. Justice Smith's policy argument, in both Alexander and People, focuses
on the need to prevent unjust enrichment of insurers, but the effectiveness of a causal connection requirement to achieve this purpose
is dubious. As Justice Byrd suggested in People,2 3 2 the burden initially cast on insurers by the rule is not likely to remain with them,
for premium rates will be adjusted to absorb the added cost; the
Ark. 853, 537 S.W.2d 542 (1976), rejecting an argument that credit life insurance should be
treated as a special category, not subject to Insurance Code § 275.
229. See text at notes 188-189 supra.
230. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-418 (1973) (life insurance); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 376.580,
377.340 (Vernon 1968) (life insurance); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 2515 (West 1976) (life,
accident and health insurance issued by limited stock companies); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-4-10
(1979) (life insurance). But see United States Nat'l Life & Cas. Co. v. Heard, 148 Okla. 274,
298 P. 619 (193 1) (suggesting that Oklahoma statute merely reduces warranties of the truth
of statements to representations). See also TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 6.14 (Vernon 1963)
(requiring showing that "breach or violation ... of any warranty, condition or provision of
any fire insurance policy, contract of insurance, or applications therefor, upon personal
property" be shown to have contributed to the destruction of covered property).
231. See Whitmore v. Supreme Lodge Knights and Ladies of Honor, 100 Mo. 36, 13
S.W. 495 (1890). The Kansas statute goes back to 1907, see Becker v. Kansas Cas. & Sur.
Co., 105 Kan. 99, 181 P. 549 (1919); that of Oklahoma to 1923, see United States Nat'l Life
& Cas. Co. v. Heard, 148 Okla. 274, 298 P. 619 (1931); Rhode Island's to 1902, see Leonard
v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 27 R.I. 121, 61 A. 52 (1905); and the Texas statute to 1913,
see Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Finegold, 183 S.W. 833 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
232. See text at note 213 supra.
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ultimate burden will thus probably be borne, in major part, by policyholders who have made no material misrepresentations at all. A
concern to avoid unduly harsh treatment of those who have misled
insurers without fraud is certainly legitimate, but the reformation
device outlined above seems more likely to accomplish the objective
without unjust enrichment of insurers and also without casting an
additional burden on the policyholders in general.
C. Section 275(1)-Related Matters
That section 275(1) does not provide a complete body of substantive law governing representations made to procure insurance,
even as to the types of insurance within its coverage, is evident from
the foregoing discussion.
The pre-Code doctrine that a misrepresentation does not render
the policy procured by it voidable unless the representation is substantially untrue 233 does not appear to be repudiated by the statute.
While, before the enactment of the Insurance Code, this doctrine
appeared to have little real significance in Arkansas law, 2 34 it may
acquire a new importance now that the pre-Code requirement of
fraudulent intent has been removed. A case or two decided under
the Code may point in this direction.
In OldAmerican Lfe Insurance Co. v. McKenzie23 5 an applicant
for medical expense insurance answered a question in the application about his medical history by revealing a disc operation, giving
its date and the name of the surgeon, and asserting that there had
been a complete recovery, but he failed to reveal that two subsequent spinal fusion operations had been performed. The court rejected the insurer's contention that the omissions made the policy
voidable, reasoning that the application had provided the insurer
with sufficient information to enable it to learn of the subsequent
operations by inquiry of the insured's physician. The court declared
that the insured had "substantially met all burdens imposed upon
him in his relations with defendant under his contracts of insurance."2'3 6 The pre-Code case of Missouri State Life Insurance Co. v.
Wit 237 was cited as precedent; that case was similar on its facts and
the court there said simply that the applicant had supplied the in233. See note 14 supra.
234. See text at note 63 supra.
235. 240 Ark. 984, 403 S.W.2d 94 (1966).

236. Id at 987, 403 S.W.2d at 96.
237.

161 Ark. 148, 256 S.W. 46 (1923).
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surer 38with enough evidence to give it the opportunity to investi2
gate.
PyramidLife Insurance Co. v. Garrison239 went beyond McKenzie. An applicant for a hospital, surgical and medical expense policy represented in 1963 that she had had no medical or surgical
advice or treatment within the preceding five years, but she revealed
that in August of 1949 she had had her left kidney removed by a
doctor in Arizona with no complications. The insurer sought cancellation of the policy on the ground that the denial of medical treatment within the five years preceding the application was false, and it
produced evidence that in 1957 the insured had been diagnosed as
suffering from granular urethritis and that she had been treated for
that condition by two Arkansas physicians in 1957, 1958, 1959, 1960,
1962, 1964 and 1965, the treatments in 1964 and 1965 being the basis
of her claim for policy benefits. The chancellor ruled that the insured had made full disclosure, and the supreme court held the finding not against the preponderance of the evidence since the
application for the policy had disclosed urinary problems and a kidney removal and had given the name and address of the physician
who had attended her in 1949. McKenzie was cited as presenting a
similar situation, but one wonders if it could safely be assumed that
inquiry of the Arizona physician would have led to the insurer's discovery of the subsequent treatments in Arkansas.
The scope of the insurer's duty to investigate, in order to learn
facts not disclosed by the applicant for insurance, has never been
given much exposition in the Arkansas cases, nor has the source of
the duty. It may well be that the cases just described are better accounted for as involving the concepts of waiver and estoppel, the
unexpressed rationale being that the insurer will be charged with
knowledge of facts it could have learned before issuance of the policy by following leads given by the applicant or otherwise available
to the insurer. The insurer's issuance of the policy with such imputed knowledge could lead to the conclusion that it waived any
misrepresentation of those facts, or that the insurer is estopped from
using such misrepresentation as a defense. 2"
Section 275 of the Insurance Code does not appear to preclude
resort to waiver and estoppel,24 I and the pre-Code cases invoking
238.
239.
240.
241.
bling §

See note 63 supra.
241 Ark. 101, 406 S.W.2d 334 (1966).
See text at notes 46, 47 and 62 supra.
This has been assumed in cases governed by statutes of other states closely resem275(1) of the Arkansas Insurance Code. See Wardle v. International Health & Life
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these doctrines should remain viable precedents. Continental Casualty Co. v. Campbell242 supports this view. The insured under a
health and accident insurance policy testified that he told the insurer's soliciting agent that he had been hospitalized for a short time
the previous year (1960) and had been told by his physician that he
had Asian flu, but that the agent had replied that such hospitalization was insignificant and the agent had filled in a "no" answer to an
application question asking whether the applicant had been medically treated or hospitalized within the past five years. The insurer
introduced evidence that the physician who treated the insured in
1960 had diagnosed fibrocystic disease of the left lung and advised
the insured of the diagnosis.243 Upholding a judgment in favor of
the insured, the supreme court relied on McKenzie2 " for the principle that the insurer cannot complain of the applicant's failure to reveal a prior ailment when the applicant has disclosed information
which would enable the insurer to learn of the illness by its own
investigation. The court cited Southern National Insurance Co. v.
Heggie,245 a pre-Code case, as authority for treating the knowledge
of the insurer's soliciting agent as the knowledge of the company
and as a basis for estoppel against the insurer to set up the falsity of
the answer in the application as a defense.
One of the most recent Arkansas decisions involving Insurance
Code section 275 may be thought of as bypassing the section by
resorting to waiver or estoppel, although the decision is not explained in those terms, and it raises more questions than it answers.
In FordLife Insurance Co. v. Jones,2' Lamar Jones, the buyer of a
pick-up truck, purchased through the truck salesman a policy of
credit life insurance from Ford Life Insurance Company. Jones told
the salesman that he had suffered a heart attack three years previously and was still under a doctor's care, but he then signed the
insurer's printed form, which served both as application for and certificate of insurance, his signature being made beneath a bold-face
"Health Statement" which declared that he was, to the best of his
knowledge and belief, in good health. A ruling against the insurer
on its misrepresentation defense was upheld by the supreme
Ins. Co., 97 Idaho 668, 551 P.2d 623 (1976); McLane v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 150 Mont. 116,
432 P.2d 98 (1967); Vaughn v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 543 P.2d 1404 (Okla. 1975).
242. 242 Ark. 654, 414 S.W.2d 872 (1967).
243. Id at 657, 414 S.W.2d at 874.
244. 240 Ark. 984, 403 S.W.2d 94 (1966).
245. 206 Ark. 196, 174 S.W.2d 931 (1943).

246. 262 Ark. 881, 563 S.W.2d 399 (1978). See Comment, 32 ARK. L. REv. 397 (1978).
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Noting that the printed form Jones signed provided no
space for qualification of the statement of good health, the court, in
an opinion by Justice Hickman, asserted that, "Such a statement on
such a form should not be used as a defense when, in fact, it is undisputed that there was no misrepresentation or fraudulent statement. ' 248 The company's argument that the salesman who sold the
insurance was merely a soliciting agent whose knowledge could not
be treated as the insurer's was answered with the observation that
"[sluch a situation places an unrealistic burden on an insured which
can only result in a decided advantage enuring to the benefit of the
company. '249 Finally, as to the application of Insurance Code section 275, the court said:
We limit our decision to the facts in this case. We are not
unmindful that a strong argument can be made that we are making a decision that flies in the face of our previous decisions and
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 66-3208 (Repl. 1966). However, in the final
analysis it is our duty to see that the law enables people to have a
fair decision after their day in court and undoubtedly our decision in this case cannot be characterized otherwise.2 5 °
court.

Three justices dissented, deploring the majority's failure to attempt to reconcile the decision with the statute and prior cases. Justice Smith, in an opinion joined by Justice Fogleman, argued that
prior cases, holding that under section 275 a false statement of good
health in an application for a policy, if material, provides the insurer
with a defense within the period of contestability,25 ' governed the
case under consideration. He insisted that Jones' explanation of the
state of his health to the salesman was irrelevant, since the salesman
was merely a soliciting agent for Ford Life and the knowledge of
such an agent is not imputable to his principal, nor does such an
247. Judgment was given on a verdict in favor of Jones's widow against the insurer for
the amount owed on the pick-up truck, statutory penalty and attorney's fees. The supreme
court reversed the judgment for error in awarding the amount due under the policy to the
insured's widow, rather than to the finance company to whom the debt had been assigned,
and for error in assessing statutory penalty and attorney's fees, but the court rejected the
insurer's argument that it was not liable on the policy at all because of misrepresentation in
its procurement. 262 Ark. at 883-86, 563 S.W.2d at 400-02.
248. Id at 886, 563 S.W.2d at 402.
249. Id
250. Id Chief Justice Harris filed a concurring opinion, calling attention to his opinion
in National Old Line Ins. Co. v. People, discussed in text at notes 206-207 supra, and commenting: "I reiterate that specific questions which certainly called for specific answers
would have prevented this situation." Id at 888, 563 S.W.2d at 403.
251. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 245 Ark. 934, 436 S.W.2d 97 (1969), and Dopson v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 244 Ark. 659, 426 S.W.2d 410 (1968) were cited.
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agent have authority to waive the insurer's requirement of a certifi252
Juscate of good health as a condition to issuance of the policy.
tice Byrd, in a dissenting opinion of his own (also endorsed by
Justice Fogleman) agreed with Justice Smith that the case was
within section 275 of the Insurance Code and that the insurer could
not be affected by the conduct of the truck salesman, a soliciting
agent for the insurer, but he added the suggestion that even if the
salesman had been a general agent, his knowledge should not be
attributed to the insurer in a case such as this, where the applicant
for the policy should realize that the insurer will be deceived by the
application as completed.253
One can only guess at the effect this decision will have on future cases, since the opinion for the court expressly acknowledges
that it may be inconsistent with the statute and the cases decided
under it but offers no justification except that the court should see to
it that people "have a fair decision after their day in court. 254 One
can sense, in this case and others, a feeling that credit life insurers
seek an unfair advantage in their dealings with applicants for such
insurance but a frustrated inability to find doctrine in prior cases
that can legitimately be drawn upon for the protection of the insureds. 255 The problem of finding appropriate legal doctrine to

eliminate the perceived unfairness is rendered more intractable by
the failure of the opinions to identify with precision the factual elements in the marketing of credit life insurance which produce the
unfairness. 6
252. 262 Ark. at 889, 563 S.W.2d at 402.
253. Id

at 891, 563 S.W.2d at 405.

254. Id

at 886, 563 S.W.2d at 402.

255. Though Justice Smith dissented in Jones and he wrote for the court in rejecting a
contention that credit life insurance should be treated as a special category in Southern
Security Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 259 Ark. 853, 537 S.W.2d 542 (1976), he too has shown
impatience with credit life insurers.
256. Justice Smith's discussion in People, quoted in text at note 207 supra, points to: (1)
the short-term character of the policy, (2) its nonmedical character, (3) the failure of the
insurer to provide space on the application form for qualifications of the printed representation of good health, (4) the absence of proof that the salesman explained the application
form, and in particular the representation of good health, to the applicant, (5) the absence, in
the particular case, of causal connection between misrepresented fact and loss. Chief Justice
Harris, in his concurring opinion in People emphasizes the ambiguity of the declaration of
good health, the ease with which it can be answered incorrectly in good faith, and the desirability of insurers asking specific questions calling for precise factual information. In the
Jones case he found those observations pertinent to a case where it does not appear that the
applicant even thought himself to be in good health. 256 Ark. at 143, 506 S.W.2d at 131.
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D. Section 275(2)
The second subsection of Insurance Code section 275 provides
that in any action in which the insurer proves a misrepresentation
with respect to a medical impairment, if the other party to the action
"shall prevent full disclosure and proof of the nature of the medical
impairment, the misrepresentation shall be presumed to have been
material. ' 257 The subsection is evidently intended to relieve the
hardship on insurers that had resulted from the interaction of the
traditional rule that the burden is on the insurer to prove all of the
elements of a misrepresentation defense 25 8 and the statute treating
confidential communications between doctors and patients as privileged.25 9
This portion of section 275 seems of minor significance, for it
does not come into play until after the insurer has proved a misrepresentation, and for purposes of proof of misrepresentation the privileged communication rules are not relaxed by the statute. In the
pre-Code cases in which insurers complained of being stymied by
the privileged communication rules, those rules prevented the insurers from proving either the falsity or the fraudulent character of the
insureds' representations. 26 The greatest contribution made by the
Insurance Code toward lightening the insurers' burden is probably
the elimination, under subsection (1) of section 275, of a need to
prove that misrepresentations were made with fraudulent intent. 6
E. Other Insurance Code Provisions

In addition to section 275, the Insurance Code contains a
number of other sections which have, or may have, relevance to
257. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3208 (1980).
258. See note 87 supra.
259. See note 42 supra.
260. American Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Edenfield, 228 Ark. 93, 306 S.W.2d 321 (1957);
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Owen, 111 Ark. 554, 164 S.W. 720 (1914).
261. Subsection (2) of Insurance Code § 275 has figured in only one decision to date. In
American Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Turman, 254 Ark. 456, 495 S.W.2d 866 (1973), it was

invoked in support of a holding that the insurer was not precluded from defending under
paragraphs (b) and (c) of subsection (1)by the fact that it pleaded only the defense offraudulent misrepresentation, the reasoning being that the misstatement became primafacie material when the plaintiff prevented medical proof of fraudulent intent by invoking the
physician-patient privilege. This ruling was at best an alternative holding, since the court
placed primary reliance on the proposition that it would take judicial notice that cancer of
the stomach of 29 months duration is material to the risks involved in writing a nonmedical
policy of life insurance for one-year term. It is unclear from the opinion why either of these
findings made affirmative pleading of paragraphs (b) and (c) of § 275(1) unnecessary, except
that an Alabama case had made an analogous holding. Two justices dissented.
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cases involving misrepresentation in the procurement of insurance.
For example, the incontestability and age adjustment clauses which
operated, under pre-Code law, to limit misrepresentation defenses
when the insurers included such clauses in their policies, 262 assume

increased importance under the Code because they are required
terms in many policies.26 3 There are also a number of Code provisions which operate either as implied limitations of the rules of section 275264 or to create procedural obstacles to a successful
misrepresentation defense. 265 Detailed treatment of most of these
provisions does not seem called for, as none has figured prominently
in litigation thus far, and most seem unlikely to do so in the future.
Age adjustment clauses, however, may pose new problems in
view of the modification of misrepresentation law embodied in section 275. As has been indicated,2 6 6 the cases prior to the enactment

of the Insurance Code, employing common law reasoning, treated
fraudulent misrepresentation of age as grounds for avoidance of the
policy if the misrepresentation was material, despite the inclusion in
the policy of a provision for adjustment of the amount of insurance
in the event that an insured's age had been misstated. The reason262. See text at notes 98-105 supra.
263. As to required incontestability clauses, see ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-3304 (life insurance, other than group and industrial), 66-3317 (annuity contracts, other than group), 663406 (industrial life insurance), 66-3510 (group life insurance), 66-3605 (disability insurance,
other than group) (1980). There are some variations in detail among these provisions. See
also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3324 (1980), dealing with incontestability of reinstated life policies and annuity contracts, other than group. (Forerunners of these sections were 1949 Ark.
Acts 248, § 2(2), requiring two-year incontestability clauses in policies of group life insurance, and 1951 Ark. Acts 394, § 3(A)(2), prescribing three-year clauses for policies of individual accident and sickness insurance. See also 1951 Ark. Acts 394, § 7.)
Age adjustment clauses are required, in varying terms, by ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-3306
(life insurance, other than industrial and group), 66-3319 (annuity contracts, other than
group), 66-3407 (industrial life insurance), and 66-3513 (group life insurance) (1980). (Prior
to the Insurance Code, 1949 Ark. Acts 248, § 2(5) had required an age adjustment clause in a
policy of group life insurance.)
264. For example, §§ 374 and 420 of the Insurance Code applicable to group life and
group disability insurance contracts respectively, reduce the scope of § 275 by making certain representations unavailable to the insurers by way of defense unless they are in writing
and copies have been given to the persons making the representations or their beneficiaries,
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-3511, -3702 (1980); the chapters dealing with individual policies
have no comparable requirements. Insurance Code chs. 14, 15 & 17; ARK. STAT. ANN. tit.
66, chs. 33, 34 & 36 (1980).
265. See, e.g., Insurance Code § 274 which declares the application for any life or disability insurance policy or annuity contract (other than industrial life insurance) inadmissible
as evidence "in any action relative to such policy or contract, unless a true copy of those
portions of the application signed by the applicant were attached to or otherwise made a part
of the policy or contract when issued." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3207 (1980).
266. See text at note 102 supra.
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ing was that the fraud made the whole contract voidable. Innocent
misrepresentation, on the other hand, did not affect the validity of
the policy2 67 (unless it was the subject of a warranty). The age ad-

justment clause, if the policy included one, therefore gave the insurer a partial defense where, except for the clause, it would have no
defense at all. Now, under the Insurance Code section 275(1), a
non-fraudulent but material misrepresentation can be grounds for
avoidance of the policy by the insurer. 268 Does it follow that a nonfraudulent but material misrepresentation of age can justify avoidance of a policy which is required by the Insurance Code to include
an age adjustment clause? The question almost answers itself. To
treat section 275 as authority for avoidance of the policy would be
virtually to nullify the portion of the statute requiring the age adjustment clause by depriving the clause of nearly all practical effect;
it would be operative only to the extent that the insurer chose to rely
on it rather than on section 275. The probability is that the age
adjustment clause requirements were designed at least as much for
the benefit of policyholders and their beneficiaries as for the protection of insurers, and to give effect to that purpose the age adjustment
provisions should be treated as creating implied exceptions to the
more general rule of section 275.
A somewhat more difficult question is whetherfraudulent misrepresentation of age can be treated under the Insurance Code as
making a policy voidable if the policy is one required by the Code to
include an age adjustment clause. It would not deprive the statutory
requirement of virtually all effect to allow the insurer to avoid the
policy in this case, for the age adjustment clause could still be applied in favor of the policyholder or beneficiary in cases of innocent
misrepresentation. The question is whether the statutory prescriptions of age adjustment clauses should be treated as intended to
overrule the common law doctrine permitting avoidance for fraudulent misrepresentation, whether or not the policy contained an age
adjustment clause. There is much to be said for a reading that such
overruling is intended. First, it is consistent with the wording of the
statutory passages mandating inclusion of age adjustment clauses;
they make no express distinction between fraudulent and nonfraudulent misstatements of age. Second, to treat such clauses as
controlling would avert prejudice to insurers as a result of misrepresentations of age without imposing on policyholders or beneficiaries
267. See text at notes 17 and 87 supra.
268. See text at note 156 supra.
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a forfeiture of all benefits. Third, the only purpose allowing avoidance of the contract could serve would be to punish perpetrators of
fraud for their misconduct, but in cases of life insurance, to which
most of the statutory requirements of age adjustment clauses apply, 269 that punishment would be more likely to fall on innocent
beneficiaries than on the guilty parties.27 ° Giving the age adjustment clause requirements literal effect substitutes a satisfactory reformation remedy for the more drastic remedy of rescission in cases
of misrepresentation of age.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study is to assess the impact of the Arkansas Insurance Code of 1959 on the law of misrepresentation in procurement of insurance. Though the cases decided under the Code
make it clear that the statute, particularly its section 275, has worked
change, they do not present a neat and consistent picture of the
dimensions of the change. To a substantial degree the uncertainty is
attributable to the drafting of the statute; it is hardly a model of
clarity, and Arkansas is not the only jurisdiction whose courts have
had trouble with statutory language of the sort found in section 275.
Nevertheless, the Code's language can be made to yield better guidance than has thus far emerged and, it is believed, produce more
satisfying results, with increased attention to two familiar principles
of statutory construction: (1) that particular words and phrases
should be read in the light of the context in which they appear, 27 '
and (2) that insight into legislative purpose and probable meaning
can often be gained from a study of the history of the law with
which the statutory language deals.272 This article has ventured to
suggest some solutions to problems of interpretation and application
that have surfaced in the cases, or seem likely to, primarily by reliance on these techniques.
269. See note 263 supra.
270. In all of the cases involving age adjustment clauses cited in notes 102-105 supra, the
contests were between insurers and beneficiaries or assignees of policies, the persons who
had made the alleged misrepresentations having died. Of course, where annuity contracts
are involved, the weight of the penalty could more often be made to fall on the perpetrator
of the fraud.
271. Compton v. State, 102 Ark. 213, 143 S.W. 897 (1912). See Shinn v. Heath, 259 Ark.
577, 535 S.W.2d 57 (1976); John B. May, Co. v. McCastlain, 244 Ark. 495, 426 S.W.2d 158
(1968).
272. J.L. McEntire & Sons, Inc. v. Hart Cotton Co., 256 Ark. 937,511 S.W.2d 179 (1974).
See Terral v. Terral, 212 Ark. 221, 205 S.W.2d 198 (1947).

